



**DEN NORSKE
ATLANTERHAVSKOMITE**
THE NORWEGIAN ATLANTIC COMMITTEE

Security Policy Library

3-2015

OPENING SPEECH AT THE LEANGKOLLEN CONFERENCE

Erna Solberg

PROSPECTS FOR NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Alexander Vershbows



Foto: Thomas Haugersveen/
Statsministerens kontor

Prime Minister of Norway
Ms Erna Solberg



NATO Deputy Secretary General
Ambassador Alexander Vershbow.

Published by: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee
Editor: Audun Reiby
Printed by: Hegland Trykk AS, Flekkefjord
ISSN: 0802-6602

For more information, visit our website: www.dnak.org

Opening speech at the Leangkollen conference

By Prime Minister Erna Solberg

Ladies and gentlemen, Peace and security are of fundamental importance to a free society. What particularly worries me about today's new security challenges is that they are posing a threat to the fundamental democratic values we uphold:

- Our belief in international law.
- Universal human rights.
- The rule of law.
- Free trade.
- Cooperation.
- Freedom of speech.

Today, we are witnessing fundamental divisions in terms of ideology, interests, values and world views, on a scale we have not seen since the end of the Cold War. These divisions are becoming increasingly evident in many areas, and recently we have seen them clearly in two contexts:

- Russia's aggression and violations of international law in Ukraine, and
- ISIL's brutal onslaught in Syria and Iraq.

These two challenges dominated our international agenda in 2014. Although they are very different, they have one thing in common. They are both diametrically opposed to our fundamental values.

So far, 2015 has started out on a grim note:

- Russia is continuing and intensifying its policy of destabilisation in Eastern Ukraine.
- The terrorist attack against the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris stands out as another horrifying example of the increasing reach of terrorism.

Last week, I took part in the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Auschwitz. This was a stark reminder of the horrors of our European history, which also has relevance today.

We are experiencing how an ideology of hatred and extremism can transcend borders, and threaten security in the heart of Europe.

We are also seeing other serious and alarming trends. Nationalist

forces in Europe are gaining strength. At a time when international cooperation is needed more than ever, we are seeing faith in multilateral solutions diminishing.

Globalisation has lifted millions out of poverty and increased trade, which has benefitted us all. But globalisation also brings with it its own set of challenges:

- Climate change.
- Migration and growing numbers of refugees from wars and conflicts.
- The threat of global pandemics.
- Greater vulnerability to financial crises.
- And links between terrorism, organised crime and cyber-crime.

Now that the threats and challenges we face are global, our responses must be based on cooperation and a common platform – of interests and values.

We have seen some clear trends emerging over the past year. Security challenges have become more serious. And they are now closer to home.

Ladies and gentlemen,

Let me start with the challenges closest to home.

The collapse of communist rule in Eastern Europe marked the dawn of a new security environment in Europe; a European continent characterised by low tension and new partnerships. The old East–West divide was replaced by the vision of a united continent, founded on liberal ideas and the principles of human rights and democracy.

To a great extent our vision has come true. Former foes have become friends and allies. Countries previously under the thumb of repressive regimes are now part of a European community of democracies. But now - this development has come to a halt. We hoped that all of Europe – Russia included – would eventually embrace a liberal democratic model.

We have gradually had to accept that, unfortunately, this is not the case.

- Russia's commitment in 1999 to pull its troops out of Moldova by 2003 was never met.
- Russian troops still remain in parts of Georgia after the invasion in 2008.

- In Russia itself, human rights are being violated, and the space for civil society and opposition in the country has been substantially reduced.

One of the main challenges we are facing today is a Russia that is more assertive on the international stage. Its military actions in Ukraine have altered the security situation in Europe. Russia's illegal annexation of Crimea is without precedent in Europe since the end of the Second World War. Its destabilisation campaign in Eastern Ukraine is continuing. Propaganda, indirect interventions and maintaining deniability are key elements of Russia's approach.

Although the threat remains low, we are seeing increased military activity along NATO's borders and around the Baltic Sea. Allied and non-allied countries alike have experienced border violations.

Norway will maintain a predictable and stabilising military presence in the High North.

Russia's actions in Ukraine have caused legitimate concerns in several other countries. The Russian concept of 'spheres of influence' is especially worrying for neighbouring countries with Russian-speaking minorities – some of which are among our eastern NATO allies.

Every country has the right to decide its own future. The principle of sovereignty is enshrined in international law. We will not accept the Russian concept of 'spheres of influence'.

In response to Russia's actions in Ukraine, Norway stands firmly together with our partners and allies. We have implemented the EU's restrictive measures against Russia. Our military-to-military cooperation has been suspended.

We cannot and will not compromise when universal values are at stake.

At the same time, Russia is still a neighbouring country. We have common interests and common tasks that have to be addressed. Together with Russia we must manage our living marine resources; protect the environment and ensure safety at sea in Arctic waters.

Regional people-to-people cooperation should be encouraged, even in difficult times.

Over the past 25 years, Norway and Russia have gradually expanded our contacts and cooperation based on mutual interests and international law. Tensions have been reduced and trust has been built. However, Russia's actions in and around Ukraine have undermined these positive developments.

We have to be realistic. The current crisis in Ukraine is not a temporary one, and there is no quick fix. We want Russia to be a real partner for the EU and NATO. Russia's actions make this harder to attain. We will continue to work to resolve the current challenges in our relations with Russia.

At the same time we need to be prepared for a situation that may last a long time.

Let me now turn to our southern borders. The security challenge posed by instability in the region south of NATO's borders is very different from those emanating from the east. The 'belt of insecurity' that stretches from the Sahel through the Middle East is of profound and fundamental concern.

Despite geographical differences, many of the developments we are seeing in this belt of insecurity are the same:

- Failed states are providing safe havens and breeding grounds for terrorists.
- Poverty and feelings of exclusion are making young people easy targets for extremist ideas.
- And there is a lack of effective and inclusive political leadership.

The Arab Spring in 2011 created hopes of democracy and increased cooperation in the Arab world. These hopes have not yet been realised, except, perhaps, in Tunisia.

ISIL's rapid advance and capture of territory inside Iraq and Syria took many by surprise. We have been shocked and appalled by their acts of cruelty.

For nearly four years, a bloody conflict has raged in Syria. What started off as young people demonstrating against a dictator has turned into a proxy war in which regional powers support different parties in a brutal civil war.

The Security Council has failed to agree on a course of action that could have stopped the bloodshed at an earlier stage and possibly reduced the potential for ISIL's growth. As political leaders, we must take responsibility for the consequences when the international community fails to act.

Norway has responded to the Iraqi appeal for help in the fight against ISIL. We are getting ready to deploy soldiers to assist in capacity-building. We are part of a broad international coalition consisting of more than 60 countries. Iraqi ownership is vital, as is regional support and engagement.

The situation in the Middle East and North Africa has clear security implications for Europe, as the recent terrorist attack in France so horrifically showed us.

Let me now turn to how we intend to meet these challenges.

Firstly, we need to invest in our own security. We need to ensure that we have the right capabilities to meet the broad range of current and future security challenges.

Many of the challenges I have described cannot be solved with military means alone. A holistic approach is needed.

In hindsight, experience has shown that it might be difficult to achieve success with military means alone. The international community must often show long-term commitment when agreement is reached on intervention. Libya is one example of this. This could be a lesson to be learned for future situations.

Violence born of religious extremism is one case in point. More than 15 000 foreign fighters have travelled to Syria and Iraq, including 3000 from Europe.

We have recently launched a new action plan to counter radicalisation and violent extremism. We must promote tolerance and prevent marginalisation. We must build a strong and inclusive society. Let us invest in education and encourage critical thinking to combat extremism. We also need stronger international cooperation between intelligence services and police to stop the flow of foreign fighters.

We have launched a number of initiatives aimed at improving coordination between different government entities, for example in the area of counter-terrorism. Norway has established a joint counter-terrorism centre, enabling our domestic and foreign intelligence services to share information and produce joint threat assessments.

Cyberspace allows us to communicate, cooperate and prosper. But it has also brought upon us new and alarming threats and vulnerabilities, from states and non-state actors alike. Norway will intensify its efforts to prevent and combat asymmetric threats such as cyber-attacks and organised crime. Closer international cooperation and respect for the rule of law are key to fighting transnational threats and challenges.

The military has played and will continue to play an important part in safeguarding our national security. Our highly capable armed forces are doing an outstanding job.

At the same time, we need to take a look at our defence structure and determine what further adjustments are necessary in light of the changing security environment. Reduced warning requires reduced response time. The Chief of Defence has been tasked to conduct a thorough review of our armed forces. Based on his advice, we will make decisions on further improving our military capacity and capabilities.

The changed strategic environment in Europe must have consequences for our approach to defence and security. Security comes at a cost.

We will continue to increase our defence budgets in the years to come.

Secondly, Norway is committed to engaging in international cooperation as a means of ensuring security.

NATO remains the cornerstone of Norwegian security policy. The current security situation in Europe has demonstrated the value of collective defence and collective security. In the current situation, NATO reassurance – demonstrating that we stand together – has been vital.

I would argue that in the aftermath of Ukraine the Alliance reacted effectively. At the summit in Wales we decided on measures to further increase our capabilities and ability to react quickly. NATO's Readiness Action Plan is an important roadmap. We are now more focused on collective defence and collective security. This is a development I welcome. At the same time, there are still significant security challenges emanating from outside the NATO area. Failed states outside of Europe will inevitably have an impact on our security.

Sometimes, threats must be addressed at their source.

Building collective security at home means taking collective responsibility abroad.

Also, our willingness and ability to operate together with allies and partners improves our ability to operate at home. Operations abroad are important for providing regional peace and stability, but they are also important for our national security.

The NATO operation in Afghanistan illustrated the importance and success of NATO's partnerships. We must strengthen and build on these partnerships, also after the operation in Afghanistan has ended.

The forces NATO has at its disposal are formidable. However, NATO is far more than just military hardware. No other international security organisation compares to NATO.

It is a political alliance, based on shared values. It has a permanent collective command and force structure, and a standing mechanism for political decision-making.

NATO is as relevant as ever. But we cannot take the Alliance for granted. All allies – Norway included – need to do their share. Norway has contributed significantly to reassurance measures in NATO. For instance, last autumn we deployed a company from our Telemark Battalion to exercise in Latvia. In 2015 Norway will contribute substantially to the NATO Response Force. Our forces will – together with Netherlands and Germany – test the newly-adopted Very High Readiness concept for the NATO Response Force.

Strong US leadership has been crucial in managing fundamental transitions in Europe. We are now facing another fundamental transition in Europe. I believe the need for US leadership in NATO is as great as ever. But the health of the transatlantic security relationship requires an investment from both sides. If we want the engagement of the US in Europe to be sustained, we also need to demonstrate that we are willing to invest in our own security.

Europe has been hard hit by the financial crisis, and this has taken its toll on defence budgets both in Europe and in the US.

We are seeing global shifts in power, with strong economies emerging elsewhere. This also diverts attention from Europe and our security challenges.

Over the past decade the EU has steadily increased its role in safeguarding European security. The EU has historically played a central role in providing stability in Europe, not least through integrating former Warsaw Pact countries.

As I have touched upon already, today's security challenges are complex. They cannot be met by military means alone. The EU has an important role to play in coordinating political and economic efforts to deal with security challenges.

It is in our interest to engage with the EU on these issues. Let's not forget that the outer borders of the EU are also Norway's borders. Our participation in Schengen opens the door to broader cooperation with our European partners.

We are cooperating closely with the EU on security and defence. Norway seeks to play an active part in EU efforts to develop and strengthen military capabilities.

Norway actively supports cooperation between international

organisations, particularly the EU and NATO. Our efforts carry more weight if they are coordinated.

It is important to respond once conflicts break out, and we have the tools to do so. But preventing conflicts from occurring in the first place is an even better use of our resources. Conflict and crisis prevention are important tools for international security. Building capacity is also important – ensuring that our partners have the capabilities to safeguard their own security.

It is in our interest that the UN's legitimacy and universality is respected and that the UN is able to uphold its key role in the maintenance of international peace and security. The UN is essential to our shared response to threats to international peace and security. Never before has the interdependence between the three pillars of the UN – peace and security, development, and human rights – been more obvious.

I am afraid I may have drawn a rather gloomy picture so far. But we are also seeing some developments in the right direction. My sincere hope is that 2015 will be a milestone year for development and climate. If we succeed in reaching agreement in these areas, it could have a long-term and positive impact on our security. Sustainable development and inclusive growth are prerequisites for building stable and democratic societies. We need to continue to support these positive developments.

To conclude,

We see our security increasingly being challenged. The democratic values we uphold are at risk.

Human rights. Democracy. The rule of law. Cooperation. Freedom of speech. International law. These are values we still have to fight for. They are not European or Western values. They are universal values.

To do this we need to invest in our own security. And we need to engage in international cooperation as a means of ensuring security. We must build our security – together.

Thank you.

Prospects for NATO-Russia relations

Keynote address by NATO Deputy Secretary General Ambassador Alexander Vershbow at the 2015 Leangkollen Conference, Oslo

Let me begin by saying how honored I am to speak here today after the Prime Minister, and at such an illustrious venue, the Nobel Institute. I cannot think of a more symbolic setting for a speech about NATO – one of the world's most eminent and successful peace organizations.

In the 21st century, the quest for peace remains as urgent as ever. This will certainly keep the Nobel Committee busy to recognize efforts to bring conflicts to an end. And it will keep NATO hard at work as well. Indeed NATO today is as necessary as at any time in its history – and we're fortunate to have a Norwegian at the helm.

After the watershed events of 2014, we face a new and more dangerous security environment, with threats pressing in on us from the East and from the South. We did not want this. We did not choose it. But it is the reality. And every successful strategy must be based on facts and realism, not simply on hope.

To the East, Russia has torn up the international rule book. It has returned to a strategy of power politics. It threatens not just Ukraine, but European and global security more generally. And it is pursuing this strategy even as the costs to its own prosperity and reputation grow.

To the South, violent extremism is spreading across North Africa and the Middle East. And we are seeing the consequences in the form of mass migration across the Mediterranean, foreign jihadist fighters traveling between Syria and Europe, and other terrorists, many of whom are inspired by a twisted interpretation of Islam, trying to bring bloodshed to our own streets.

So, for the first time in NATO's history, we have to look both "East" and "South." This said, the theme of this opening session is 'NATO-Russia relations,' so that is where I shall focus my remarks.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine is not an isolated incident, but a game-changer in European security. It reflects an evolving pattern of behavior that has been emerging for several years, despite our efforts to reach out to Russia and build a cooperative European security system with Russia.

Today, we must contend with a Russia that wants to go back to

a Europe based on spheres of influence and doctrines of limited sovereignty for its neighbors – policies that are a throwback to an earlier time, a time we thought we had put behind us. Russia's behavior, in short, has called into question many of the assumptions on which we have strived to build the European security order. We will have to live with its consequences for some years to come.

Russia has used force to alter legally recognized borders and to actively subvert the government of a neighboring state. Although it claims to want de-escalation and to respect Ukraine's sovereignty, its actions tell a different story.

The open, rules-based system that respects international borders, and the right of states to choose their own future, has been undermined. And yet Russia also signed up to these rules – and even helped write them – many times: in OSCE documents such as the Helsinki Final Act and the Charter of Paris, in the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and in many other international agreements. In the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, Russia explicitly guaranteed Ukraine's international frontiers in exchange for the transfer of nuclear weapons from Ukraine to Russia.

Our first reaction at NATO to Russia's actions has been one of bitter disappointment. For over 20 years, we have tried actively and consistently to make Russia a strategic partner. We made it clear that our vision of a Europe whole, free and at peace included a prominent place for Russia. In the NATO-Russia Founding Act in 1997 we pledged not to regard each other as adversaries but to work together to create a "lasting and inclusive peace".

For a while our cooperation seemed to be working. In Afghanistan, Russia helped our ISAF mission by providing training to counter-narcotics experts and the Afghan National Security Forces, and helping to maintain the fledgling Afghan Air Force's helicopter fleet. And let's not forget that our troops deployed together for several years under the NATO flag in Bosnia and Kosovo, after combining our diplomatic efforts to end those conflicts. After 9/11, Russia supported our Active Endeavour counter-terrorism mission in the Mediterranean, and we have cooperated in the Gulf of Aden on counter-piracy as well.

Russia was not a passive partner. It too brought initiatives to the table: for instance, in countering terrorism and interdicting explosives; in cooperating on airspace management over Eastern Europe; and in maritime search and rescue – to name but a few.

These examples demonstrate that NATO-Russia cooperation was seen by Moscow to be in its interests as well. It was not a zero-sum game; but a “win-win.” We were helping Russia to be more secure – not less, as Moscow now claims. And that cooperation could work again in the future – if Russia wants to be a real partner and to abide by the rules.

Yet what we have seen, especially since Putin’s return to the Presidency in 2012, is a Russia determined to go in the opposite direction: to detach itself from Europe, to assert itself in its own neighborhood, and to seek to build alternative mechanisms – such as the Eurasian Union and the BRICS group – whose *raison d’être*, at least in Moscow’s view, is defined by opposition to the West.

Even before the Ukraine crisis, Russia was backing away from the commitment it made at our Lisbon Summit in 2010 to develop a true strategic partnership with NATO and to cooperate in potentially important areas such as missile defense. Russia became less transparent about its own military activities, especially major exercises. It based these exercises on absurd scenarios of a direct threat, or even an attack from a NATO country. It stopped implementing the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, and other transparency initiatives such as the Open Skies Treaty. It showed no interest in our overtures to re-engage on nuclear and conventional arms control. Instead of more predictability and trust we now have less, even compared to the Soviet period.

Indeed, with its frequent “snap exercises,” like the one now underway in the Kaliningrad region, Moscow seems determined to surprise, shock and intimidate rather than to build confidence and predictability as it pledged to do under the Vienna Document of 1999.

And just a few weeks ago, Russia issued the latest revision of its Military Doctrine. It explicitly refers to NATO as destabilizing and a “danger” to Russia – without, I might add, giving any convincing rationale as to why or how NATO threatens Russia, or providing any justification for Russia’s aggressive behavior.

Russia’s narrative – a false narrative, let me stress – is one of a country humiliated by a West that has tried to take advantage of its weakness since the end of the Cold War. NATO enlargement has been invoked by numerous Russian and some Western commentators. But when the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe sought to join the Alliance, we made a special effort to demonstrate that

NATO enlargement would contribute to European stability, and that it was not directed against Russia. This included a series of unilateral commitments to refrain from deploying substantial combat forces or nuclear weapons in new member states. Indeed, despite Russia's aggression, we have held to these commitments.

Have we in the West made mistakes in dealing with Russia? Probably, yes. But I do not believe that our Russia policy since 1989 explains or justifies in any way Russia's current policy of confrontation with the West or its unprovoked aggression against its neighbors.

So what does explain Russia's reorientation? I believe it is domestic considerations, more than anything else. Putin fears his own "color revolution". The Maidan demonstrations, the aspiration for more democracy and for less corruption, are a threat to his own system of power in Russia – especially after he saw how the flawed Duma and Presidential elections in 2011 and 2012 triggered popular protests on the streets of Moscow.

So Putin embarked on a campaign of nationalism. He did this to divert attention from an economy in decline, well before the sanctions and the dramatic fall in the oil price. He presented Western and traditional Russian values as incompatible, as even being in direct conflict. In his first term as President, he asked Russians to accept less democracy for more prosperity. Now he is asking them to trade prosperity for militant nationalism, in which Russia's greatness is measured not by the country's economic and scientific achievements, but by its ability to dominate and destabilize its neighbors.

Russia is paying the price for its aggression – as it must. The sanctions are biting, capital flight is increasing, and Russians' standard of living is declining. But we cannot expect an immediate turnaround. As we saw in the Balkans, it is easier to stoke up the fires of nationalism than to calm them back down. And Putin's regime is firmly entrenched, assisted by a powerful propaganda machine that feeds paranoia and xenophobia, and by the suppression of dissent.

Even though government budgets are being cut by 10%, the Russian military build-up is set to continue. In 2015 we can expect more Russian pressure against its neighbors and a continued hostile stance against NATO.

As far as NATO is concerned, we have no option but to respond, and to protect ourselves. That is why, at our Summit in Wales last September, NATO's leaders agreed on a Readiness Action Plan (or

RAP). It will ensure that our forces can deploy quickly to deal with any challenge. It will increase the number, size and complexity of our exercises. And it will enable rapid reinforcements should they be needed, facilitated by forward-based command and control and logistics units on the territory of our Eastern allies.

This is the most significant boost to our collective defense in decades. It will significantly enhance our ability to defend our populations against threats from both the East and the South. But let me stress that the RAP is purely defensive. Our goal is stability, not competition, with Russia or with anyone else. We are only doing what we need to do to defend ourselves and deter anyone who might wish to challenge us.

And because security does not come for free, in Wales our leaders also made a Defense Investment Pledge: to stop the cuts of the past few decades; to increase defense spending toward meeting the goal of 2% of Gross Domestic Product as our economies grow; and to spend our defense budgets more wisely on the key capabilities we need.

In this new environment, NATO's security is not an optional extra, or a rain check for some future date. We must implement the Readiness Action Plan and the Defense Investment Pledge – in full and on time. Every Ally must assume its share of the collective responsibility. And I am glad that Norway is responding to the challenge.

With Germany and the Netherlands, Norway is in the lead in establishing the new Interim Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, the so-called 'Spearhead Force'. This will allow NATO to respond in a matter of days to any attack on NATO territory, and lay the basis for the permanent Spearhead Force that we expect to declare operational at our Warsaw Summit next year.

Norway is also making a significant contribution to our enhanced exercise program, and it has increased its defense spending for 2015. This is very welcome. But there is still a long way to go until Norway reaches the 2% target. With a strong economy, I hope that Norway will set an example for other Allies and commit to reaching that goal.

But in addition to ensuring our collective defense, we must also look beyond our borders. Another priority at the Wales summit was to increase our support to our eastern neighbors, especially Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, who are the main targets of Russian pressure and interference.

Let me add that we don't see our relations with these countries exclusively through the prism of our relations with Moscow. They are independent countries with internationally recognized borders, who are entitled to pursue their own path. In recent elections, all three countries have chosen leaders and parties that advocate Euro-Atlantic integration – not Russia's Eurasian Union.

The more stable they are, the more secure we are. So helping Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova – to strengthen their military forces, reform their institutions and modernize their economies – is not an act of generosity; it is in our fundamental strategic interest.

NATO is doing its part. To help Ukraine to modernize and reform its armed forces, we have launched five Trust Funds to assist in areas like command and control, logistics, cyber defense and military medicine. We are sending more advisors to Kyiv and will be carrying out exercises with Ukraine's armed forces. And we are helping Moldova and Georgia to strengthen their defense capacity in similar ways and, in Georgia's case, to help it prepare for future membership in the Alliance.

But this defense assistance, like economic support, is only one side of the coin. These countries have to keep their commitments to fight corruption, take hard economic decisions, reach out to their minorities, and build efficient, transparent institutions. Only with these reforms can our help be effective.

Let me conclude by addressing the most difficult question: What should be our approach towards Russia?

First and foremost, before we can re-engage with Russia, Moscow must de-escalate the situation in Ukraine. It must stop sending weapons and supplies to the rebels in the Donbass, it must pull its own soldiers and advisors out of Eastern Ukraine, and it must work constructively to implement the provisions of the Minsk accords – in full, not selectively. The Russian-backed offensive by the separatists over the weekend makes a diplomatic solution more difficult, but it is still the best way out.

Looking beyond the immediate crisis in Eastern Ukraine, we must continue to make it clear to Russia that it cannot have the benefits of integration without respecting the rules. It cannot select the rules it wants to obey and ignore the others. And it cannot impose on the rest of us a new European security order based either on its own rules, or no rules at all.

In the longer run, our strategy has to be one of patience and

consistency. Russia expects us to give up the sanctions and go back to business as usual, without changing its own conduct. That is basically what we did after the war in Georgia in 2008. But this time around, having chosen our course, we must stick to it. We must stay united, stay firm and increase the costs to Russia of its aggression. Over time, Russia will see that it is in its own best interests to return to a policy of cooperation – but only if we show it that we take our principles seriously.

We have all woken up to a new security reality here in Europe. We have shown that we are ready to counter and contain a revisionist Russia. And we can continue doing that for a long time if we have to – not because we like it, but because we will not compromise on the rules and principles on which our Alliance and the security of the entire Euro-Atlantic area rest.

We do not seek confrontation with Russia. And neither are we looking for regime change. What we do want is for Moscow to change its behavior; to abide by the very good rules that Russia itself once subscribed to; and to return to the spirit of cooperation that has brought all our nations more freedom, prosperity and opportunities than ever before. This may be a long time coming, and will call for strategic patience, but I don't think we have any alternative.

Previous publications in this series:

- 1-2015 Crimea and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict *Anton Alex Bebler*
- 3-2014 Baltikum, Russland og fremtiden *Tor Husby*
- 2-2014 Russlands stormaktsstrategi og Vestens respons *Janne Haaland Matlary*
- 1-2014 What now, little England? Prospects for the forthcoming Scotland and EU referendums. *Øivind Bratberg*
- 4-2013 Konflikten i Syria *Rolf Willy Hansen*
- 3-2013 Polen – et lyspunkt i Europa *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 2-2013 Hva skjer i Nord-Korea – Asiatisk stabilitet i fare? *Sverre Lodgaard*
- 1-2013 Engaging with Islamists: A new agenda for the policy community *Mona Kanwal Sheikh*
- 3-2012 US Shale Oil Revolution and the geopolitics of Oil *Trygve Refvem*
- 2-2012 NATO's influence in the near abroad *Oktay Bingöl*
- 1-2012 Ungarn – alene og miskjent *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 4-2011 Conflict or Coincidence of Interest of Main Oil and Gas Importing, Exporting and Transit Countries *Liana Jervalidze*
- 3-2011 Breaking down the remaining walls *Alister Miskimmon*
- 2-2011 Russia in NATO *Charles A. Kupchan*
- 1-2011 Bringing War Home—The use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams by Norway and Denmark to construct strategic narratives for their domestic audiences *Ida Dommersnes*
- 5-2010 Sjøforsvarets historie 1960-2010—En kortversjon *Roald Gjelsten*
- 4-2010 The Tragedy of small power politics *Asle Toje*
- 3-2010 Integrasjon med grenser eller grenseløs integrasjon? *Bjørn Innset*
- 2-2010 Reconciling the nuclear renaissance with disarmament *Alex Bolfrass and Kelsey Hartigan*
- 1-2010 Approaching the comprehensive approach *Dag Kristiansen*
- 3-2009 Turkish Neo-Ottomanism: A turn to the Middle East? *Einar Wigén*
- 2-2009 20 år etter muren *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 1-2009 Between Reluctance and Necessity: The Utility of Military force in Humanitarian and Development Operations *Robert Egnell*
- 5-2008 Civil-military relations: No Room for Humanitarianism in comprehensive approaches *Stephen Cornish and Marit Glad*
- 4-2008 Tsjekkoslovakia—40 år etter *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 3-2008 NATO—Moldova/Israel/Ukraine *Dr. Gabanyi, Dr.Kogan, Dr. Begma & Igor Taburets*
- 2-2008 Hearts, minds and guns: the Role of the Armed Forces in the 26st Century *UK Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup*
- 1-2008 Krav til fremtidens forsvar sett fra unge offiserers ståsted *Tomas Bakke, Kadett Krigsskolen*
- 7-2007 Threats to Progress of Democracy and Long Term Stability in Georgia *Liana Jervalidze*
- 6-2007 Militærmarkens særtrekk i moderne konflikter *Div. forfattere*
- 5-2007 Norge i et Sikkerhetspolitisk Dilemma *Asle Toje*
- 5-2007 EU-staters varierende bidragsvilje til militær intervensjon *Rolf Magnus Holden*
- 4-2007 Defence as the Best Offence? Missile Defences and Nuclear Non-proliferation *Lars Van Dassen and Morten Bremer Mærli*
- 3-2007 Putins Russland—Partner eller utfordrer? *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 2-2007 Energy and Identity—Readings of Shtokman and NEPG *Jakub M. Godzimirski*
- 1-2007 NATO and the Dialouge of Civilisations *Christopher Cooker*
- 1-2007 NATO planlegger å være relevant—også i fremtiden *Ivar Engan*
- 7-2006 Putins Russland og utenverdenen *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 6-2006 Ungarn 1956—Et 50-årsminne *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 5-2006 NATO foran toppmøtet i Riga *Ambassadør Kai Eide*
- 4-2006 Russian energy policy and its challenge to western policy makers *Keith Smith*
- 4-2006 Oil and gas in The High North—A perspective from Norway *Ole Gunnar Austvik*
- 2-2006 EUs sikkerhetspolitiske rolle i internasjonal politikk *Jan Erik Grindheim*
- 1-2006 Fra "Kursk" til "Priz": Ubåtredning som internasjonal samarbeidsområde *Kristian Åtland*

- 9-2005 Nordisk sikkerhet **Tønne Huitfeldt**
- 8-2005 NATO going global or almost
The Current Revolution in the Nature of Conflict
The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee. **Alv Jakob Fostervoll, Jamie Shea, Chris Donnelly**
- 7-2005 Galileo—et europeisk globalt navigasjonssystem **Hans Morten Synstnes**
- 6-2005 Coming home to Europe? Central and Eastern Europe in EU and NATO
Eastern Europe's silent revolution **Jahn Otto Johansen og Nils Morten Udgaard**
- 5-2005 Det tyske eksperiment **Jahn Otto Johansen**
- 4-2005 The naval Dilemma of the early 26st Century **Hans Olav Stensli**
- 3-2005 What are the strategic challenges faced by Norway in the years to come?
In the new types of conflict we face, how to define and defend humanitarian space?
The Norwegian Atlantic Committee's 40th annual Leangkollen Conference. the Nobel Institute. **Jørgen Kosmo and Jonas Gahr Støre**
- 2-2005 The New Geopolitics of the North? **Jakub M. Godzimirski**
- 1-2005 "Global Partnership", russiske ubåter og brukt kjernebrensel – internasjonal koordinering av oppgaver og bidrag
Christina Chuen og Ole Reistad
- 6-2004 Oljens geopolitikk og krigene ved Persiagulfen **Ole Gunnar Austvik**
- 5-2004 Coping with Vulnerabilities and the Modern society **Jan Hovden**
- 4-2004 Forsvarsperspektiver i nord **Jørgen Berggrav**
- 3-2004 NATO og de transatlantiske motsetninger
-Kortsiktige og langsiktige perspektiver **Jahn Otto Johansen**
- 2-2004 The Role of a Humanitarian Organization in an International Security Operation -
a Basis for Cooperation or a Basis for Separation? **Jonas Gahr Støre**
- 1-2004 If Effective Transatlantic Security Cooperation is the Question, Is NATO the Answer? **Stanley R. Sloan**
- 6-2003 Frankrike og Irak-krigen: Bare i prinsippenes navn? **Frank Orban**
- 5-2003 Norwegian Priorities for the Extended G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
Asle Toje and Morten Bremer Mærli, NUPI
- 4-2003 Saddam's Power Base **Major John Andreas Olsen**
- 3-2003 Terroristbekjempelse og folkeretten **Terje Lund**
- 2-2003 Men and Machines in Modern Warfare **General Charles A. Horner (ret.)**
- 1-2003 The Real Weapon of Mass Destruction: Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare in the era of terrorism and "rogue" states
Morten Bremer Mærli

B ØKONOMI
ÉCONOMIQUE



NORGE P.P. PORTO BETALT



**DEN NORSKE
ATLANTERHAVSKOMITE**
THE NORWEGIAN ATLANTIC COMMITTEE

Fridtjof Nansens plass 8

N-0160 Oslo

Tel: +47 22 40 36 00

Fax: +47 22 40 36 10

post@dnak.org

www.dnak.org