Den 21. utgaven av NORSEC ble holdt under tittelen “Preparing for insecurity in a more fragmented world”. Blant de øvrige innlederne var blant annet utenriksminister Espen Barth Eide (Ap), sjef for Forsvarsstaben, Generalmajor Ingrid Gjerde, Nicolas de La Grandville, EUs ambassadør til Norge, og flere fremtredende forskere.
NORSEC er en konferanse rettet mot studenter, kadetter og unge yrkesaktive. Les mer her.
Opening Speech – NORSEC 2026
Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, dear friends and colleagues,
It is once again a great pleasure—and truly a privilege for me as Secretary General of The Norwegian Atlantic Committee—to welcome you all to Oslo and to the NORSEC Conference.
I would like to begin by thanking YATA Norway for their continued dedication to creating this important platform. Year after year, you bring together young professionals, experts, and decision-makers to engage in serious, informed, and forward-looking discussions on security and international affairs. That contribution has never been more important than it is today.
Because we meet at a time when the very foundations of our security—and indeed of the international order—are being tested in ways we have not seen for decades.
Last year, I spoke about uncertainty. About a world where facts are contested, where power increasingly outweighs principles, and where democratic discourse is under pressure.
That uncertainty has not diminished. It has deepened.
We are now witnessing not just instability, but transformation. Or perhaps it is appropriate to call it a “rupture” - like the Canadian prime minister Mark Carny did in Davos this January.
The post-Cold War order — what we often refer to as a rules-based international system — is no longer simply under strain. It is being actively challenged, reshaped, and in some cases, deliberately dismantled.
Three structural shifts define our current moment:
1. First, the return of great power competition.
2. Second, the weakening of multilateralism and international institutions.
3. Third, growing uncertainty within the transatlantic relationship itself.
Together, these developments mark the end of an era—and the beginning of something far less predictable.
I will come back to each of these structural shifts, but first let me give you a backdrop:
For decades, European security has rested on a relatively stable foundation.
NATO has ensured collective defence through deterrence backed by American capabilities and strategic leadership.
A shared commitment to democratic values, liberal rights and a rule-based order has bound the transatlantic community together since 1949.
This was not a perfect system—but it has been a remarkably successful one.
Today, however, we must acknowledge the difficult reality that we no longer can take that system for granted.
The United States has become an unpredictable partner under Donald Trump’s second administration. American foreign and security policy is increasingly being shaped by hasty decisions, unstructured press conferences and the willingness to use hard power against sovereign state leaders and nations.
It is also a result of domestic priorities, economic constraints, and strategic competition with China.
We also see a more transactional approach to alliances—where commitments are measured not only in shared values, but in tangible contributions. Trade and energy have become weaponized. This creates uncertainty—not only for adversaries, but also for close allies.
And uncertainty, is in itself a strategic challenge.
At the same time, Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine continues to define the security landscape in Europe. Our main threat stems from the Kremlin!
Let us be absolutely clear:
This war is not only about Ukraine.
• It is about sovereignty.
• It is about international law.
• And it is about whether military force can once again be used to redraw borders in Europe without lasting consequences.
If Russia were to succeed—even partially—it would set a precedent that extends far beyond Ukraine.
It would signal that power prevails over principle.That is why supporting Ukraine is not only a moral obligation—it is a strategic necessity.
1) The return of Great Power Competition
This brings me to my first point: the return of great power competition.
The war in Ukraine is not an isolated conflict. It is a manifestation of a broader systemic rivalry—one in which major powers increasingly seek to reshape the international order in line with their own ambitions.
We are witnessing a sharpening strategic alignment between authoritarian powers. China is expanding its influence across economic, technological, and military domains, while Russia—thou weakened—remains willing to use force to redraw the European geography.
Great power competition now spans regions, domains, and instruments of power—from military force to economic coercion, technological decoupling, and influence operations globally.
This is not a temporary disruption. It is structural shifts toward a more contested and less predictable international system—where deterrence, not assumption, must once again underpin security.
2) The weakening of multilateralism and international institutions
Second, we are witnessing a weakening of multilateralism and international institutions.
For decades, institutions such as the United Nations, the WTO, and arms control regimes have provided frameworks for cooperation, predictability, and conflict management. They have not eliminated competition—but they have constrained it!
Today, that constraint is eroding. Major powers increasingly bypass, block, or selectively engage with these institutions when it suits their interests. We see paralysis in the UN Security Council, fragmentation in global trade governance, and the erosion of arms control agreements.
At the same time, rules are being challenged not only rhetorically, but in practice—through violations of sovereignty, economic coercion, and the use of hybrid tactics that fall below the threshold of traditional conflict.
The result is a more transactional and less predictable international environment—where norms carry less weight, and where enforcement mechanisms are weaker.
For Europe, this means operating in a system where legal frameworks and institutions can no longer be relied upon as the primary guarantors of stability.
3) Growing uncertainty within the transatlantic relationship itself
Third, we face growing uncertainty within the transatlantic relationship.
The transatlantic alliance still remains the cornerstone of European security. But it is no longer as politically or strategically self-evident as it once was.
In the United States, foreign and security policy is increasingly shaped by domestic polarization, shifting priorities, and a stronger focus on strategic competition with China. This has led to a more selective and, at times, transactional approach to European allies and NATO.
Commitments are now more openly questioned.
This does not mean that the United States is disengaging from Europe. But it does mean that the terms of engagement are changing. The TRUST in US security guarantees are withering.
For Europe, the implication is clear: greater responsibility for its own security is no longer a political preference — it is a strategic necessity.
A stronger European contribution is essential not only to share the burden, but to sustain the credibility of the Alliance and in a worst-case scenario to safeguard Europe’s freedom!
So where does this leave us?
In a position of greater responsibility than at any time in recent history. Most allies accept this new reality, but disagree on the way forward.
As Europe seeks to strengthen its defence, several models are being discussed.
1) A European defence union within the EU.
2) Coalitions of the willing among like-minded states.
3) Or a stronger European pillar within NATO.
Each has its merits. But we must also be realistic.
1) The EU lacks key members—such as the UK, Turkey, Canada and Norway—who are essential to European security.
2) Coalitions can act quickly, but may lack long-term coherence.
3) NATO, however, remains the only structure with the necessary capabilities, command- and planning structures, and operational experience.
Therefore, the most effective path forward should be strengthening NATO—by strengthening the European pillar within the Alliance.
What is important moving forward?
Security is not only about military capability. It is also about resilience.
• About safeguarding our democratic institutions
• About protecting critical infrastructure
• And about countering disinformation and hybrid threats
And perhaps most importantly: Maintaining public trust!
Because security in the end rests not only on weapons—but on societies.
• On cohesion
• On legitimacy (lejittamassy)
• And on shared values
This brings me back to why conferences like NORSEC matter.
In an age of polarization and digital echo chambers, physical meeting places—where ideas can be exchanged openly and critically—are more important than ever.
Security policy cannot be conducted in isolation. It requires dialogue:
• Across sectors
• Across borders
• And across generations
And that is exactly what you are contributing to here today!
Many of you in this room represent the next generation of leaders in foreign and security policy.
The decisions that will shape the future of Europe—and of the transatlantic relationship—will increasingly be yours to make.
That is both a responsibility and an opportunity.
Because while the challenges are serious, they are not impossible to overcome.
But they do require engagement. And they require knowledge.
If there is one message I would like to leave you with today, it is this:
We are entering a period where strategic clarity is essential.
• We must be clear about our interests
• Clear about our values
• And clear about what we are willing to defend - and how!
Because ambiguity, in the current environment, can be costly.
More than a century ago, President Theodore Roosevelt said: “Speak softly and carry a big stick.”
That advice remains relevant.
• Diplomacy matters
• Dialogue matters
• But so does deterrence!
Ladies and gentlemen,
We are living through a defining moment in European security.
The choices we make now will shape not only our own future—but the future of the international order.
And with that, I wish you all a productive, insightful, and inspiring NORSEC 2026.
Thank you for your attention!
