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challenges facing their citizens. Out of many paradoxes that this presents to a foreigner's eye, just three may be picked out here.

First, though neither country wants to 'militarize' the EU, both seem to find it easier to join in the EU's 'hard' military schemes (like battle groups) than to accept the idea of building really binding collective European policies on internal aspects of security like anti-terrorism, immigration and asylum seekers, or even emergency response planning. Apart from the already mentioned hang-ups about a 'real' EU defence, it would appear that Sweden (at least) has further reasons to discourage moves in that direction because (i) a comprehensive EU defence/security policy *would* tend to break down all the barriers between external and internal security (and security governance), as NATO never wanted to or could have done, and (ii) the goals of such a policy regarding the 'new threats' would tend to be set by the *average* level of European experience and concern about internal threats (and indeed, internal conflict!), which is clearly a good deal higher than the level of experience and concern in Norden. Besides, remaining gaps in EU common policies make it easier for Sweden, as well as Norway, to pursue some cherished national ideals through initiatives moving straight from the national to the global level: membership of the New Agenda Coalition, mediation initiatives, or Sweden's initiative to set up a Commission under Hans Blix on Weapons of Mass Destruction to name only some current examples.

Secondly, Norway and Sweden have been among the most active Europeans in pushing ideas of multi-functional intervention and complex peace-building for *other countries* ('weak' or post-conflict states), where the aim is precisely to coordinate military measures with internal security and with political and economic reconstruction and in a single mutually supporting concept. Sweden particularly insisted that a civil-military planning cell should direct the next stage of the EU's ESDP operations; but the Swedish government is only beginning (in the light of responses that were widely seen as inadequate to its citizens'suffering in the Indian Ocean tsunami and to the Skåne storms of January 2005) to debate the possibilities of closer interaction between its own military and civil emergency resources.

Third and of particular interest to SIPRI: despite Nordic commitment to 'peace' values, this region has shown a conspicuous lack of interest in *local* arms control and disarmament. Sweden in particular has held back from in the Europe-wide CFE Treaty process (where Norway does figure as a 'flank' state) because of concerns related essentially to the secrecy of wartime mobilization plans. A recent SIPRI-commissioned study showed that even on aspects where Sweden and Norway are active with parallel policy aims—small arms and mine clearance—they work far more often alone or with other Western partners than with each other. In fact, the only aspect of international disarmament on which Norway, Sweden and also Finland consistently pull in the same direction is on programmes to help destroy Russia's old WMD materials.

Why labour these contradictions? Not because there is any merit in singling out Norway and Sweden for criticism, but on the contrary: because all the dilemmas listed here are ones that find an echo in the broader European security debate today, whether conducted in NATO or the EU or some other framework like OSCE: Europe as a whole has no convincing strategy for living with the US in future, as partner or as problem or both. No-one is debating as openly as they should the tasks NATO has *stopped* doing—the debate is all about the Alliance's new departures, and not even enough about those (e.g. what we are really aiming for in Afghanistan, and whether NATO action is the right way to get it). The debate about the EU's ultimate defence and security role ('finalité') has always been muffled and has now been further confused, or perhaps driven underground for a while, following the shocks of failed referendums on the new Constitution. Even the EU's new Security Strategy (of December 2003) does not say in any specific detail what EU military actions are *for;* which will be the EU's priority cases for intervention and why; and how all the different functional instruments at the EU's disposal can be brought together to tackle security challenges both abroad and at home. Differences in perception about the seriousness of internal threats like terrorism, or transnational ones like illegal migration and crime, exist all over Europe and not just in Norden, as shown *inter alia* by the fact that all the strongest homeland security mechanisms from Schengen (which Norway and Sweden do belong to!) downwards have less than complete participation by the 25 EU states.

All that said, Norden is arguably one of the clearest mirrors for viewing Europe-wide security dilemmas thanks to its general hang-ups about integration, on the one hand, and the transparency with which its democratic communities conduct their affairs, on the other. The question inevitably arises: if Norway and Sweden (and others, notably Finland) share some particularly acute problems, should they not work more together to find the solutions and/or to push others' policies in directions that they would find more convenient? Have they, in fact, done as much as they could even to ensure that *positive* Nordic ideas and values are fully reflected in Europe's collective policy-making? In fact, what often seems to outsiders like the most natural tactical device of Nordic 'ganging up' usually turns out to be the most difficult when viewed from within the region. Firstly, to make this work, the èlites of different Nordic states have to be prepared to admit that they have a problem—and admit it at the same time; a stage which has not yet clearly been reached on any of the issues above. Secondly, the whole point about Norden's defence needs in the modern age has been that there *is* no purely local solution, and that even the Nordics' combined political leverage is likely to prove inadequate for any real impact upon the way that larger players will solve the problem. Thirdly, if Nordic states are to admit the need for more profound policy changes, they must find a way to carry the people with them: and that can really only be done on a nation-by-nation basis in the terms that make most sense for national traditions. If the EU's constitutional crisis has taught us anything it is that Europe needs drastically to improve its èlite/grass-roots communications, on security and defence policy as much as on anything else. That is a message that the leaders of Norway and Sweden, who also have in common their pride in being two of Europe's most advanced democracies, cannot afford to and surely will not want to ignore.

(Footnotes)

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DEFENCE ROLES AND POLICIES OF NORWAY AND SWEDEN IN THE 21ST CENTURY: AN OUTSIDER'S VIEW[1]

by Alyson J.K. Bailes, Director, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

During the Cold War, it would have seemed much more natural to contrast the strategic roles of Sweden and Norway than to compare them—the one a long-standing neutral state occupied only with its own defence, the other a front-line NATO Ally. Today that distinction still stands, although Sweden's formal status has been gradually modified to arrive at a formula of 'militarily non-allied'. Conversely, Sweden has been a full member of the European Union for ten years now, while the Norwegian people have said No to the chance of EU membership not once but twice. Beyond these institutional contrasts lie several deeper levels of inherent difference, both historical and geographical. Sweden has a long unbroken existence as a nation-state, and long experience as a 'stormakt', while Norway has just (in 2005) celebrated 100 years of its independence from Sweden. The contrast, but also the subtle inter-twining, in the two countries' experiences in World War Two is well known. Geographically, Sweden is essentially a power of the Baltic and Norway one of the Western seaboard and High North. Norway's direct land and sea boundaries with historic Russian territory in the North have made Russia much more of an intimate strategic threat, but also a potentially intimate partner for Norway—as happened during the time of the 'Pomor' trade—in a way that could never apply for Sweden. There is surely enough proof of strategically significant divergence here without needing to talk about differences of 'national character', which is always dangerous ground to venture onto and especially risky for an outsider to the region.

Nevertheless, there have been and are many striking parallels between the two states' challenges in defence and security policy, and between the ways their policy-makers have chosen to respond—even without needing to cite the evidence that is gradually being revealed of tacit Norwegian-Swedish military collaboration from the last war onwards. This analysis will try to do two things, in the knowledge that both are somewhat controversial and can only lead to experimental conclusions: (i) to identify the parallels in Norwegian and Swedish challenges and responses from 1945 onwards; and (ii) to examine two sets of dilemmas and contradictions *within* the policies of both states on defence and security as they stand now, in the opening years of the 21st century.

I. The Parallels

In the Cold War period Norway and Sweden both faced a huge asymmetrical danger from the East. Both were in practice protected by the military strength and nuclear strategic cover of NATO and of the USA within it. But neither Sweden because of its neutral status, nor Norway because of special 'opt-outs' regarding its role in NATO, accepted any US or NATO forces or any nuclear objects on its territory. Both had an arms control culture that more generally disapproved of nuclear weapons. These elements of what might be called strategic *restraint* on the part of both

countries were part of the so-called 'Nordic balance' and of the overall solution that allowed Norden to escape the worst tensions and confrontations of the Cold War period, while maintaining some degree of positive cooperation with Russia.

Since 1990 both Norway and Sweden have decided not to take double EU/NATO membership, which would have been open to them at any time and which is now the During the Cold War, it would have seemed much more natural to contrast the strategic roles of Sweden and Norway than to compare them—the one a long-standing neutral state occupied only with its own defence, the other a front-line NATO Ally. Today that distinction still stands, although Sweden's formal status has been gradually modified to arrive at a formula of 'militarily non-allied'. Conversely, Sweden has been a full member of the European Union for ten years now, while the Norwegian people have said No to the chance of EU membership not once but twice. Beyond these institutional contrasts lie several deeper levels of inherent difference, both historical and geographical. Sweden has a long unbroken existence as a nation-state, and long experience as a 'stormakt', while Norway has just (in 2005) celebrated 100 years of its independence from Sweden. The contrast, but also the subtle inter-twining, in the two countries' experiences in World War Two is well known. Geographically, Sweden is essentially a power of the Baltic and Norway one of the Western seaboard and High North. Norway's direct land and sea boundaries with historic Russian territory in the North have made Russia much more of an intimate strategic threat, but also a potentially intimate partner for Norway—as happened during the time of the 'Pomor' trade—in a way that could never apply for Sweden. There is surely enough proof of strategically significant divergence here without needing to talk about differences of 'national character', which is always dangerous ground to venture onto and especially risky for an outsider to the region.

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Since 1990 both Norway and Sweden have decided not to take double EU/NATO membership, which would have been open to them at any time and which is now the 'mainstream' solution for 19 (soon 21) other European countries. Instead, they have taken advantage of NATO's Partnership for Peace and of the provisions for cooperation with non-EU partners in the European Security and Defence Policy, respectively, to enjoy a practical status of 'all-but-membership' in terms of general defence planning, equipment collaboration and so on—besides taking the chance to participate in peace operations under both the EU and NATO flags. As a result, however, both countries are both now confronting broadly parallel challenges of military reform as the demands of interoperability, mobility and professionalism for outside operations clash with old assumptions of territorial defence relying on conscription (and on volunteers for occasional UN missions). These headaches are made worse by both governments' general wish to go on cutting defence costs, which is shared by most European states except the UK and France; but also by an unusual degree of popular attachment to features of the national defence tradition, including the political and social symbolism of conscription, which is perhaps only paralleled in Germany. It is interesting to draw a contrast with Denmark, where the same feelings do not seem to apply on conscription, and territorial defence has been more or less abandoned in order to focus defence efforts on peace missions and homeland security. Perhaps as a result, Denmark currently has over twice as many personnel on overseas missions (around 2000) than either Norway or Sweden despite considerably smaller total forces and a lower defence budget. A possible shade of difference between the Swedish and Norwegian predicaments is that for Sweden, the motive and the cost of protecting the domestic defence industry also seems to be a very big complication in reform, whereas for Norway this factor certainly exists but on a more modest scale.

2. US and NATO, Love and Hate

The first of three seeming contradictions in both Norwegian and Swedish policies that will be discussed here concerns the 'Atlantic' dimension. Since 1949, NATO has been in practice the key to both Norway's and Sweden's survival and freedom. Èlite elements in both countries are still firmly attached to NATO as protective framework, and want especially to keep the USA committed to it: in spite of the large popular majority in Sweden against joining NATO, and in spite of quite strong anti-US feelings in both countries, including recently Norway's refusal to join in and Swedish outright opposition to the invasion of Iraq. Both countries face the problem, however, that what they like about NATO is what NATO used to be, and what they like about the US is what the US strategic role used to be—namely a static shield, which did not demand that either of them do anything very much to support it except by things they wanted to do anyway on their own territory. It was plainly a shock for many Norwegians when NATO dragged them into a fighting war in Kosovo; and there are signs of unease now in both countries about NATO turning more and more exclusively into an exporter of security for other regions and countries often very remote from Nordic interests. NATO planning for the direct defence of Europe has been virtually dropped, the US is preparing further withdrawals and Eastward displacement of its European troop presence, the NATO command system less and less has any territorial character—all things that no Nordic capital can welcome, but that none of them has any real leverage to prevent. Even if, however, NATO is (objectively speaking) turning into a bit of a sinking ship for Norden, Norway and Sweden do not seem to have developed much of a policy yet except for hanging on to the railings. There are at least three alternative ways ahead that some other Europeans are thinking about in this predicament, that seem blocked at present for all the Northern Nordics:

- to go where the US is going regardless of institutional frameworks and traditions, i.e. to directly support Washington's new interventionist policies even when pursued outside NATO and against different enemies - as the UK and Denmark among others have tried to do;
- to argue that if the organized defence communities are now doing less for Norden, Norden should do less for them and simply stay out of all the new-style global operations. As is well known, Norway and Sweden have never even seriously debated this option but have hastened to join all such missions (of both NATO and the EU) as had an acceptable legal and moral base, notably in the Balkans and Afghanistan but also in even more remote places like the Congo. Should this be ascribed to a continuation of the old, essentially altruistic Nordic peacekeeping tradition? Or does it have some instrumental purpose for national security too, e.g. seeking experience to sharpen national forces' readiness, and/or 'earning points' from the US and other allies so that they might help Norden in a crisis even without binding institutional plans? (The latter motivation certainly seems to explain the way that Norden's Baltic neighbours, and some other smaller states in Central Europe have played their hand);
- to shift one's bets gradually from NATO to the EU instead, as a potential framework for the defence of national territories as well as interests. Norwegian and Swedish attitudes to the EU's new-found defence ambitions have in fact been very similar from the outset in one respect, even if looking from outside and inside the Union respectively. They have insisted that the ESDP must not compete with NATO, must be posited on good EU/NATO relations, and must not slide into 'real defence'. The latter would clearly be a difficult option for Norway as a non-member, but also for Sweden as a non-allied state. Thus when wording was put in the EU's draft Constitutional Treaty about EU states supporting each other.in the case of military attack (not just in response to terrorist actions), Sweden was among those insisting on adding words to protect the specificities of the non-allies' defence policies, while Swedish and Finnish Ministers assured their nation sthat no real change was involved.

All these complications play back into Norway's and Sweden's general relations with the US and their attitude on current big issues of US/European relations. In broad terms, as with NATO, one may conclude that the majority of both countries' elites probably want to *conserve* traditional Atlantic partnership—both for the positive things it can achieve, and as insurance against Russia. It is not always equally clear, however, how their real-life activities fit that goal. Both Swedish and Norwegian behaviour seems to be a mixture of very close cooperation with the US in some fields, notably technology and defence equipment (and notoriously, on some aspects of counter-terrorism); a posture of non-provocation in direct bilateral contacts especially during at high level visits; open rejection of some key tenets of Bush-style strategy and free public criticism, including on some points that are very sensitive on the American side; and relative passivity in trying to bridge the broader US/Europe gap, compared with other established Atlanticists like the UK or even Poland. Is there perhaps an unconscious Nordic assumption left over from the Cold War that others are in the front line for solving such major challenges, and the Nordics will help most by keeping their heads down?

3. Hard or Soft Security

Nordic states are well known for their interest in 'softer' functional aspects of security like the environment, and in values of 'human security. This has never stopped Norway and Sweden from liking hard military security—they just want to keep it in its proper place, while continuing to 'desecuritize' as many as possible of the other