A TIMELINE FOR THE CONFLICT AND WAR IN UKRAINE

Geir Flikke

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A Timeline for the Conflict and War in Ukraine

With a foreword by Tor Bukkvoll (FFI)
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One of the central issues for understanding the conflict and war in Ukraine is whether this is a process that moves forward on its own inertia or part of a plan. As usual, the answer is probably a bit of both. One argument would be that Putin has had two aims that have not changed since the conflict started, but that there has been significant improvisation and adjustment along the way, as the conflict spiraled off into new phases. Hence, the analyst can do two things: he can present some speculations on what might have been taking place in the minds of Russian decision makers during the different phases of the conflict, and what the Russian leadership is most likely to do next; or, he can simply suggest that as in every conflict, there is a “war logic”, which is beyond the control of state agency, and where each phase serves as a necessary fundament for the next.

If we accept speculation, it could be possible to suggest that Putin’s two aims are (1) to prevent Ukraine from joining the West and (2) to make sure the Ukrainian experiment with a Western model of governance fails. The former is necessary for reasons of great power identity and strategic security, and the latter is necessary for Russian regime survival. It is paramount for the Russian leadership to demonstrate both to its own population, and to the populations of other post-Soviet states, that popular uprisings against corrupt and authoritarian leaders never turn things for the better. The people must be made to understand that they always will be worse off after such a rebellion than they were before. Putin has in fact on a number of occasions expressed sympathy for the fact that Ukrainians were tired of the corruption under Yanukovych, but he has categorically denied that this grievance may legitimize a non-constitutional change of leadership. The question of how a population by legal constitutional
means should remove a leader that himself does not play by the book is not discussed. Repeated statements both by Russian leaders and the leaders of the separatists in Donbas suggest that these two aims have remained unchanged throughout the conflict.

Exactly how these aims should be attained, however, has changed several times along the way. One factor that may explain this is that Russian leaders initially expected their meddling to result in a major uprising in most of the eight oblasts that make up Eastern and Southern Ukraine. Had this happened, the challenge could have been interpreted by Kiev as so massive that the new authorities would have given in to the Russian/separatist demands of neutrality and federalization without much resort to force. Thus, there is a possibility that Putin and his closest circle in the beginning hoped to get what they wanted without much violence. However, when the uprising became limited mostly to the two oblasts Luhansk and Donetsk, and Ukraine consequently decided to respond with force because the challenge seemed surmountable, the Russian leaders still chose to see what they could get by playing the smaller rebellion.

After putting their bet on the LNR and DNR, however, they discovered that the Ukrainians were both more willing and able to fight than expected. By that time, however, it was too late to back out. When the Ukrainian forces rapidly recovered territory originally lost to the separatists, the Russian leaders may have felt they had little choice but to massively back up the separatist. Thus the first major deployment of regular Russian forces to Eastern Ukraine came about in the middle of August 2014. Since then Russia has tried to build up the military strength of the separatists enough so that little or no further direct Russian military involvement should be needed. However, as demonstrated in particular by the fighting in January and February 2015, direct Russian military involvement is still necessary when the fighting gets intense.

As a part of this logic, the current Kiev leadership seems to have accepted that it cannot restore full control of the Donbas only by military means. However, instead of giving more ground politically, they now seem set on isolating the conflict. This leaves Putin with three options. He can negotiate a more comprehensive peace settlement than that of the fragile Minsk-treaty, and he could do it now. This could elicit some more concessions from the Ukrainian side, but would probably be far from what Putin wants. Alternatively, he
can launch another major offensive. This would increase the pressure on the Ukrainians, but Putin would still risk a major expansion of the EU/US sanctions without Ukrainian surrender, and perhaps even more severe fallouts in the UNSC. Thirdly, he can maintain the conflict at its current low intensity level. This will lead to a contest between Russia and Ukraine about who can endure the longest. Both countries fear that economic stagnation and decline may stir public unrest. Given Putin’s hatred of losing, but also taking into account how much expanded sanctions would hurt, option three seems most likely at the moment.

These three speculative options notwithstanding: the Ukraine conflict is already a complex, multi-leveled and multifaceted conflict, which is shown in the compiled time-line presented below. The speed and scale of the conflicts initial phase suggests a low-intensity “operation”, but its cascading effects have magnified the implications of it, and also created ripple effects that severely affect European and transatlantic security. If anything at all can be learned from this conflict, it has everything to do with the costs of negligence. Perhaps European security has wandered off too far in its pursuit of “global” security, and perhaps the time has now come to address the fundamentals.
Introduction

This timeline is an attempt to re-create the anatomy of the conflict and war in Ukraine. Other institutions, such as the OSCE, have compiled similar timelines, underlining the capacity and actions of the OSCE in the crisis.¹ The UN has also provided research libraries outlining the UN’s response to the evolving crisis and war.² Some of OSCE’s material is replicated, but the timeline also includes actions/decisions taken at state level (Ukraine, Russia), at sub-state level (DNR and LNR), and in other international organizations (EU sanctions and the UN).

Rather than emphasize organizational capacities in crisis management, however, I seek first to visualize how the international community has reacted (sanctions), second, to create an image of the dynamic of the separatist rebel movement in Donetsk-Luhansk, and thirdly, to indicate how information is “timed” and sequenced into the conflict development, and third, to move beyond the “blame-game” of news narratives, and see facts as they are.

This latter motivation is an important one. Often, news narratives create their own timelines, and their own causal chain of events. Moreover, the longer the crisis, the more fragmented the timelines and the news-narratives become, and the more confused cause and effect may appear. Sometimes, news narratives, rather than to clarify the complexity, origins, and dynamics of a crisis, become agencies; they present events in a particular light. Hence, a primary motivation with this timeline is to suggest a more comprehensive view on the development of the conflict, while also capturing its complexity, and clarifying its origins. As all sources, news narratives need to be interpreted and stripped down to what could be called basic claims or basic information. I have attempted to do so in this timeline.

The material is compiled on the basis of multiple English language and Russian language sources. The empirical material is organized as follows: it starts from Yanukovych’ disappearance from Kiev, although arguably, the conflict started before this, and ends in May 2015.

² http://research.un.org/en/ukraine
The Conflict and War in Ukraine: A Timeline

20 February 2014:
• Street fighting turns violent in Kiev. In the course of one day, 39 peaceful demonstrators are killed by unidentified sniper fire, and 8 are wounded.3

21 February 2014:
• Ministers of foreign affairs of the EU-countries Poland, Germany and France negotiates an agreement with President Yanukovych and the opposition representatives from Svoboda (Tyhanibok), Udar (Klichko) and Batkyvshina (Yatseniuk), which stipulates early presidential elections in December 2014 and a return to the 2004 Constitutional arrangement. The agreement also stipulates the formation of a government of national unity.4 The Russian representative, Ombudsman for Human Rights, Vladimir Lukin, departs early, and does not sign the agreement.5

• The agreement between the opposition and Yanukovych brokered by EU-countries rules out the introduction of a state of emergency. Still, it states that all illegal weapons should be returned to the authorities within 24 hours.

• The Ukrainian Rada votes 310 in favour and 54 against de-criminalizing the law that allowed for the arrest of Yulia Timoshenko. The Rada also voted to return to the 2004 Constitutional order, to implement an amnesty to all participants in demonstrations, and to dismiss the Minister of the Interior. Yanukovych announces two days of mourning for the victims of the Maidan events.6

22 February 2014:
• Yanukovych and parts of his government disappears from Kiev. Rumours hold that he has fled to the East of Ukraine, where he

3  http://www.gazeta.ru/social/2015/02/24/6424389.shtml
4  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/ukraine-president-says-deal-has-been-reached-opposition-bloodshed
5  http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/21/agreement-on-the-settlement-of-crisis-in-ukraine-full-text
6  http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-presidency-agreement-eu-cautious/25272042.html
attends a conference in Kharkov. The Ukrainian ministry of health adjusts the death toll in the Maidan demonstrations to 77.

- Timoshenko is released from the hospital in Kharkov, and flies to Kiev.

- The Rada votes 328 in favour and none against to remove Yanukovych from the presidency for his failure to perform his presidential duties. Rada speaker, Oleksandr Turchinov, is named acting president.

**23 February 2014:**
- The Rada votes to abolish the language law from 3 July 2012, which permitted the official use of two languages in regions where the percentage of Russian-speakers exceeded 10 percent. The abolition of the law from 2012 implied a return to the Soviet law on languages adopted in Ukraine in 1989, which is considered legally diffuse on a number of issues.

**24 February 2014:**
- The Rada approves a bill allocating funds for early presidential elections on 25 May 2014. The bill is supported by 352 deputies of a quorum of 376 deputies.

- Russia’s Prime Minister, Medvedev, calls on Ukraine to honour its gas-price agreement, but does not recognize the new government.

**25 February 2014:**
- Russia accuses the West of supporting “terrorists” in Kiev, and

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8 [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ukraines-president-open-to-early-vote-polish-leader-says-scores-reported-killed-in-clashes/2014/02/21/05d3de46-9a82-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ukraines-president-open-to-early-vote-polish-leader-says-scores-reported-killed-in-clashes/2014/02/21/05d3de46-9a82-11e3-b931-0204122c514b_story.html)
states that events in Ukraine “discredit the initiators and their guarantors [EU], threaten civic peace, social stability and public safety. We are bound to note that several of our western partners show no concern for the fate of Ukraine, but for one-sided geopolitical calculations. There is no sign of real assessment of the criminal acts of extremists, including neo-Nazis and anti-Semites”.14

26 February 2014:
• Putin orders unilateral military exercises in Western Russia along the border with Ukraine to “check troop’s readiness for tackling crisis scenarios”. Exercises are announced to last for 4 days.15

27 February 2014:
• Armed and unidentified groups surround and occupy the Crimean regional parliament and haul the Russian flag on top of the parliament building. In a so-called “emergency session”, the Crimean parliament decides to hold a popular referendum on Crimea’s status on 25 May 2014.

• Russia sends military aircraft toward Ukraine’s borders. Turchynov condemns Russian military involvement on Crimea.16

• US Secretary of State, Kerry, warns Putin that the escalating crisis “is not Rocky IV”.17

28 February 2014:
• The first (closed) meeting is held in the UNSC. Ukraine’s permanent representative to the UN calls for a Security Council meeting in accordance with chapters 34 and 35 of the UN Charter, calling the situation on Crimea a direct threat to the territorial integrity of Ukraine.18

14 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/24/russia-ukraine-west-yanukovich
• Yanukovych holds press conference in Russia, claiming that the international community had cynically tricked him, and that fascists had taken over in Kiev.19

• Head of the interim government, Turchynov, states that Russia is “directly involved” on Crimea. The Rada demands that Russia halt all steps that show signs of forced claims on Ukraine’s territorial integrity, Turchynov said, and added that all civil rights of Ukrainian citizens of Russian nationality are guaranteed by the Constitution.20

1 March 2014:
• The Crimean parliament (Verkhovnaya Rada) adopts a new resolution to hold the popular referendum on 30 March 2014.

• The UNSC holds its 2nd unscheduled meeting on Ukraine. The UN representative expresses deep concern for calls from the “newly elected” PM on Crimea, Aksyonov, for a Russian military presence on Crimea. The Ukrainian permanent representative calls Russia’s action a threat against the territorial integrity of Ukraine. The Russian permanent representative blames the EU for the political crisis in Ukraine and asks why the 21 February 2014 agreement was not held in respect, disregarding that Russia’s representative did not sign this agreement.21

• Putin attains the approval from the Federation Council of the Russian Federation to use military force (in accordance with the Russian Constitution of 1993).

• The UNSG, Ban Ki-Moon, calls Putin and urges Russia’s president to take direct part in settling the crisis unfolding on Crimea22

2 March 2014:
• Ukraine urges the Russian Federation to withdraw all troops to the Black Sea bases. Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, Lavrov, states

that Russia is acting on the principle of protecting the rights of the “compatriots”.23

3 March 2014:
• The 3rd unscheduled meeting on Ukraine is held in the UNSC (called by Russia). Russia’s permanent representative to the UN motivates the meeting with suggestions that “the crisis (was) provoked by the State coup in Kyiv as a result of the armed takeover by radical extremists continues to deteriorate and generate very serious threats to the future of that country”. The Russian permanent representative suggests that: “The centre of Kyiv and many towns in western Ukraine have been overrun by armed national radicals chanting extremist anti-Russian and anti-Semitic slogans.” The Russian permanent representative flashes a letter from former president of Ukraine, Victor Yanukovych, in the UNSC asking for a Russian military presence in Ukraine due to the alleged claims that “people are being persecuted on the basis of their language and their political beliefs”24

• The permanent US representative, Powers, states in the UNSC that “The Russian military are secure. The new Government in Kyiv has pledged to honour all of its existing international agreements, including those covering Russian bases.” 25 The French permanent representative states that Russia is re-introducing the principle of limited sovereignty and spheres of influence, and compares the presence of Russian troops on Crimea to that of the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia 26 The Chinese permanent representative states: “China consistently stands for the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of any country and of respect for Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.”

• The permanent representative of Ukraine to the UNSC states that 16,000 Russian troops has, since 24 February, deployed to Crimea on ships, that these troops block and control all communications from Crimea, and wage psychological warfare against the civilian

The Ukrainian representative states that: “I, too, am a Russian-speaking person, but I do not need any protection.”  

4 March 2014:
• Putin holds a press conference at Novo-Ogarevo residence, dismissing that there are Russian military groups on Crimea. He states that those armed units there are “local self-defence forces”, and that these took over “several dozen C-300 units, several dozen air-defense missile systems, 22,000 service members and a lot more. However, as I said, this is all in the hands of the people of Crimea and without a single gunshot.” The Ukrainian representative urges Russia to withdraw all its military forces to the Sevastopol base.

• Putin states, at the Novo-Ogarevo residence press conference, about the changes in Ukraine that: “There can only be one assessment: this was an anti-constitutional takeover, an armed seizure of power. Does anyone question this? Nobody does.”

• US president Obama dismisses allegations that the rights of Russians are violated in Ukraine and Crimea, stating that “Mr. Putin must have a different set of lawyers, making a different set of interpretations”.

5 March 2014:
• Russia’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sergey Lavrov, holds a press conference where he states that “Russia does not give orders to the self-defence forces on Crimea.”

29 According to the bilateral treaty on the Sevastopol base, prolonged to 2042, Russia has the right to station up to 25 000 troops on the base. See: http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-crisis/what-invasion-russian-denials-crimea-trigger-war-words-n45666
30 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/transcript-putin-defends-russian-intervention-in-ukraine/2014/03/04/9cadcd1a-a3a9-11e3-a5fa-55f0c77bf39c_story.html
31 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/kerry-in-kiev-pledges-1-billion-in-us-aid/2014/03/04/9f425fc0-a398-11e3-84d4-e59b1709222c_story.html
6 March 2014:
• The Crimean parliament votes to hold the popular referendum on Crimea’s status on 16 February 2014 and adds the question of annexing to the Russian Federation to the ballot.

10 March 2014:
• The UNSC holds a 5th closed meeting on Ukraine.

11 March 2014:
• The Crimean parliament votes for independence and membership in the Russian Federation 5 days before the so-called referendum. All Ukrainian state insignia are removed from the parliament buildings.

• The Ukrainian Rada adopts a statement that the Crimean authorities should reconsider the declaration of independence and confine to the Constitution of Ukraine. A deadline is set to 12 March 2014, after which the Rada would initiate a procedure of ending the powers of the Verkhovny Rada on Crimea.32

13 March 2014:
• Putin orders another military exercise along the Ukrainian border.

• The UNSC holds a 6th meeting since 1 March 2014, with the Prime Minister of the preliminary government, Arsenii Yatseniuk, present. PM Yatseniuk refers to the UN Charter, chapter 2, and claims that Russia is in violation of the principles of the Charter. Like the permanent representative of Ukraine to the UNSC, Yatseniuk addressed the Council in both Russian and Ukrainian languages. The UN launches a UNHCHR mission for Crimea to become operative by March 17, 2014. The US permanent representative calls the plans to hold a referendum “hastily planned, unjustified and divisive”, urging the parties to abide by the Ukrainian preliminary government’s decision to hold early elections on 25 May, 2014.33

• At the 6th meeting of the UNSC, the Russian permanent representative states that “The Russians do not want war, and I am

sure that the Ukrainians do not want it either. Furthermore — and this is something that I want to underscore in particular — we see no grounds for viewing the situation in such terms. We do not want any further exacerbation of the situation.” PM Yatseniuk stated at the same meeting: “we extended our hand to Russia, but in return we got the barrel of a gun. But we still believe that Russia is ready to negotiate and to tackle this dramatic conflict — not only in our bilateral relations, but in the whole of Europe — by peaceful means.”

15 March 2014:
• At the 7th unscheduled meeting of the UNSC on Ukraine, Russia vetoes a draft UN Security Council resolution on Ukraine, which refers to the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act, and the UN Charter paragraph 2 calling for all states to refrain from threats of violence and to settle all territorial disputes by negotiations. The draft resolution notes with concern the referendum to be held on Crimea on 16 March 2014. The draft resolution also calls upon Ukraine to respect the rights of all minorities. China abstains, and 13 vote for.

• The Russian permanent representative to the UN, Churkin, motivates Russia’s veto of the UNSCR on Ukraine with the following: “We cannot go along with its basic assumption, which is to declare illegal the planned referendum of 16 March whereby the people of the Crimean republic will themselves determine their future.” Churkin reiterates the claim that the Crimean case: “resulted from a legal vacuum generated by an unconstitutional armed coup d’état carried out in Kyiv by radical nationalists in February, as well as by their direct threats to impose their order throughout Ukraine.”

17 March 2014:
• EU adopts first sanctions against 21 named individuals, mostly local military personnel on Crimea and Russian military commanders.

37 http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm
18 March 2014:
- Putin holds his address to the wider Russian political community (the Federal Assembly, government and security ministries), in which he states that Crimea should always be Russian, that it is the cradle of Russia’s civilization, and that: “Crimea is our common historical legacy and a very important factor in regional stability. And this strategic territory should be part of a strong and stable sovereignty, which today can only be Russian [my emphasis] Otherwise, dear friends (I am addressing both Ukraine and Russia), you and we – the Russians and the Ukrainians – could lose Crimea completely, and that could happen in the near historical perspective.” He makes references to the Kosovo-precedent of unilateral recognition, and claims simultaneously that Crimea should have the same rights to unilaterally cede from Ukraine. At the end of the ceremony, he greets the “representatives” of Crimea and welcomes them as member of the Russian Federation.

19 March 2014:
- The UNSC held its 8th unscheduled meeting on Ukraine, where the UN special representative underlined the UNSG message that negotiations between Ukraine and Russia should proceed. The UNSG was visiting Kiev and Moscow. The Ukrainian representative claims that 300 000 Tatars were not taking part in the referendum, while 1 million Ukrainian natives were prevented.38 The Russian permanent representative stated: “Yesterday a truly historic event took place — the reunification of Russia and Crimea, which our peoples have awaited for six decades. In strict compliance with international law and democratic procedure, without outside interference and through a free referendum, the people of Crimea have fulfilled what is enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations and a great number of fundamental international legal documents — their right to self-determination.”39

20 March 2014:
- The EU cancels the summit with Russia in June 2014, and suggests holding a meeting in the G-7 and not the G-8.

21 March 2014:
• The EU introduces new sanctions against 12 named individuals, several of them notable Russian politicians, like Rogozin, Matvienko, Naryshkin, and Glazev. The television host for Russia Today, Kisselyov, is listed.

25 March 2014:
• Obama calls Russia a “regional power”, whose influence is limited to its near border regions, refuting Romney’s assertion that “Russia is the USA’s geopolitical rival no. 1”. Russia, Obama stated, is “lashing out on its neighbours not out of strength, but out of weakness”.

27 March 2014:
• The UN GA adopts a resolution on the territorial integrity of Ukraine, which is supported by 101 UN members (11 votes against). The resolution refers to all international treaties and principles in the draft resolution from 15 March 2014, plus the Russian – Ukrainian Treaty of Friendship (1997) and the Alma-Ata declaration of 1991. The resolution called upon all parties to work for a peaceful, settled and negotiated solution, and confirmed the UN’s commitment to the territorial sovereignty of Ukraine.

6 April 2014:
• Armed groups storm police stations in Donetsk and seize control over arms, calling for secession from Ukraine and the creation of the Donetsk Republic. The city oblast building is occupied and rebels want to hold a national referendum on independence on 11 May 2014.

7 April 2014:
• Pro-Russians occupy offices in Donetsk and declare the “independent republic” of Donetsk. They call for a referendum on independence from Ukraine to be held on 11 May 2014.

References:
40  http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/26/world/europe/hague-summit-focuses-on-preventing-trafficking-of-nuclear-materials.html?_r=0
41  http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3- CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/a_res_68_262.pdf
10 April 2014:
• Satellite images exposes 40 000 Russian troops 30 miles off the border with Ukraine.\textsuperscript{45}

11 April 2014:
• NATO Secretary General, Fogh-Rasmussen calls on Russia to withdraw its 40 000 troops from the border region with Ukraine.\textsuperscript{46}

12 April 2014:
• Pro-Russian militants launch offensives in Kramatorsk and Slavyansk and take over police and military headquarters.\textsuperscript{47}

13 April 2014:
• Ukrainian authorities start an anti-terrorism operation (ATO) against rebel positions in Slavyansk.

• First UNSC unscheduled meeting on the unrest in Eastern Ukraine, called by Russia and the 10\textsuperscript{th} UNSC on Ukraine in 2014.\textsuperscript{48}

16 April 2014:
• Ukrainian ATO-forces are pushed back from Slavyansk; rebels seize military hardware and triumph.

• Militants seize town hall in Donetsk.

• Militants try to seize a military base in Mariupol, but are repulsed by Ukrainian forces.

17 April 2014:
• The ministers of foreign affairs of the EU, USA, Ukraine and Russia meet in Geneva and adopt the Geneva Accords, in which all parties pledge to “refrain from violence, intimidation and provocative action”, and that all “illegally armed groups should be disarmed”.

\textsuperscript{45} http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2602132/U-S-troops-sent-Eastern-Europe-NATO-countries-feeling-threatened-Russia-Ukraine-conflict.html
\textsuperscript{46} http://www.cnbc.com/id/101575441
\textsuperscript{47} http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2014/05/03/timeline-unrest-east-ukraine/
The accords task the OSCE monitoring missions with overseeing the agreement and start processes toward de-escalation.49

- Putin acknowledges that there were Russian forces on Crimea prior to the referendum, and claims that they were there to “secure the will of the Crimean people.”.50

- Putin dismisses as nonsense that there are Russian military advisors active in Eastern Ukraine.51

21 April 2014:
- Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia accuses Kiev for breaking the Geneva accords, and for not having “disarmed Right Sector groups”. Lavrov criticizes the Ukrainian government still unrecognized by Russia, for not having ended the Maidan protests. 52

25 April 2014:
- Russia and Putin starts new military drills at Ukraine’s border, warning Kiev against launching offensives against Donetsk rebels.53

- 8 military OSCE observers were abducted in Slavyansk by rebels.54

27 April 2014:
- Rebels in Eastern Ukraine parade the 8 abducted OSCE observers through the streets of Donetsk.55

29 April 2014:
- The EU introduces new sanctions against 15 named officials, many of which are believed to be behind the Donetsk and


http://www.osce.org/cio/118266
Lugansk separatist movements, among others, Strelkov (GRU officer), Pushilyyn, Purgin, and also Russian officials overseeing the integration of Crimea into the RF (Kozak).

- Russia’s Minister of Defence, Shoigu expresses concern over alleged “build-up of NATO forces” on the borders of Russia, making reference to the US’ deployment of 600 troops for exercises in Poland and the Baltic States. ⁵⁶

**2 May 2014:**
- Ukrainian forces start attack at rebel positions in Slavyansk. Sophisticated rebel-held weaponry brings down two Ukrainian choppers. ⁵⁷

**3 May 2014:**
- The 7 abducted OSCE observers were released, among other things by the mediation of the civilian OSCE monitoring mission. ⁵⁸

**11 May 2014:**
- The so-called DNR and LNR hold widely contested referendum on independence. Leaders claim 90 and 96 per cent support for independence. There were no international observers. Local DNR leaders claim that after the referendum, all “illegal military forces on the territory will be considered occupiers.” ⁵⁹

**12 May 2014:**
- The EU puts another 13 officials on the sanctions list, among others officials from the Russian migration authorities, and officials responsible for the integration of Crimea into the Russian Federation. A first Ukrainian (former Rada member) is put on the sanctions list.

- Russia declares the referendums in DNR and LNR legitimate, and

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⁵⁸ [http://www.osce.org/cio/118266](http://www.osce.org/cio/118266)
states that Kiev should enter into direct negotiations with the local authorities of the republics.\(^60\)

20 May 2014:
- The Supreme Rada of Ukraine adopts a resolution on Concord and Unity, and initiates a process of constitutional reforms leading to regional self-rule. The resolution professes an amnesty for all anti-government protesters, and introduces the right for regions to adopt decisions on language and culture freely.\(^61\)

24 May 2014:
- An Italian journalist, Andrea Rochelli, and his Russian interpreter, the human rights activist, Andrey Mironov, are killed by shelling in the Donetsk region.\(^62\)

25 May 2014:
- Ukraine holds presidential elections in accordance with the decision of the Supreme Rada of Ukraine. Poroshenko wins the elections by 55 percent. There is no second round. Turnout is 60 percent (excluding regions that were not under control of the government). According to a statement made by Ukraine’s Constitutional Court on 16 May 2014, the president-elect was to serve 5 years in office.\(^63\)

26 May 2014:
- 11 OSCE personnel performing monitoring work are captured by rebels. Rebels storm the Donetsk airport and try to seize control over it.\(^64\)

28 May 2014:
- The UNSC holds an unscheduled meeting on Ukraine, noting the success of the presidential elections on May 25 2014. The UNSG congratulates Poroshenko on his election. Simultaneously, the 


UNSC does not verify images of a UN chopper allegedly having been used in Ukraine. The UNSC expresses grave concern over the capturing of the OSCE personnel.65

29 May 2014:
• Rebels shoot down a Ukrainian chopper and kills Ukrainian general Serhiy Kulchytskiy.66

4 June 2014:
• Rebels launch attacks against two military bases in the Luhansk district.67

4 – 5 June 2014:
• G-7 holds summit without Russian presence.

7 June 2014:
• Petro Poroshenko is inaugurated as Ukraine’s president.

12 June 2014:
• Russia holds drills in Russian Baltic fleet in response to NATO exercises. Latvia scrambles Russian aircraft moving toward Latvia’s airspace.68

20 June 2014:
• Poroshenko announces a one-week unilateral ceasefire and announces a peace plan. UNSG Ban Ki-Moon pledges his support to a new trilateral negotiation format (the trilateral group). Poroshenko invites the OSCE to monitor the ceasefire and calls for all rebels to disarm. Moscow dismisses the unilateral ceasefire, and calls it “not an invitation to peace, but an ultimatum.”69

67  http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/aeb0a2b6-ebf3-11e3-8cef-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3Rl6iZPkh
68  http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/12/uk-russia-military-exercises-idUKKBN0EN10020140612
21 June 2014:
• The UNSG, Ban Ki-Moon, talks to Poroshenko on the phone, congratulating him with the unilateral ceasefire and the peace plan.

23 June 2014:
• The UNHCR registers 46,100 internally displaced persons from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine.\(^7^0\)

24 June 2014:
• The UNSC holds its 17\(^{th}\) meeting on Ukraine. The UNSC welcomes the peace-plan given to the UN GS from Poroshenko (20 June). The UNSC calls for the release of all abducted OSCE personnel and condemns the shoot-down of an Ilyushin aircraft with Ukrainian paratroopers by rebels on 14 June 2014.\(^7^1\)

• US permanent representative to the UN, Powers, states at the 17th meeting of the UNSC that: “time and again, we have had to dedicate significant amounts of time to reviewing the efforts of Russia to destabilize its neighbour and to refuting the bold misinformation and outright fiction about what is happening on the ground in Ukraine.” Powers notes that 3 T-64 tanks have appeared in Eastern Ukraine, and that rebels have used BM-21 rocket launchers to shoot down a Ukrainian military aircraft.\(^7^2\)

• The Russian permanent representative to the UN, Churkin, recognizes the importance of the talks in the trilateral format (OSCE, Ukraine and Russia) and the importance of Poroshenko’s ceasefire and peace plan. Churkin claims that in excess of 450,000 refugees have crossed into Russia from Eastern Ukraine.\(^7^3\)

27 June 2014:
• Ukraine signs the Association Agreement with the EU.

\(^7^0\) [Link](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7205)
\(^7^1\) [Link](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7205)
\(^7^3\) [Link](http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.7205)
• Time magazine quotes UN refugee council to suggest that more than 100 000 refugees have left Ukraine for Russia.\textsuperscript{74}

• Rebels release 4 out of 8 abducted OSCE observers from Donetsk.

\textbf{30 June 2014:}
• Poroshenko holds national speech, stating that the ceasefire has ended. He states: “Peace is, was and will be my goal. Only the instruments of achieving it are changing. The defense of Ukraine's territorial integrity, of the security and lives of peaceful citizens, demands not just defensive but offensive action against the terrorist militants.”

\textbf{1 July 2014:}
• Fighting resumes in the Eastern parts of Ukraine.\textsuperscript{75}

• NATO releases fact-sheet on NATO-Russian relations and the severance of ties over Ukraine.\textsuperscript{76}

\textbf{11 July 2014:}
• Rebels launch attack at Donetsk airport. \textsuperscript{77}

\textbf{12 July 2014:}
• EU sanction list is widened with 11 names, mostly so-called “state officials” in the Donetsk and Lugansk areas. Among those sanctioned are Boroday (PM), Khodakovsky (Minister of the Interior), and Kryakov (Minister of information) of the DPR, and LDR “officials”.

\textbf{17 July 2014:}
• The Malaysian Airline carrier MH-17 is shot down over Eastern Ukraine, killing all 298 persons on board. The missile that downed the aircraft came from a BUK-weapon system most likely provided to the rebels from Russia.

\textsuperscript{74} \url{http://time.com/2933860/ukraine-russia-refugees/}
\textsuperscript{75} \url{http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/01/ukraine-fighting-intensifies-poroshenko-ends-ceasefire}
\textsuperscript{76} \url{http://www.nato.int/nato_static/assets/pdf/pdf_2014_07/20140716_140716_Factsheet_Russia_en.pdf}
\textsuperscript{77} \url{http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/ukraine/10960813/Ukraine-pro-Russian-rebels-attack-Donetsk-airport.html}
21 July 2014:
• The UN Security Council adopts resolution no 2166 (2014) deploring the “downing” of MH-17 and demanding an international investigation of the crash-site. The resolution expresses grave concern that armed rebel groups impeded free access for international investigators in eastern Ukraine.78

25 July 2014:
• EU sanction list is widened with 15 names, among these, prominent Russian officials, such as Patrushev, Fradkov, and Gryzlov. Duma deputies that support the establishment of a permanent representation of the DNR in Moscow were also targeted.

30 July 2014:
• EU sanction list is widened with 8 names, this time persons from President Putin’s inner economic circle, Rotenberg, Kovalchuk and Shamalov. Sanctions also cover presidential administration officials responsible for giving instructions to Russian media about how to cover the conflict.

31 July 2014:
• First meeting of the trilateral group for conflict resolution (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE).79

1 August 2014:
• US Pentagon sources state that 10 000 Russian soldiers have moved up until 30 miles near the Ukrainian border.80

4 August 2014:
• Russia initiates large exercise at the Ukrainian border, involving 100 aircraft.81
5 August 2014:
• UN sources suggest that 168,000 refugees have crossed the border from Eastern Ukraine into Russia.\(^{82}\) NATO senior officials state that Russia is again building up its troop presence along the border with Ukraine, reaching a number of 20,000 troops.\(^{83}\)

7 August 2014:
• Zakharchenko replaces Borodai as so-called PM of the DNR.\(^{84}\)

12 August 2014:
• Russia declares that it will send a convoy of up to 300 trucks to Eastern Ukraine. These allegedly carry humanitarian aid.\(^{85}\)

14 August 2014:
• Konov (aka Tsar) replaces Strelkov as so-called minister of defence of the Donetsk republic.\(^{86}\)

23 August 2014:
• Russian convoy of 260 trucks crosses Ukraine’s border without permission from Kiev. Kiev calls the border crossing a “direct invasion”. Rebels accompany the trucks, and not the Red Cross (ICRC).\(^{87}\)

• US spokesmen state that Russia is firing artillery rockets into Ukrainian territory from Russian territory, and states that the UNSC will convene to discuss the issue, as well as the illegal border crossing of the truck convoy.\(^{88}\)

• NATO Secretary General, Fogh Rasmussen, calls the entry of a

\(^{83}\) http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/fae9bde0-1ca2-11e4-88c3-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3SqW5THdN
\(^{87}\) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/22/russian-convoy-crosses-border-ukraine-without-permission
\(^{88}\) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/22/russian-convoy-crosses-border-ukraine-without-permission
Russian convoy of trucks into Ukraine a “major escalation of the conflict”.89

26 August 2014:
• Second meeting of the trilateral group for conflict resolution (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE) with the presence of new leaders of the separatists in Lugansk and Donetsk.

27 August 2014:
• Ukrainian authorities accuse Russia of “wide-scale looting” after the convoy of Kamaz trucks return to Russian territory. The trucks had, according to Ukrainian authorities, taken substantial amount of military technology from the Topaz plant back to Russia.90

28 August 2014:
• Rebels in Eastern Ukraine claim to have around 3 000 Russian volunteer fighters on their side in the conflict. The rebels claim that these were “on leave” from regular duty.91

29 August 2014:
• Putin toughens rhetoric on Ukraine and praises rebels in “Novorossiya”.92

31 August 2014:
• Putin calls for Ukrainian authorities to start “statehood-talks” with rebels in Eastern Ukraine. “We must immediately begin substantive, meaningful negotiations, not on technical questions, but about the political organization of society and the statehood of Ukraine’s southeast for the unconditional securing of the legal interests of the people who live there,” Putin stated, not specifying what he meant by “we”.93
1 September 2014:
• Third meeting of the trilateral group for conflict resolution (Russia, Ukraine, OSCE) with the presence of new leaders of the separatists in Lugansk and Donetsk.

3 September 2014:
• Russia announces major drill of strategic nuclear forces to be held in September, involving 4 000 troops in the central Altai region.94

4 September 2014:
• The NATO summit starts in Wales.

5 September 2014:
• Russian media sources laud “volunteers” fighting in Eastern Ukraine, and cover a funeral of one such “volunteer”. Rossiya television channel claims that up to 4 000 “volunteers” are fighting in Eastern Ukraine.95

• The Minsk trilateral group meeting (OSCE chairmanship Switzerland, Ukraine, Russia) produces a protocol of the meeting, called the “Minsk protocol”. The protocol resembles earlier proposals by Poroshenko (the 15-point peace plan announced on 20 June 2014), but is assembled on the grounds that the “representatives” of DNR and LNR are legitimate. The protocol outlines 12 points: To ensure an immediate bilateral ceasefire; to ensure the monitoring and verification of the ceasefire by the OSCE; the adoption of the law of Ukraine about local government provisional arrangements in some areas of Donetsk and Lugansk (law on the special status); to ensure the permanent monitoring of the Ukrainian-Russian border and verification by the OSCE with the creation of security zones in the border regions of Ukraine and the Russian Federation; immediate release of all hostages and illegally detained persons; to adopt a law preventing the prosecution and punishment of persons in connection with the events that have taken place in some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts; to continue the inclusive national dialogue; to take measures to

94  http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/03/russia-military-exercise_n_5762292.html
improve the humanitarian situation in Donbass; to ensure early local elections in accordance with the law of Ukraine “about local government provisional arrangements in some areas of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts” (law on the special status); to withdraw illegal armed groups and military equipment as well as fighters and mercenaries from Ukraine; to adopt a program of economic recovery and reconstruction for the Donbass region; to provide personal security for participants in the consultations.

8 September 2014:
• Interfax quotes Deputy PM Kozak of Russia that 105 000 refugees from Ukraine have received status as refugees in Russia. Kozak states that 500 a day apply for refugee status.96

9 September 2014:
• The permanent representative of the Kingdom of the Netherlands sends the report of the Dutch investigators of the MH-17 aircraft to the UNSC. The report suggests that investigations on the ground have been “extremely difficult”, and that the main conclusions are tentative. The report recorded that “there were impacts from a number of high energy objects from outside the aircraft.” 97

12 September 2014:
• The EU sanctions list includes another 24 named persons, including members of the “new” DNR administration, including persons that are meeting in the trilateral group format.

13 September 2014:
• Russia Today states that the second convoy of 200 Russian trucks arrived in Luhansk.98

19 September 2014:
• Fifth meeting in the trilateral group, which results in the adoption of an implementing Memorandum to be attached to the Minsk protocol.99

96 http://russialist.org/interfax-over-100000-ukrainians-granted-refugee-status-in-russia-deputy-pm/
The memorandum stipulates that: all heavy artillery weaponry should be pulled back until 15 km from each side of the demarcation line creating a 30 km buffer zone; all offensive operations are banned; all combat aircraft flights over the zone of conflict are banned; all “foreign mercenaries” should be withdrawn from the conflict zone; an OSCE mission should be set up to monitor the Minsk protocol.

25 September 2014:
- Russian ombudsmen for children claims that 390 000 refugees have received status as refugees in the RF, of which 100 000 are children. This is 290 000 more than Kozak stated on 8 September.100

3 October 2014:
- Separatists announce “local elections” to be held in Donetsk and Lugansk on 2 November 2014. So-called “social organizations” are allowed to ballot, and the threshold is set to 5 per cent. Rebel warriors state that elections will be held also in the zone of conflict.101

- The UNSC condemns the killing of an ICRC staff member in Donetsk, due to a shell that fell close to ICRC premises.102

17 October 2014:
- Putin supported Poroshenko’s plan on a special status for Donetsk in Milano. Putin stated, after the bilateral meeting with Poroshenko: “this is not an ideal plan, but it is a step in the right direction” about Poroshenko’s special status document. Rebel leaders did not, however, discard their plan to hold “elections” on 2 November 2014. 103

27 October 2014:
- Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, Lavrov, states that Russia will recognize the result of the announced “elections” in DNR and LNR on 2 November 2014.104

101  http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/10/03_a_6247113.shtml
103  http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/10/18_a_6265837.shtml
30 October 2014:
• Strelkov holds his second press conference in Moscow. At this press conference, Khomyakov stated that there was no war between Donetsk and Ukraine, but between Russia and the USA. Strelkov agrees, stating that there is an economic and informational war being waged against Russia from the West. Strelkov does not recognize the Donetsk elections, suggesting that Zakharchenko is “keeping his people down” in the Republic. Strelkov calls for the unification of Ukraine, Russia and Belarus. 105

4 November 2014:
• Andrei Zakharchenko is taken in oath as the “head of the Donetsk Republic”.106

13 November 2014:
• Putin states in a recorded interview with German television in Vladivostok that Russian military forces were intervening on Crimea, but that it was blocking Ukrainian military bases to prevent a bloodbath. Putin stated: “Our armed forces, let’s be frank, blocked Ukraine’s armed forces that were stationed in Crimea. But not for the purpose of forcing people to participate in the vote – that’s impossible to do – but to prevent bloodshed, and to allow people to express their personal views on how they would like to see their own and their children’s future.” 107

29 November 2014:
• The EU widens its list with another 13 names, mostly people responsible for organizing the mock elections in November 2014. By 2015, the EU sanction lists counts 132 named persons.

30 November 2014:
• UN sources note that more than 1 million people are internally or externally displaced from the conflict zone in Eastern Ukraine.108

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105 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2014/10/30_a_6283501.shtml
106 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/photo/inauguratsiya_glavy_donetskoi_narodnoi_respubliki.shtml#!photo=4
107 http://www.voanews.com/content/putin-admits-russian-troop-role-in-crimea-annexation/2523186.html
• Ukrainian authorities estimated that Russia has sent about 950 half-empty Kamaz trucks to the conflict zone since August 2014. Some of these were carrying weaponry. 109

5 December 2014:
• Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, Lavrov, states that the local “elections” in Donbass and Lugansk were “exactly within the range of what had been negotiated with the Minsk protocol”, pointing to the granting of a political amnesty to be given after the Rada elections in October. Lavrov suggested that an OSCE monitoring mission could only be established after the granting of an amnesty.110

• Putin orders snap military exercise near Baltic NATO borders, involving 9,000 personnel from the Baltic fleet.111

20 December 2014:
• Putin states that no one can intimidate or isolate Russia, and that “open calls are being made to make Russia pay dearly for its independent stance, for the support of its compatriots, for Crimea, for Sevastopol, and for our mere existence.”112

• The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs states that no one can sanction Russia to give up Crimea, since it is “a historic and integral part of Russia”.113

22 December 2014:
• The leader of the self-proclaimed Donetsk republic, Zakharchenko, signs a “decree” on the formation of a DNR and LNR press-service. The press-service centre draws on resources from ITAR-TASS.114

112 http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-dismisses-us-crimea-sanctions/26754040.html
113 http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-dismisses-us-crimea-sanctions/26754040.html
114 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/03/18_a_6603689.shtml
13 January 2015:
• The UNSC condemns the shelling of a bus at the bus stop of Volnovakha, killing 11 and wounding 17. 115

26 January 2015:
• Putin claims that the Ukrainian army is not a regular state army, but part of a “NATO legion”, which persists to restrict and encircle Russia. 116

• NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, refutes Putin’s claims about a “NATO legion” in Ukraine as nonsense.

31 January 2015:
• The scheduled meeting of the trilateral Minsk-group produces no results, as the representatives of Donetsk and Lugansk do not attend. 117

6 February 2015:
• The parliament of the unrecognized Donetsk Republic adopts a memorandum claiming successor-status to the 1918 Krivorozhkiy-Donetsk republic. The memorandum proclaims the existence of a “state”, and calls for all regions of the “republic” to adjoin a federal state on the principles of “voluntary federal agreements”. This marks a local resuscitation of the Novorossiya campaign. 118

• NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, speaks at the Munich Security Conference, calling Russia’s aggression in Ukraine and continued support to the separatists for a “turning point” in European security. The Secretary General summarizes Russia’s behaviour as “annexation, aggressive actions, and intimidation.” 119

8 February 2015:
• Artillery from the DNR fires against Ukrainian positions at Debaltseve. Rebels post videos on the web. 120

118  http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/02/06_a_6402557.shtml
120  http://www.gazeta.ru/social/video/2015/02/08/artilleriya_dnr_vedet_ostrel_ukrainskoi_armii_pod_debaltsevo.shtml
• The so-called “Donetsk News Agency” accuses Ukraine for sending paramilitary people with Russian insignias into the Donetsk region to discredit Russian forces and reduce the prestige of the Donetsk and Lugansk republics in the eyes of the world. 121

9 February 2015:
• The Donetsk and Lugansk so-called republics allegedly start the mobilization to reach 100 000 volunteers in the defence of the republics. Russian pundits dismiss this as unrealistic and part of information warfare. Ukraine personnel underline that they abide strictly by the provisions of the Minsk agreement, holding their stand on the demarcation line. 122

10 February 2015:
• German Merkel meets with Obama in Washington DC to discuss the European peace plan.

• Rebels claim to have encircled Debaltseve, and suggestions are that they are moving towards Mariupol. Russian papers quotes “sources” close to the Novorossiya project that Moscow allegedly supports the reintegration of Donetsk and Lugansk with Ukraine, and that the “rebels are progressing only to negotiate from a position of strength.”123

10 February 2015:
• Kiev announces an inspection of military camps in Rostov-na-Donu by sending a note to Russia’s MFA. Inspection is demanded within the framework of the Vienna declaration on confidence building measures adopted in 2011.124

11 – 12 February 2015:
• The Normandie-format (France, Germany, Ukraine and Russia) meets in Minsk, hosted by lifetime president Lukashenko. Putin’s arrival is uncertain and not announced until late 11 February 2015. The 5-paged agreement is to be signed by the trilateral contact group, consisting of the Swiss broker, Heidi Taliavini, Ukraine’s

121 http://www.gazeta.ru/social/news/2015/02/08/n_6903093.shtml
122 http://m.gazeta.ru/social/2015/02/09/6406101.shtml
123 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/02/09_a_6406781.shtml
124 http://www.gazeta.ru/social/2015/02/10/6407021.shtml
former president, Kutchma, and the Russian Ambassador to Ukraine, Zubarov. The names of the leaders of DNR and LNR appear on the document.125

12 February 2015:
- The Normandie-format emerges from the talks with a ceasefire plan to come into force on 15 February 2015.
- Putin holds press conference after the Minsk-agreement on a ceasefire, blaming the Ukrainian side for “slow progress”, due to their alleged “unwillingness” to talk directly to representatives from DPR and LPR.126
- Heavy fighting around Debaltseve continues. Rebels storm the village Loginovo.127
- The Ukrainian Rada votes to stop the accreditation of Russian press organs to Ukraine. Moscow reacts furiously.128
- DNR leader Zakharchenko, echoes Putin’s press statement, saying that if the ceasefire is not held, the blame should be laid on Poroshenko.

13 February 2015:
- Russia submits UN SC resolution on the Minsk agreement to the UN. The resolution adopts the package for resolution embedded in the Minsk-agreement.129

14 February 2015:
- The Obama administration releases satellite images showing Russian forces and military hardware joining the rebels at the destruction of Debaltseve.130

126  http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/02/11_a_6408829.shtml?p=article&r=1612
• DNR leader Zakharchenko claims that Kiev have betrayed 5 000 security forces surrounded in Debaltseve.131

15 February 2015:
• Spokespersons from France and Germany believe that the ceasefire is “generally holding”. Ukrainian military claim to have been shot at 60 times since the start of the ceasefire.132

• Rebels disavow ceasefire around Debaltseve, referring to it as “rebel territory”.133

• Rebels turn OSCE observers away from observing in Debaltseve in spite of the agreement in the ceasefire plan that OSCE should monitor the agreement.134

16 February 2015:
• The EU adds another 19 names to the sanction list, mostly select commanders of the armed rebel units in DNR and LNR, but also two deputies of the Russian State Duma, the head of Russia’s main operation department of the general staff, and two deputy defence ministers of Russia.135

• The EU adds 9 organizations to the sanction list, among these Strelkov’s Novorossiya organization, the Cossack National guard, and several illegally formed battalions of militias.136

17 February 2015:
• The conflict around Debaltseve rages on. DNR leader Zakharchenko is allegedly wounded. Heavy artillery and military equipment is not withdrawn from the demarcation line.137

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131 http://www.gazeta.ru/social/video/2015/02/14/zaharchenko_ukraina_predala_5000_chelovek_kotorye_nahodyatsya_v_debatsevskom_kotle.shtml
133 http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/15/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSKBN0LH14T20150215
134 http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/15/us-ukraine-crisis-osce-idUSKBN0LJ0LO20150215
135 http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm
136 http://europa.eu/newsroom/highlights/special-coverage/eu_sanctions/index_en.htm
• Rebels claim to control two thirds of Debaltseve.\textsuperscript{138}

• Amnesty International states that 7 000 civilians are still trapped in Debaltseve, with 18 000 having fled.\textsuperscript{139}

• Russia’s draft UNSC resolution on the Minsk agreement is unanimously supported in the UNSC. The Russian UN permanent representative, Churkin, accuses UN SC members of having tried to “rewrite” the Minsk agreement, and that “Ukraine has a chance to turn this dramatic page in history”.\textsuperscript{140}

• The UNSC resolution 2202 (2015) reaffirms all parties’ respect for Ukraine’s territorial integrity (by the US permanent representative referred to as ‘ironic’, since Russia has not), endorsed the Minsk agreement packages (i and ii --- on immediate, comprehensive ceasefire, withdrawal of all heavy artillery, and OSCE monitoring), and called for all parties to support the agreement. The Minsk-package also stated that the Ukrainian parliament should, within 12 March 2015, adopt a law on decentralization for Eastern Ukraine, and ensure amnesty for those involved (without any specified time frame).\textsuperscript{141}

• The UNSC 2202 (2015) makes references to the only UNSC resolution adopted during the Ukraine crisis, UNSCR 2166 (2014) on full accountability and transparency from all parties (rebels included) on the investigation of the MN-17 flight shot down over Eastern Ukraine on 17 July 2014.\textsuperscript{142}

18 February 2015:
• Ukrainian forces start to pull out of Debaltseve. Poroshenko confirms the withdrawal, and lists the units. Withdrawal takes place under heavy fire from rebels. President Putin states that “what is happening there was completely predictable, since, as we know, the Ukrainians there were encircled a week before the Minsk-agreement.”\textsuperscript{143}

\textsuperscript{138} http://www.gazeta.ru/social/2015/02/17/6415569.shtml
\textsuperscript{139} http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31495099
\textsuperscript{140} http://rt.com/news/233243-un-council-resolution-ukraine/
\textsuperscript{143} http://www.gazeta.ru/social/2015/02/18/6416829.shtml
• Zakharchenko announces that “the territory of the DNR is the territory of Donetsk oblast,” and that “if our demands of de facto independence are not accepted, we will announce that Donetsk oblast is our territory.”¹⁴⁴

• Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, Lavrov, urges rebels to provide POWs from Debaltseve (300 of a total of 5 000 troops) with clothes and food.¹⁴⁵

• At an evening meeting with the NSC, Poroshenko calls for a UN peacekeeping mission to oversee the ceasefire and the Minsk agreement.¹⁴⁶ Ukrainian diplomatic sources request an EU Mission in Eastern Ukraine.¹⁴⁷

• President Poroshenko speaks on the phone to the leaders of the Normandie format (France, Germany, Russian and Ukraine), urging them not “to pretend that what happened at Debaltseve was a part of the Minsk agreement.”¹⁴⁸

• At a summit in Latvia, NATO Secretary General, Jens Stoltenberg, expresses deep concerns over the deteriorating developments around Debaltseve.¹⁴⁹

19 February 2015:

• Russia’s permanent representative to the UNSC, Vitaliy Churkin, states that Kiev’s appeal to the UN and the EU on a peacekeeping mission de facto disavows the Minsk-Treaty.¹⁵⁰

• Russia’s PM, Medvedev, instructs the government and Gazprom to adopt a plan for gas-deliveries to Donetsk.¹⁵¹

¹⁴⁴ http://www.gazeta.ru/social/2015/02/18/6416829.shtml
¹⁴⁷ http://lenta.ru/news/2015/02/18/eliseev/
¹⁴⁸ http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ukrainian-call-for-un-peacekeepers-runs-into-quick-trouble/2015/02/19/b6a49d54-b7b5-11e4-bc30-a4e75503948a_story.html
¹⁴⁹ http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohg/opinions_117517.htm
¹⁵¹ http://www.rg.ru/2015/02/19/medvedev-site.html
• Ukrainian military authorities report new shelling of the outskirts of Mariupol, registering 13 mortar and artillery attacks around the population area of Shyrokine. 152

21 February 2015:
• UN estimates that 1.5 million have fled their homes in Eastern Ukraine, and that 5700 have been killed. Rebels and Kiev swap prisoners. 153

• Pro-Putin rallies and Anti-Maidan takes place in Moscow, St. Petersburg.

• Yanukovych states that he would like to return to Kiev and Ukraine. 154

• US Secretary of State, Kerry, accuses Russia of “craven behaviour” in breaching the ceasefire and threatens with harsher sanctions. UK minister of foreign affairs supports the statement, adding that “We know to a certainty what Russia has been providing to the separatists, how Russia is involved with the separatists.” 155

• Ukrainian military spokesmen state that the rebels are sending more tanks and hardware to Novoazovsk by the Black Sea and suggest a rebel attempt to charge Mariupol. 20 of these tanks are Russian. 156

• OSCE is let into Debaltseve. 157

22 February 2015:
• Rebels claim that they will withdraw heavy artillery and military technology from the line of demarcation. Ukrainian military claim .............................

152 http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/ukrainian-call-for-un-peacekeepers-runs-into-quick-trouble/2015/02/19/b6a49d54-b7b5-11e4-bc30-a4e75503948a_story.html
154 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/21/ukraine-debaltseve-rebels-maidan-one-year-anniversary
155 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/21/russia-additional-sanctions-john-kerry-london-talks-philip-hammond
156 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/21/russia-additional-sanctions-john-kerry-london-talks-philip-hammond
that Russia is reinforcing rebel stands with military hardware close to Mariupol.\textsuperscript{158}

• 3 participants in a Euromaidan march in Kharkov are killed after a bomb is thrown into the march.\textsuperscript{159}

• Medvedev announces that Ukraine has paid in advance for only 3-4 days of gas, and that the transfer of gas may be halted.\textsuperscript{160}

• OSCE observers call situation in Debaltseve a humanitarian catastrophe.\textsuperscript{161}

\textbf{23 February 2015:}

• Rebels in Eastern Ukraine celebrate the Day of the Red Army (men’s day) and claim militant continuity with Soviet times.\textsuperscript{162}

• Putin gives interview to National State Television and Radio Company and thinks that the “apocalyptic scenario” of a war between Ukraine and Russia will not become a reality. Putin restates his claims from 18 March 2014, that Crimea will “always be Russian”, but adds that it is “Ukrainian, Crimea Tatarian, Greek and German” as well. “It will be a home to all these people”, he claims, dismissing Poroshenko’s promise that Crimea shall be returned to Ukraine as “revanchist”.\textsuperscript{163}

• A Finnish television company, YLE, films a column of military vehicles, carrying grad missiles 50 kilometres off the Ukrainian border. The vehicles had no license plates and were driving in direction of Ukraine from Rostov.\textsuperscript{164}

\textsuperscript{158} \url{http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/22/us-ukraine-crisis-idUSKBN0LQ08A20150222}
\textsuperscript{159} \url{http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/02/22_a_6422997.shtml}
\textsuperscript{160} \url{http://www.vedomosti.ru/companies/news/39656311/medvedev-esli-otbor-gaza-ukrainoj-sohranitsya-na-nyneshnem}
\textsuperscript{161} \url{http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/39684611/nablyudateli-obse-zayavili-o-gumanitarnoi-katastrofe-v}
\textsuperscript{162} \url{http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/23/ukraine-separatists-soviet-holiday-mens-day-donetsk}
\textsuperscript{163} \url{http://kremlin.ru/news/47730}
\textsuperscript{164} \url{http://tvrain.ru/articles/kolonna_voennoj_tehniki_s_raketami_i_gruzovik_s_logotipom_magnita_chto_proishodit_na_rossijsko_ukrainskoj_granitse-382608/}
• Gazeta.ru suggests that the DNR rebels are aiming for Mariupol, the sea-based city of 500 000 inhabitants. The journal suggests that a loss of Mariupol may entail a complete economic collapse of Ukraine. Gazeta.ru suggests that the “leadership of Novorossiya” is adding still more villages to their territory in the Mariupol region.

**24 February 2015:**

• The procurator of Ukraine closes investigations on the sniper fire killings of 20 February 2014. Blame is given to Berkut, gazeta.ru claims. 23 identified Berkut-members are under investigation, 20 of which are not arrested. All are members of a special black ops unit of Berkut, officials claim, and were given direct orders by the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Zakharchenko) to open fire against peaceful demonstrators.

• Ukraine military authorities claim that rebels are not withdrawing heavy artillery from the demarcation line, and claim that the rebels are regrouping.

• Secretary of State, Kerry, states that Russia has been “persisting in their misrepresentations, lies, whatever you would like to call them”.

• Zerkalo nedeli (Ukrainian) states that the Ukrainian procurator office has identified 20 Russian FSB officers that are under suspicion for having taken part in the violent Maidan incidents.


**25 February 2015:**

• Ukrainian military announces that the rebels are not withdrawing,
but “circulating” armed vehicles and regrouping them to the South.171

5 March – 15 March 2015:
• Putin disappears from performing public duties. Rumours of health, child-birth, and even a coup, surge.172

14 March 2015:
• The deadline for demarcation of the territories and solving of the status of the Eastern Ukraine “republics” (according to the Minsk memorandum) runs out. Poroshenko launches a new legal initiative to the Verkhovna Rada.173

15 March 2015:
• The TV-channel Russia 1 launches the alleged documentary film “Crimea – the road to the Motherland”, in which Putin states that he evacuated Yanukovych to save his life, and that he was prepared to put Russian strategic forces on combat readiness over Crimea.

16 March 2015:
• Russia’s MFA expresses concerns over Poroshenko’s new law draft to the Rada on conditions of self-rule in Donetsk and rebel areas, and claims that the new law draft launches conditions that have not been included in the Minsk-agreement from 12 February 2015.174

17 March 2015:
• The law on the status of the territories of Eastern Ukraine promoted by Poroshenko on 14 March is made public. The Rada voted to support a resolution calling the regions “illegally occupied”, but passed the law on the status. This law stipulated: Kiev is prepared to give a “special status” to the regions within the borders of September 2014 (the expansion of November 2014-January 2015 not included – i.e. Debaltseve and the Donetsk airport) given

173 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/03/18_a_6603565.shtml
174 http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcb3/e8969627c9e62c9a43257e0b0045b2a3!OpenDocument
certain conditions. These are new elections (under OSCE monitoring and under Ukrainian law), the withdrawal of all military hardware from the territories of the DNR and LNR, and equal access to news-media for all candidates, and also Ukrainian media. The Rada also adopted a resolution appealing to the UN and the EU to send peacekeepers to the region.

• The Head of the Duma Committee on foreign affairs calls the resolution of the Rada that Eastern Ukraine is occupied for “nonsense”.

• Putin’s Press-Attaché Peshkov states that peace-keeping forces in Eastern Ukraine can be introduced only on the condition of agreement between the leaders of the “republics” and Ukraine.

• The local leaders in DNR are categorically against the introduction of peace-keepers.

18 March 2015:
• Germany’s Chancellor and Ukraine’s president hold telephone conversations on Poroshenko’s new legal draft to the Rada and forthcoming meetings within the Normandie-4 format.

• Kiev announces that it has gathered documentations on Shoigu’s and Putin’s statements in the Russia 1 documentary, and that these will be sent to the Hague Tribunal.

• The Novorossiya press-centre in Moscow is closed. The head of the office announces that information about “Novorossiya” would be distributed through the Donetsk and Lugansk press-agencies. The press centre was set up in April 2014, under the patronage of Surkov and the Centre for Political Trends, led by Aleksey Chesnakov. The centre maintains the blog “War and Peace” (Война и миръ), which publishes interviews with the rebels.

175 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/03/18_a_6603565.shtml
180 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/03/18_a_6604817.shtml
181 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/03/18_a_6603689.shtml
Lavrov accuses Ukraine for a glaring breach of the Minsk agreement in its proposal that all elections in DNR and LNR should be monitored and recognized by international organizations. Lavrov, who endorsed the elections on 2 November 2014 before they were held, suggests that France, Germany and Russia should conduct a trilateral demarche to Ukraine.¹⁸²

19 March 2015:
• Russia announces that it will not change the contract of gas deliveries with Ukraine. Kiev demands that Russia lowers price of gas and pays more for gas transit, ahead of gas-negotiations in Brussels on 20 March.¹⁸³

20 March 2015:
• RUSI report testifies to the first massive incursion of Russian soldiers in Eastern Ukraine on 11 August 2014. The report establishes that Russian reconnaissance and special operation units where active in Eastern Ukraine from 14 July 2014.¹⁸⁴

25 March 2015:
• Novaya gazeta publishes interview with 20 year old Russian conscript, who testifies as to having been sent to Eastern Ukraine from Ulan-Ude in Russia. The interview is reprinted in the Guardian.¹⁸⁵

26 March 2015:
• DNR leader Zakharchenko issues “ultimatum” towards Kiev, claiming that Kiev should withdraw military hardware from the frontline buffer zone, and that rebels would return their hardware if not.¹⁸⁶

4 April 2015:
• Russia’s minister of foreign affairs, Sergey Lavrov, states in Bratislava that the Minsk agreement should be held, and that OSCE

¹⁸³ http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2015/03/18/6604309.shtml
¹⁸⁴ https://www.rusi.org/downloads/assets/201503_BP_Russian_Forces_in_Ukraine_FINAL.pdf
¹⁸⁶ http://www.gazeta.ru/social/2015/03/26/6615153.shtml
should monitor the first steps of the agreement - the ceasefire and the withdrawal of heavy artillery.\textsuperscript{187}

\textbf{9 April 2015:}

- Ukraine’s minister of foreign affairs, Pavel Klimkin, visits Paris and holds an interview with \textit{Novaya gazeta}, in which he reiterates Ukraine’s proposal to have peacekeeping forces to uphold the Minsk-agreement in Eastern Ukraine. The interview is reproduced in \textit{Novaya gazeta}, and Klimkin rebukes the statement of Russia’s MFA that Poroshenko’s 17 March proposal alters the Minsk agreement. According to Klimkin, the Minsk agreement outlines in clear that any elections in the eastern regions should be monitored by international observers. Klimkin expresses bewilderment as to the suggestion that Russia might turn down a proposal for peacekeeping forces in the UNSC.\textsuperscript{188}

- Lavrov states at a press conference in Russia that “Kiev is the main obstacle for fulfilling the Minsk-agreement”\textsuperscript{189}

- The Rada discusses and adopts numerous laws initiating decommunization in Ukraine, among other things, laws that consider Nazism and Soviet Stalinism as equal, and bans all symbolic from Soviet times.\textsuperscript{190} The law package also included statements rehabilitating OUN and UPA as fighters for Ukrainian independence. The laws opened all KGB archives from the Soviet period.\textsuperscript{191}

\textbf{10 April 2015:}

- Kharkov oblast council adopts a resolution appealing to the UN, in which Russia is designated as “aggressor country”. The City Council of Kharkov does not follow.\textsuperscript{192}

\textsuperscript{187} http://www.praguepost.com/world-news/46595-lavrov-insists-on-minsk-agreements-while-in-bratislava
\textsuperscript{188} http://www.novayagazeta.ru/politics/68003.html
\textsuperscript{189} http://beforeitsnews.com/politics/2015/04/russia-kiev-the-main-obstacle-to-the-implementation-of-minsk-lavrov-2703330.html
\textsuperscript{190} http://www.rferl.org/content/ukraine-decommunization-soviet-past-russia-stalin-lenin/26963110.html
\textsuperscript{191} http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/20/ukraine-decommunisation-law-soviet
\textsuperscript{192} http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/04/09_a_6633217.shtml
27 April 2015:  
• Gazeta.ru publishes article that an attack on Mariupol is imminent.193

2 May 2015:  
• Ukraine demands a payback of 16 billion USD for gas through the Stockholm arbitrage courts. Gazprom retorts that the fines according to the take-and-pay scheme are already “astronomical”, close to 40 billion USD.194

11 May 2015:  
• Authorities in the non-recognized republics of LNR and DNR state that they will not go for independence, but “wide autonomy” within the borders of Ukraine. Denis Pushilin argued, however, that if Ukrainian authorities violate the Minsk agreement, the republics would go for complete independence and de facto statehood.195

12 May 2015:  
• Ukraine addresses the UN to demand 350 billion USD from Russia for the “destruction of Donbass”. Ukrainian authorities compare the “attack on Ukraine” with Iraq’s attack on Kuwait.196

194 http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2015/05/02/6664001.shtml  
195 http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2015/05/11_a_6682593.shtml  
196 http://www.gazeta.ru/business/2015/05/12/6682669.shtml
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