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NATO and the Dialogue of Civilisations

By Christopher Coker, LSE

In recent years NATO has re-branded itself. It has gone global. It is responding to the demands of globalisation. Globalisation is an ambiguous process – it promotes insecurity; it creates wealth but also creates inequalities. It maximises opportunities but also maximises risks. We are not sure whether it is enabling or disempowering. It is a dialectical process that is inevitably ambiguous because we stand not at its end but its beginning.

NATO is entering into two dialectical relationships : one with the Greater Middle East (in the War on Terror), the other with Asia (as the Asian Century Dawns). The alliance has a Mediterranean dialogue and is forging one with Japan, Australia and South Korea. It has rediscovered geo-politics.

The Geopolitical Imagination

The greatest geopolitical thinker of the modern area was Halford Mackinder, the former director of my own institution, the London School of Economics. At the turn of the 20th century he penned a seminal paper, 'The Pivot of World History'. For him, the decisive event was the colonisation of the New World by Western Europe and Siberia by the Russians. Whereas the Europeans had moved west across the North American plains to the Pacific, the Russians had moved east across the Eurasian land mass. By 1904 both had reached the Pacific Ocean. The 20th century, he suggested, would be determined by the conflict between the two.

That is the point about geopolitics – it tells a story; it involves a grand theme. Mackinder, of course, got it wrong. The future of the world was not tested in the Pacific in the course of the 20th century, but in Europe. The pre-eminent geopolitical narrative, at least until 1991, was the recurring necessity to prevent the domination of Europe by any single power. Europe, not the Pacific, was the pivot of world history. It is no longer. This in itself is of central importance.

In the geopolitical imagination there is always an enemy. In 1914 it was

Germany; after 1945 the USSR. The identity of the enemy is not important for the cogency of the theory, which is always about conflict. This takes us to the second factor. Geopolitics assumes a permanent interest and a permanent policy solution. In the 20th century the permanent interest was the balance of power in Europe, and later the globe. The permanent solution was coalition politics. The political challenge for the United States, in particular, was to form a coalition of liberal societies against those societies who challenged the balance of power, such authoritarian states as Imperial Germany and the USSR.

Thirdly, there is always a major framework within which strategic thinking can cohere. For much of the 20th century that framework was the idea of a World Order. It is useful here to remind ourselves that the concept of the 'world' was a late 19th century invention. It was this century which saw the coining of such terms as 'world politics' (the first course of which was taught at the University of Wisconsin in 1894); 'world economy' (the international division of labour); 'world trade'; 'world power'; and finally and most recently 'world order'. Geopoliticians were concerned about the kind of world order that would emerge, and who would run it. Every American president from Woodrow Wilson to George Bush in 1991 promised to take their countries into a New World Order through war.

What is interesting about Bush's son, the first president of the 21st century, is that he has not promised his country a New World Order; instead, all he has promised is more successful management of the global disorder which prevails. In one sense, despite America's unipolar 'moment in history', or the emergence of what the French like to call the first 'hyperpower', America's geopolitical ambitions are much more modest than those of the past.

So what is the situation today, who is the enemy? There are two: radical Islam, or more correctly Islamism and China. What is the permanent interest? To preserve Western influence. And the solution? In the case of Islamic fundamentalism, the management of risk; in the case of China the management of its rise. Why should the latter be of interest to the alliance? It hardly ever figures in NATO's thinking.

The War on Terror

In many ways, the template for the war on terror is very similar to new thinking on crime in Western societies. What most societies in the West now aim at is modest improvements in crime prevention at the margin, as well as a better management of resources. The aim is a reduction in the likelihood of criminal acts and these days better support for the victims. These are all 'post heroic' objectives. Few of us think that crime can be reduced significantly. All this is very different from the philosophy of penology in the 19th century which first saw the rise of national police forces, regulated prison regimes, and the idea that criminals were not just to be punished but also rehabilitated, and if possible redeemed. Prison became a school of life; the hope was that the criminal would become a useful citizen. Indeed, once crime was seen as a product not so much of greed but social deviancy, social rehabilitation had to become the norm.

Since the early 1990s all this has changed. Soaring crime rates, questionable results in rehabilitation, including stubbornly high rates of recidivism, as well as declining state budgets for policing have forced governments to adopt alternative strategies. No longer do we treat individual offenders: we manage criminal environments. We have 'zero tolerance' policies; we move potential criminals from the area where they pose a risk, that is, the areas that matter such as tourism or business. We prefer to quarantine criminals in urban environments where they can do little damage to the economy, such as the ghettos of North American cities, or the sink estates of the UK. We go in for criminal profiling, identifying potential groups, to better manage them. We do not police the community so much as manage communities of risk. And we certainly do not seek to rehabilitate criminals. These days we tend to lock them up. Our prison populations are higher than ever, 2 million in the United States, or 1 prisoner for every 120 members of the population. 'Three strikes and you're out' is now the slogan. And when we do let prisoners out we often tag them electronically. We monitor their movements. Freedom is no longer unsupervised.

We address terrorism in much the same way. Like the police force, our first aim is to pre-empt terrorist action; accordingly our policies are proactive. We wish to 'reshape environments' the better to minimise risks

that come from them. But reshaping very rarely involves much investment of economic or political resources. In the words of Ulrich Beck, many developing societies have found they are now responsible for "*autobiographical solutions to systemic contradictions*", which is merely a German Professor's way of saying they find themselves on their own. In Afghanistan the great challenge has been to link development to security and security to development: hence the Provincial Reconstruction Teams – fourteen in all.

There are two major ways in which the West now manages the risk of terrorism. One is surveillance. We are all on camera every day; in my country, which has the highest number of CCTV cameras per head of population, every citizen is on camera 300 times in the course of their working hours. Corporations actively monitor consumer choice every time a credit card is swiped or the internet site is visited, or an Oyster card is used on the London Underground. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) constantly seek greater surveillance capacities. Trade and environmental regimes increasingly arrogate the right to inspect. Intrusive verification is at the centre of most arms control agreements, as Iraq found in the 1990s, and as the Iranians are finding today. Surveillance has become crucial in obtaining the information that determines the scale of risk and shapes risk management strategies.

Surveillance allows us to systematically gather information to monitor the behaviour of risk groups, pariah states or rogue states, or what the State Department more diplomatically prefers to call 'states of concern'. One of them is Afghanistan.

Then there is the Precautionary Principle which was introduced in international environment law after 1992: namely that if the international community waits too long for scientific evidence of for example, global warming, by the time the evidence is available it will be too late to act. "The absence of evidence is not evidence of absence" as Donald Rumseld famously asserted in the run up to the 2003 Iraq war.

The United States may not have signed up to the Kyoto Accord, but it cer-

tainly wishes to introduce something like the precautionary principle into international security law. 'Anticipatory self defence' was the official US legal justification for attacking Afghanistan in 2002. The War on Terror mandates – or is deemed to – the political redesign of certain societies as a safety measure or precaution.

The Rise of China

There is a second challenge the West faces. The rise of China presents the United States with a second geostrategic challenge. As The Quadrennial Defence Review in February stated: China is at a strategic crossroads: it can either choose to work with the United States or against it. Probably it can do both. As Yogi Bera, the famous American baseball player famously commented: If you're at a crossroads, take it.

There are two arguments involved here. One is that China is still a power that is willing to come to terms with the American unipolar moment, rather than challenge it. The other is whether it challenges it or not in the future, it has one over-riding requirement: oil. It is oil that may bring it into collision with the United States in the Middle East (with its strategic partnership with Iran), in Latin America (with its strategic partnership with Chavez), and in Africa where it is now associated with what Max Boot, the American conservative commentator calls "the dictatorship premium". It is striking that NATO hardly ever mentions oil.

No-one knows, of course, how long oil resources will last. Some geologists disagree, as is the wont with experts, on when oil production will peak. The optimists say 30 years; the pessimists say 5 or 10. For the United States this is as much a problem as it is for China in the long run. In the short run, however, China's predicament is far worse because it is growing so fast. It has accounted for 40% of all recent growth in world oil consumption and is now the second largest consumer of oil after the United States itself. Its oil consumption is expected to increase by 10% per year. Beijing has inevitably focused on African nations as likely hydrocarbon acquisition targets. An estimated 25% of its total oil imports currently come from Africa and Beijing has placed a high priority on maintaining strong ties with its African energy suppliers through investment,

high-level visits, and a strict policy of 'non interference in internal affairs' which dictators, African or not, find comforting.

The 'dictatorship' premium is worrying for NATO, which is training the African Union force in Darfur, for it involves another geopolitical dimension which is new: the future of global governance. In order to ensure its supply, China has made some unpleasant bedfellows. One is Sudan which now accounts for 7% of its total oil imports. The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) is the single largest shareholder in the Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company which controls Sudan's oil fields. 4,000 Chinese security guards now guard its oil investment. Nearly 80% of Sudan's oil revenue is used to purchase weapons to subdue the rebels in the southern part of the country. In March 2004 Beijing also extended a $2billion loan to Angola, another country whose regime is considered to be endemically corrupt and authoritarian. Zimbabwe also remains a major source of iron and has benefited from arms sales in recent years.

The problem is that the US State Department has labelled Sudan a 'state sponsor of terrorism'. Here the two geo-political chessboards intersect. For states such as New Jersey, Illinois and Oregon have banned public pension funds from investing in companies active in the country. US investors have sold their holdings or suspended operations until the political situation improves, and Chinese companies have inevitably filled the vacuum. As the Nigerian energy minister commented after signing a deal with the Great Wall Company of Beijing, while the Americans insist that their trade partners sign up to the war on terror, and the Europeans insist that they tackle corruption, all the Chinese are interested in is trade.

Far from retreating on this score, the United States too is making good governance a requirement to qualify for the Millennium Challenge account. But the situation for the European members of the alliance is more serious still. The cosmopolitan states that constitute the world's first trans-national community, the EU, have established in turn the world's first trans-national network. It is a network distinguished not by the use of military power, but a new diplomatic style, cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan states, argues Beck, differ significantly from 'surveillance'

states such as the United States which keep the world under scrutiny all the time. Cosmopolitan states, by contrast,

> not only fight against terrorism but also against the causes of terrorism. Out of the solutions of global problems which appear insoluble at the level of the individual state, they regain and renew the power of the *political* to shape and convince.

The word 'political' is important here. Robert Cooper, the British diplomat, sees the EU as a post-modern system which is more trans-national than supra-national – a community that lives in a post-modern system but embraces global governance as a way of amplifying its own power. The Europeans syndicate their values by exporting their model – a trans-national one – in the hope that it will have broader appeal in the world at large.

Europe runs an overlapping network which involves NGOs. These networks promote cosmopolitan democracy – the partnership between states, social advocacy groups and pressure groups involved either in direct action (environmental protestors such as Greenpeace) or the monitoring of human rights abuses (Watch Groups such as Transparency International, a Berlin based global anti corruption organisation which publishes an annual Corruption Perception Index (CPI) in which Africa significantly figures ranking the extent of corruption in different states). It is these that are the building blocks of a "cosmopolitan democratic view". It is that view which is now threatened by the rise of China.

Grand Narratives

Now none of this might matter but for the fact that geopolitics tells a story. What makes us afraid of new challenges is the trend to invest it with a certain degree of historical inevitability.

If the 'pivotal year' for Halford Mackinder was 1904, the pivotal year for many geopoliticians is 1979 which saw two turning points: Deng Xiaoping modernised the Chinese economy since when economic growth has been dramatic, and the Mullahs came to power in Iran. The Islamic republic of Iran represents a challenge to the American version of modernity and has

inspired fundamentalists across the world, many of whom look to Teheran for funding.

In terms of Islamism in general it is useful to turn to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 which the South Africans abstained from signing because they were unable to accept the notion of racial equality. In retrospect we can see this was a country, one issue (apartheid) debate which only ended in 1994. Looking back at that event, however, much more significant in the long term is the abstention of Saudi Arabia which went largely unnoticed at the time because the overwhelming majority of UN members were Europeans or like the Russians and Americans were of European descent Saudi Arabia abstained on religious grounds. The Universal Declaration endorses the freedom of religion (including Article 18, which gives one the right to change one's religion). According to the Saudis this was contrary to Islam which recognises conversion in only one direction: to Islam.

Whatever the merits of the case, the point I am making is that the 1948 Saudi abstention was considered to be an anomaly at the time, as indeed was the Saudi kingdom itself. It was an anomaly because religion was not considered as important as the secular ideologies of the day. The Saudi abstention was seen as a rejection of the European Enlightenment which had produced the secular ideologies such as liberalism and Marxism, which in 1948 were contending for the world's soul.

Today, of course, we can recognise that the Saudi abstention retains a degree of symbolism as the clearest expression of the now growing insistence that the Western idea of what is required to be a fully functioning human being is not universally shared. And yet the NATO Secretary-General in a speech in Warsaw in February claimed that it is only through active engagement in the Balkans, Darfur and Afghanistan that the alliance can promote its values, or what he called its 'value-based security policy".

Thus we come to the second grand narrative: not the clash of civilisations but the challenge to the Western 'moment' in history - that 500 year cycle in which Western ideas and values were entrenched in the international

system. That system which the West did so much to create may be coming to an end. Put very crudely, the international community and its laws and regulations are largely a creation of Western governments. It is by no means certain that China will be interested in sustaining it indefinitely, or playing by the rules.

For China may be becoming, in continents such as Africa, a 'soft power' as well. Over the past 25 years the country has fashioned a successful, economic model for development and modernisation embedded in ancient traditions. It combines modern but authoritarian political leadership with state-guided capitalism. This is highly attractive in some parts of the developing world and threatens to reduce the influence of the competing Western principles of liberalism, democracy and the free market. In other words, the 'post-Washington consensus', may be challenged by a Beijing consensus.

The thinking of China is important too because it is dominated by traditional concepts of sovereignty and the nation state, concepts that do not encourage multi-lateralism and certainly not global governance. In this respect China paradoxically has more in common with the United States than it does with Europe, and this should be of concern to the Europeans most of all with their predilection for delegating sovereignty to supernational bodies, and their commitment to effective multi-lateralism and humanitarian intervention. Whatever happens, in the long run, the rise of China constitutes a challenge to the current international architecture based on Western dominance under the leadership of the United States.

Conclusion

To conclude, NATO is operating in an infinitely more complex world than five years ago. If it wants a constructive dialogue of civilisations it needs to formulate a new Security Concept. In time –it would be best – for its sixtieth anniversary. This would allow it to stop expanding its tasks and roles every time the Secretary-General makes a speech. It would enable it to prioritise its missions; it would enable it to rein itself in, to do the things it can do well, and not attempt those it can't.

NATO planlegger å være relevant – også i fremtiden

"I believe NATO will remain as important for you tomorrow as it is for us today", sa NATOs generalsekretær Jaap de Hoop Scheffer under åpningstalen til yngre tilhørere under en konferanse i London i oktober 2006.

Av Ivar Engan

Kampen for å bevare våre viktigste verdier – som frihet til å uttrykke egne meninger, reise, velge våre ledere og tilhøre en religion etter eget ønske – var Alliansens overordnede oppgave under Den kalde krigen. Selv om vi i de mer fredfylte hjørnene på kloden ofte tar dette for gitt - og ikke ser dem direkte truet etter bortfallet av trusselen om invasjon fra det tidligere Sovjetunion - må de understrekes, om mulig spres til andre mindre heldige deler av verden, og beskyttes når det er nødvendig. Dette var hovedbudskapet fra Generalsekretæren til oss i London; vi under tredve.

Siden Murens fall og Sovjetunionens sammenbrudd, har mange spådd NATO en dyster fremtid. Historien forteller oss at gamle allianser ofte slår sprekker når den felles fiende forsvinner. Nå viste imidlertid NATO en nyfunnet raison d'être i tiden etter 1991, og vanligvis trekkes tre hendelser frem: Utløsningen av Washington-traktatens Artikkel 5, som sier at et angrep på en alliert er et angrep på alle, rett etter terrorangrepene i USA 11. september 2001; rollen som ble tildelt Alliansen under krigene i Bosnia og det tidligere Jugoslavia på midten av 90-tallet; og sist, men ikke minst, Kosovo-krigen i 1999. De fleste sier seg enig i at disse hendelsene viste at Alliansen fortsatt hadde relevans, nå som territorialt forsvar av Vest-Europa har havnet litt i bakgrunnen i folks bevissthet.

Allikevel slutter vi ikke å snakke om NATOs fremtid som et usikkerhetsmoment. Det er hovedsakelig tre grunner som blir fremstilt som bidragende til dette: For det første, ikke alt går etter planen i Afghanistan. For det andre, mange trekker frem EU som fremtidens sikkerhetsgarantist i Europa. Sist men ikke minst, USAs ensporede unilateralisme, økende fokus på Asia og tiltakende militære kapabilitetsforskjeller over Atlanteren. Den

nevnte konferansen og flere avisledere vedrørende Alliansens fremtid i tiden rundt toppmøte i Riga i november, bekrefter inntrykket om fortsatt usikkerhet.

Optimistisk Generalsekretær

Selv mener jeg at Generalsekretæren har grunn til å være optimist: NATO vil være like relevant i morgen, slik den er det i dag, og slik den var det under Den kalde krigen. Vi, *"the successor generation"* som vi ble kalt under konferansen i London, har få erindringer om frykt for atomkrig fra Den kalde krigens dager. Derimot innser vi at utfordringene for fremtiden står i kø. Foruten global oppvarming og fattigdom, har vi internasjonal terrorisme og mislykkede stater, for å nevne noen. De to sistnevnte er for øvrig områder der NATO fortsatt kan utgjøre en forskjell – dersom medlemslandene ønsker det. Oppslutningen om fortsatt medlemskap i NATO for Norge står dessuten sterkt. Trass vedvarende usikkerhet om Alliansens fremtid, Folk og Forsvars årlige meningsmåling om holdninger til NATO og EU bekrefter at flertallet av de spurte nordmennene (63 %) mener at medlemskapet i NATO trygger landet.

Transformasjon

Jeg var praktikant i første halvdel av fjoråret i NATOs Defense Investment-avdeling i hovedkvarteret i Brussel. Uten overdrivelse var ordet *transformasjon* en gjenganger både i korridorene, og under møtene der medlemslandenes representanter deltok. Begrepet, forstod jeg fort, innebar mer enn at enheten i NATO-strukturen som står for planleggingen av operasjoner og ellers det militærfaglige, nå ble betegnet som Allied Command Operations (ACO) i stedet for SHAPE. Representanten fra enheten Allied Command Transformation (ACT) satt som regel rett ved siden av representanten fra ACO under de nevnte møtene, og ACT har det overordnede ansvaret for Alliansens transformasjon – tilpasningen til det nye trusselbildet.

NATO er nå i større grad involvert utover Alliansens territoriale forsvar. De tidligere Warszawapakt-medlemmene Polen, Tsjekkia, Ungarn, Romania og Bulgaria er i dag en viktig del av Alliansen. De tre baltiske landene fra det tidligere Sovjetunionen, og Slovenia som tilhørte det tidligere Jugoslavia,

er også med. Alliansens neste toppmøte om to år vil trolig åpne døren for ytterligere nye medlemmer fra Øst-Europa. Disse nye landene bidrar med utstyr og tropper til NATOs tiltakende internasjonale operasjoner utenfor Det atlantiske området; som i Kosovo, Sudan, i Middelhavet, Irak og Afghanistan. NATOs transformasjon innebærer også at det er blitt opprettet en rekke fora for militært og politisk samarbeid med Russland, Ukraina, land i Middelhavsområdet, og internasjonale organisasjoner som OSSE, EU og FN.

Transformasjon innebærer også at medlemslandenes militære styrker omorganiseres i mindre lettere enheter til bruk i internasjonale operasjoner. Riga-konferansen utgjorde endelig startskuddet for en operasjonell NATO Response Force (NRF), som er en høyteknologisk, fleksibel, og raskt utplasserbar styrke til bruk i konfliktområder verden over. Det blir også i større grad fokusert på mer militær integrasjon i form av opprettelsen av felles kapabiliteter, som for eksempel innkjøpet av fem C-17 tungtransportfly til bruk i NATOs operasjoner.

Afghanistan – et være eller ikke være?

Da Den kalde krigen var slutt ble det sagt at NATO måtte engasjere seg utenfor traktatområdet, eller risikere å bli irrelevant. Luftangrepene i Bosnia og Kosovo, og den påfølgende troppeutplasseringen i sistnevnte, gjorde som nevnt Alliansen mer relevant. Disse operasjonene viste først og fremst større vilje til å bruke militær makt mot suverene stater for å forhindre hva man anså som brudd på menneskerettighetene. Men den største operasjonen i NATOs historie er, uten sammenligning, Afghanistan. Over 30.000 soldater fra ulike NATO-land står i dag i Afghanistan. Mye er gått galt: Et tosifret antall døde NATO-soldater som resultat av kampene i de Taliban-infiltrerte områdene i sør, en utålmodig lokalbefolkning som i tiltakende grad viser sterkere støtte til Taliban-geriljaen, mangel på suksess i kampen mot narkotikaindustrien i landet, stridigheter om byrdefordelingen blant NATOs medlemsland og uenigheter vedrørende nasjonale begrensninger i bruken av enkelte lands styrker – betegnet som *"caveats"* i NATO-sjargongen.

For mange fremstår operasjonen i Afghanistan som et være eller ikke være for Alliansens fremtid. Dersom NATO ikke i tilstrekkelig grad lykkes

med å stable det krigsherjede landet på fote, ser man med skepsis på at medlemslandene vil bruke NATO som et verktøy for tilsvarende oppdrag i fremtiden. Nå viser det seg imidlertid at også mye er gått riktig vei for ISAF-operasjonen. Sammenlignet med situasjonen før starten på den USA-ledede Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) i 2001, har man lykkes i å utrydde terroristenes treningsleire, landet har en president, en nasjonalforsamling, et senat, og provinsielle råd – alle valgt demokratisk. Landets bruttonasjonalprodukt er doblet, og helsetilbudet er for mange drastisk forbedret. Det vises til at det er bygd 4.000 kilometer med veinett, og afghanske jenter får, i likhet med gutter, utdanning. Dessuten er afghanske kvinner nå valgt inn i parlamentet.

Under Riga-konferansen ble det fokusert på at NATO alene ikke kan gjenreise landet. Derfor satser man på å samarbeide sterkere med andre internasjonale organisasjoner som Verdenbanken, EU, FN, G8 og nasjonale og private hjelpeorganisasjoner. Men bistandsarbeidere får vanskelige kår dersom NATO-soldatene ikke kan bidra med tilstekkelig sikkerhet. Mye tyder på at fokuset flyttes fra å telle antallet drepte Taliban-soldater til heller å forsøke å vinne afghanernes gunst gjennom å skape muligheter for sikkerhet, skoletilbud, helsetilbud og arbeid. Lykkes man der, vil Taliban-alternativet fremstå som mindre gunstig.

Mye av Alliansens prestisje er investert i Afghanistan, og man er helt klart avhengig av et utfall som kan karakteriseres som en suksess for å ikke skade NATOs troverdighet. Den korte tiden jeg var i NATO ble det hele tiden sagt at man hadde et langt tidsperspektiv på operasjonen. Det ble snakket om ti-femten år med forpliktelser og troppenærvær i landet. Dette vitner om at NATO er innstilt på å være tålmodig, og investere ytterligere i landet. Noe annet enn et positivt utfall tør man ikke snakke høyt om. Det man snakker høyere om, er at man er avhengig av hjelp fra andre organisasjoner for å lykkes.

EUs rolle som tilbyder av sikkerhet

En av organisasjonene man håper å samarbeide tettere med, er Den europeiske union. Men EU blir også ofte trukket frem som en mulig fremtidig trussel for NATOs eksistens. Da det brøt ut krig i det tidligere Jugoslavia,

erklærte Luxemburgs utenriksminister, Jacques Poos, i 1992 at nå var Europas, eller EUs, time kommet for å ta et større utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitisk ansvar. "The hour of Europe"-uttalelsen er blitt stående som et eksempel på EUs gap mellom store ambisjoner, men mangel på reelle kapabiliteter, og evne til å raskt enes om en felles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk. Men ambisjonene er klare: krefter i EU ønsker at Unionen utvikler seg fra å være en myk makt, til en aktør med hardere krefter på den utenrikspolitiske arena. Dersom det skjer, mener mange at det vil skje på bekostning av NATO.

EUs ambisjoner bekreftes av utviklingen siden begynnelsen av 90-tallet: I 1994 ble det avgjort at NATO-soldater, med klarsignal gitt fra USA, også kan bli brukt under EU-flagg til de såkalte Petersberg-oppgavene (humanitære oppdrag, krisehåndtering og fredsbevarende operasjoner). St. Malo-avtalen mellom Frankrike og Storbritannia i 1998 blir ofte trukket frem som veiskille for utviklingen av et fremtidig militært EU, da Storbritannia for første gang sa seg villig til å diskutere forsvarspolitikk gjennom EUs institusjoner. I det påfølgende år bestemte man seg også for å opprette EUs Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF), og i 2004 ble det også besluttet av Norge skulle delta med et bidrag til denne innsatsstyrken. EU sendte omsider soldater til Kongo i 2003, overtok kommandoen over den fredsbevarende operasjonen i Makedonia, og bidrar med soldater til den FN-ledede styrken i Libanon. At USA i tillegg har valgt å gå sine egne veier på grunn av Bush-administrasjonens unilaterale tilnærming, og ikke minst uenighetene over Atlanterhavet i 2003 i forkant og under invasjonen i Irak, har også gitt næring til de som ser på EU som fremtidens garantist for europeisk forsvar og sikkerhet.

Allikevel er det forhold som tyder på at NATO vil bestå ennå en stund. Det foreligger en rekke begrensninger internt i EU før Unionen er i nærheten av å utvikle en slagkraftig Felles utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitikk (FUSP). Flere mener at en fungerende FUSP betinger dypere integrasjon og mer overnasjonalt styre. EUs nye medlemsland ser for øvrig på USA som den eneste reelle garantisten av deres sikkerhet. USAs tidligere utenriksminister Madeleine Albright oppsummerte USAs holdning til utviklingen av en hardere europeisk sikkerhetsprofil gjennom sine tre D'er. Etter en rituell

støtte til europeisk integrasjon, kritiserte hun under en rekke avisintervjuer i 1998 EUs økende engasjement i forsvarspolitikken. Hun advarte mot "Duplication" (overlapping), "Discrimination" (utelukkelse) og "Decoupling" (avkobling). Amerikanerne er skeptiske til overlapping av NATO og EUs virke; de ønsker ingen diskriminering av seg selv, Canada og mindre NATO-medlemsland som ikke er medlemmer av EU; og de er skeptiske til hva de ofte ser som et fransk forsøk på erstatte amerikansk makt og innflytelse i Europa med sin egen.

USAs rolle

Det er liten tvil om at USA, uten sammenligning, spiller en ledende rolle for europeisk forsvars- og sikkerhetspolitikk samt NATOs fremtid. Bush-administrasjonens mislykkede forsøk på å gå sine egne veier har også bidratt til å sette spørsmålstegn ved NATOs fremtid. Fra USAs ståsted er det viktig å ha et relevant NATO; med allierte som bruker mer ressurser på eget forsvar og internasjonale operasjoner. Fra enkelte europeiske NATO-land var amerikanernes egenrådighet også et signal om dype ideologiske skiller, og at det var tryggest å ta mer ansvar for egen sikkerhet. Et fremtidig mektigere Kina og India kan også skifte USAs fokus østover, og dermed gjøre både Europa og NATO mindre relevant.

Imidlertid eksisterer det tegn på at USA nå velger å ta sine allierte mer med i utforming av sin utenrikspolitikk. Demokratenes flertall i Representantenes hus kan utgjøre en forskjell, og Baker-kommisjonens forslag til ny Irak-strategi inkluderer økt fokus på samarbeid med allierte. Rapporten peker også på at dialog er det beste virkemiddel for å løse konflikter. Et NATO som samarbeider med Japan, Australia, New Zealand og flere om Afghanistan er et relevant NATO. Jeg deler fortsatt Jaap de Hoop Scheffers optimisme: nytten av globalisering vil i sterkere grad utveie kostnadene, og det vil komme oss, the successor generation, til gode. Sikkerhetsutfordringene i fremtiden vil nødvendiggjøre NATO. Derfor trenger vi europeiske allierte som stadig samarbeider med USA, hindre EU-NATO duplikasjon og suksess i eksport av sikkerhet til Afghanistan.

Kilder:

Artikkelen er i hovedsak basert på taler, diskusjoner og tanker gjort under NATO Secretary General's Succssor Generation Conference i London i oktober 2006.

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