

Between Reluctance and Necessity: The Utility of Military Force in Humanitarian and Development Operations

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Introduction

The utility of military force in the contemporary strategic context is far from self-explanatory. Military operations with the political aims of stability, democratisation, economic development, and respect for human rights have been the most prominent since the end of the Cold War and are likely to continue to be so in the near future. The military continues to play an important role in these operations, but Rupert Smith accurately argues that military force is too often considered a solution 'for a wide range of problems for which it was not originally intended or configured'.² The way contemporary armed forces have adjusted to the new array of tasks, is therefore of interest and this paper focuses on the use of military force in humanitarian and development type activities. To what extent are armed forces involved in and useful in these types of activities? How does the military relate to the humanitarian and development communities? What are the humanitarian and security consequences of military involvement in these new roles?

Traditionally, the civil-military relationship in peace operations, involving both military, humanitarian and development actors, has been premised on the idea of separate roles and a sequenced interaction. Military forces would provide security in the wake of a peace settlement and thereby create a suitable condition for relief and development actors to provide the aid. However, the strategic and tactical realities of operations displayed in Liberia, Afghanistan and Iraq paint a very different picture of overlapping tasks and interdependence between military and humanitarian actors. The military is increasingly engaging in humanitarian activity and the humanitarian community is increasingly employing assistance in terms of security and logistics from the military.

Lessons learned from recent operations show that uncoordinated humanitarian and military activities achieve little effect or risk being

counterproductive. A clear trend is therefore to develop multifunctional approaches to operations, seeking to coordinate or integrate the activities of military, humanitarian and development actors into coherent operations with a common strategic purpose³. However, this paper notes that the new trend should also be critically examined in order to avoid assumptions about effectiveness stemming from increased integration.

Humanitarian activity on the part of the military is another recent reality, partly because of tactical necessities in the field, partly because it may have positive strategic and tactical effects in hearts and minds operations. In counter-insurgency operations, in which the emphasis is on winning hearts and minds and increasing political legitimacy for the government, so called civil-military operations, civil affairs units, quick impact projects, and Provincial Reconstruction Teams, are thought to be imperative for success. Thus, in contemporary multifunctional operations, the activities of military and civilian actors are not only thought necessary to be coordinated or integrated for increased effectiveness, the military may also have to, or choose to, perform traditional humanitarian relief and development tasks.

This paper has three aims; to describe the extent of civil-military interaction in peace support operations; to analyse a number of consequences of this interface; and to outline a number of policy implications and areas for future research. In order to achieve these aims, the paper is introduced by a review of the civil-military interface in the field of operations. This involves mapping the 'tactical realities' in the field, as well as reviewing the current trends in conceptual development regarding civil-military integration and coherence. Thereafter, the paper analyses a number of potential consequences of increased military involvement in humanitarian activities, as well as increased civil-military integration. The focus of this analysis is the ideas of 'militarisation of humanitarian aid' and the reverse 'humanitarianisation of the military'. What does this mean for the humanitarian principles and the idea of humanitarian space? Is integration and humanitarianisation leading to increased effectiveness and better outcomes in peace support operations?

The main argument of the paper is that the benefits of civil-military integration cannot be taken for granted, and that careful analysis of the involved actors and their interests are needed in order to determine the

need for integrated structures; i.e. which actors should be integrated and which are better left outside? How should different tasks and responsibilities be divided and distributed and co-ordinated among the different actors involved? There is a great need for increased understanding of the causal mechanisms that lead to effectiveness in complex peace support operations. Finally, the basic question of what can actually be achieved in terms of political change from external intervention must also be revisited.

The extension of the civil–military interface

As touched upon in the introduction, the starting point of this paper is the acknowledgement of a new strategic context involving a reversal of interest from traditional large-scale warfare between states to different forms of peace support operations or small wars⁴. One of the main features of contemporary conflict is the far-reaching and complicated aims of operations, which often means that Western armed forces will be operating in contexts involving a combination of counter-insurgency, post-conflict reconstruction, humanitarian assistance, as well as economic development and state building. This section highlights two important trends: 1. The changing tactical realities in the field, leading to increasing overlaps between military and humanitarian actors and; 2. The strategic trend towards multifunctional approaches seeking coherence and integration of all involved actors.

Tony Blair has advocated the use of armed force as 'an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress'⁵. Anthony Forster argues that it is not at all uncommon for politicians and scholars to conceptualise security as a precondition of democracy, 'too readily seeing the deployment of troops as a means of achieving both security and democracy'. He further notes that state-building has become the primary *raison d'être* of military intervention in a number of cases – Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), Kosovo (1999) and Macedonia (1999), and, more recently, in Afghanistan and Iraq. Forster nevertheless argues that the use of the military in state-building and humanitarian operations is far more complex than tabloid headlines about using the armed forces 'as a force for good' suggest.⁶ Amitai Etzioni similarly cautions us about the benefits of intervention and nation-building by arguing that many

commentators greatly overestimate the transformative powers of even the most powerful nations and organisations when it comes to changing and reengineering the regimes of the other nations. Instead, he argues:

[t]he tragic fact of the international reality is that both approaches to long-distance, large-scale social engineering have failed in most places. Liberal democracy is a delicate plant that grows only slowly under favourable conditions; it needs to be cultivated carefully by those who aim to live under it rather than by those who wish it for them.⁷

Page Fortna accurately highlights the fact that despite the vast literature on peace support operations, the area remains undertheorised and undertested. She notes two serious gaps in the existing literature. First, the causal mechanisms through which peacekeepers keep peace have not been systematically spelled out. Second, empirical testing of whether peace is more likely after international involvement through different forms of peace operations is very limited.⁸

The use of armed forces in tasks previously owned by the international development community, such as providing reconstruction and critical infrastructure, is what Forster has come to term the 'humanitarianisation of the military'. He accurately argues that this is an overlooked but parallel process to the often debated 'militarisation of humanitarian assistance'.⁹

The military is far from the only involved actor in contemporary peace support operations and will play but one part in operations that are likely to include a wide range of actors, such as other civilian government departments and agencies, international organisations, private security companies and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), host government agencies and security forces. A World Bank study firmly establishes the link between security and development by arguing that war retards development, and conversely development retards war.¹⁰ Olson and Gregorian similarly argue that in situations of incomplete or fragile peace, the interlinked nature of security and development is inescapable. Security is necessary to enable progress on development, and basic relief and longer-term development gains are necessary to achieve long term stability by removing common obstacles to peace. 'Whether donors, militaries, development and humanitarian relief agencies choose to work together or not, they must work "side by side" in the same settings

and the effects of their efforts are inevitably intertwined.¹¹ At the tactical level, in the field of operations, the nature of the civil-military interface is therefore an important factor for mission success.

A recent report on civil-military interaction in Liberia and Afghanistan shows that activities and mandates often overlap as military forces engage in aid provision and development actors participate in the security sector reform spectrum; especially in so called demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of excombatants. Overlaps are also obvious in the areas of post-conflict reconstruction and institutional development of justice systems, rule of law and governance.¹² Moreover, the failure of the sequenced approach to post-conflict management and civil-military interaction is obvious in both Liberia and Afghanistan where great basic humanitarian needs, and in the case of Afghanistan also security needs, still exist while already moving ahead with development and state building.¹³ In Iraq, the early, and continuing, failures of economic reconstruction and political progress are even described as causes of the insurgency – or at least its scale.¹⁴ A comprehensive and non-sequenced approach to the post-conflict situation in Iraq may therefore have limited the scale of the insurgency and improved the security situation.

The tactical realities in the field thereby show the limits of traditional separated and sequenced understandings of the civil-military divide. From a military perspective, General Charles Krulak's idea of 'three block war' shows the complex reality of soldiers by describing how troops are confronted by the entire spectrum of tactical challenges in the span of a few hours and within the space of three contiguous city blocks.¹⁵

In one moment in time, our service members will be feeding and clothing displaced refugees, providing humanitarian assistance. In the next moment, they will be holding two warring tribes apart - conducting peacekeeping operations - and, finally, they will be fighting a highly lethal mid-intensity battle - all on the same day... all within three city blocks. ¹⁶

The military is thereby out of tactical necessity increasingly becoming involved in humanitarian and development processes despite a traditional reluctance to do so. As an example, the US State Department has showcased the fact that in 2006, the US military planned 556 humanitarian projects in 99 countries, arguing that 'the U.S. military has the capability to help

after natural disasters and can promote the health and economic well-being of suffering populations. That capability and that commitment are fuelling military humanitarian aid in places where U.S. forces have had no historic role.¹⁷ One thing is clear, in situations of an incomplete or fragile peace, the interlinked nature of security and development is inescapable. Security is necessary to enable progress on basic relief and development, while longer-term development gains necessary to solidify the peace process by giving people a stake in the new stability and by removing obstacles to peace. Equally, parts of the humanitarian community is increasingly looking for security support from military or private security actors in order to be able to operate in volatile areas.¹⁸

As noted, there are also particular tasks, like security sector reform (SSR) and demobilisation disarmament and repatriation (DDR) that are inherently joint civil-military undertakings. As Olson and Gregorian put it; 'no matter how well the demobilisation and disarmament of excombatants is done by security-focused agencies, it will be a failure unless the rehabilitation and reintegration part is also done well by development agencies'. In the same way, new infrastructure and successful programs in agriculture, health and education are directly linked to security efforts as they are destroyed if a region reverts to war. The result is that military and civilian actors are in a relationship of what Olson and Gregorian call *involuntary interdependence*.¹⁹

Multifunctional Conceptual and Doctrinal Developments

The increasing interface between military and humanitarian actors is, however, not merely a tactical necessity due to changing circumstances in the fields of operation. In light of the experience gained in Sierra Leone, Afghanistan and Iraq, the British Ministry of Defence argues that coherence between the different instruments of power is essential, and that it can only be achieved if strategic processes, planning and objectives were harmonised across all instruments and agencies.²⁰ A pressing challenge is to determine effective relationships between security, relief, aid, and civil society-building efforts. The purpose is to allow collapsed states that were suffering from underdevelopment even prior to a devastating conflict, or in the Olson and Gregorian's words: to 'develop the capacity to effectively absorb a mind-boggling array of interventions.'²¹ Beyond the

tactical level interdependence between civilian and military actors, there is, in other words, a development towards increasing civil-military co-operation and integration at the strategic and operational levels. The last few years have seen the development of a number of strategic concepts in this direction. This section briefly looks at a number of these concepts and changes in order to further highlight the strategic context in which military, humanitarian and development actors operate.

At the operational level, the armed forces in many Western states are currently developing doctrine in the direction of effects-based approaches to operations (EBAO). The US Joint Forces Command defines EBAO as 'a process for obtaining desired strategic outcome or effect on the enemy through the synergistic and cumulative application of the full range of military and non-military capabilities at all levels of conflict'. Effect is described as the physical, functional, or psychological outcome, event, or consequence that results from specific military or non-military actions.²² Additional defining elements of EBAO include seeing the operations as a process beginning with developing knowledge of the adversary, viewed as a complex adaptive system, the environment, and own assets and capabilities. Knowledge of the enemy will enable the commander to determine the effects he needs to achieve in order to convince or compel the enemy to change his behaviour.²³ Although there is some disparity in the different national developments of effects-based approaches to operations, below is a list of the most common features of the concept:

- Focus on effects and outcomes rather than tasks.
- Use of several instruments to achieve the intended effects.
- Cooperation and coordination between the different instruments.
- Emphasis on mutual aims of all involved actors, based on common analysis of the situation.
- Comprehensive view of the different phases of conflict – from prevention to post-conflict reconstruction.
- Emphasis on comprehensive understanding of the conflict situation
- Follow-up and evaluation are central when planning for certain effects.
- Belief in system theory and understanding.²⁴

Although a defining feature of EBAO is the need to co-ordinate the different instruments of power towards mutual effects, the concept has not been successful outside the military sector. EBAO proved to be a hard sell to civilian actors and early ambitions to raise it to the strategic level have therefore been replaced by a more pragmatic view of EBAO as a military operational level concept with links to strategic level ideas of concept development of multi-functional and comprehensive approaches discussed below.²⁵

The European Union has come to acknowledge that the organisation's growing ambitions and responsibilities in multifunctional peace operations need additional procedural support to be realised effectively.²⁶ In response, the EU adopted the British conceptual development of Comprehensive Approaches, which serves to create 'holistic' views of conflicts/post-conflict situations, a treatment of the instruments at the organisation's disposal as 'tools in a toolbox', emphasis on integrated, civil-military planning, and focus on the desired outcomes rather than processes of operations.²⁷ In general terms, the main objective of the Comprehensive Approach is to identify *what* needs to be done, *when* and by *whom*, in order to create a lasting solution in complex theatres.

The more specific development of Comprehensive Planning is intended to define a practical framework for effective planning coordination of the different EU actors involved in crisis management. It is defined as:

a systematic approach designed to address the need for effective intrapillar and inter-pillar coordination activity by all relevant EU actors in crisis management planning. [] It includes identification and consideration of interdependencies, priorities and sequence of activities and harness resources in an effective manner, through a coherent framework that permits review of progress to be made.²⁸

Some of the requirements of comprehensive planning are identified as joint assessment and analysis of the situation, including root-causes, key-actors etc, as well as the formulation of clear measurements of success for each desired outcome and planned task.

A similar development is taking place within the UN structure, focusing on creating operational coherence between the different UN agencies and organs. The idea of 'Integrated Missions' started to evolve by the

end of the 1990's, strongly influenced by the complexity encountered in the peace operations of that decade and the shortcomings in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. These experiences indicated that the separate efforts by different UN-actors did not have enough impact, and that more coherent multidimensional operations were needed. The so called Brahimi Report provided an early initiative to integrate different UN organs and agencies in UN missions. Among other recommendations, the report proposed that 'Integrated Missions Task-Forces' for planning and implementation of multifunctional operations should be set up.²⁹

The Integrated Mission concept provides a framework for multi-actor contributions by setting a common strategic aim and by allowing the UN agencies to strive for the common aim in line with their respective procedures and processes. The shared strategic objectives should be the result of a deliberate effort by all elements of the UN system to achieve a shared understanding of the mandates and functions of the various elements of the UN presence in the field and to 'maximise UN effectiveness, efficiency, and impact in all aspects of its work'.³⁰ Integrated Mission should also involve a structure derived from an in-depth understanding of the specific operational context, the political, humanitarian, human rights and development imperatives in that particular context, and of the particular mix of instruments needed and available to achieve the desired aims.³¹ As in the case of the EU comprehensive approach, a process for planning, implementing and monitoring integrated missions has been established:

The Integrated Mission Planning Process is designed to facilitate achievement of the common understanding among the different agencies by establishing a planning process that engages the capacities of all parts of the UN System relevant to achieving impact in a given country setting. The IMPP does not aim to take over all other planning processes. It aims to ensure that the right people are at the table, that the right issues are being considered, and that the appropriate authorities and accountabilities are in place to motivate flexible, creative, and integrated strategic and operational thinking and planning.³²

The ambitious conceptual development of multifunctional approaches to war has nevertheless not been accompanied by an equally impressive implementation of these concepts. At the national strategic level, the

interagency structure often fails to achieve coherence because of bureaucratic cultures that emphasise competition and distrust across ministerial and agency boundaries. Equally, in the civil-military interface at this level, even within the ministries of defence, there is often an administrative stove pipe structure that limits the extent of joint civil-military analysis and planning of operations.³³

There is very little empirical data on the effectiveness of multifunctional approaches to operations. In essence, integrated or comprehensive operations have yet to be implemented in full, although some aspects have been tried in the contexts of Afghanistan, Iraq, Liberia and Sudan. This raises the question whether humanitarian and military activities necessarily benefit from integration and produce some value added compared to separated activities. In the field of operations, the humanitarian community has questioned the very premise of integrating for increased operational effectiveness. Clearly, many NGOs see little value in being coordinated or subordinated to larger political aims of operations. Isabelle Duyvesteyn highlights the fact that quantifiable data from peacekeeping operations produces evidence that interventions in ongoing conflicts to promote peace are 'highly problematic'. Especially military and humanitarian type activities often produce counterproductive results.³⁴ The failures of past isolated military, diplomatic and humanitarian efforts mean that much hope is placed in the multifunctional and integrated types of intervention. However, the perceived need for increased civil-military coherence and integration is often only based on an assumption that the different actors and strands of activity are both inherently compatible and more effective when coordinated than when employed individually.³⁵

As already noted, Fortna has highlighted the lack of research on the causal mechanisms between certain behaviour in peace support operations and effectiveness. In fact, the jury on the effectiveness of peace support operations is still out. While Fortna has isolated enough variables in her quantitative work to argue with some confidence that interstate peacekeeping is beneficial, General Sir Rupert Smith presents a bleaker view of intervention effectiveness – especially when considering the ambitious political aims of contemporary operations.³⁶ Moreover, the leap between grasping the effects of intervention in general and understanding the causal effects of different strategies and methods in complex and

multifunctional peace support operations is still large. One step has been taken by Doyle and Sambanis who, through extensive quantitative analysis of UN peace operations, have highlighted the importance of creating strategies for peace operations that fit the 'the ecologies' of contemporary conflicts in general and the specific parameters of each conflict zone more specifically. This generally means comprehensive approaches that include the entire toolbox of national power – military, judicial, economic, constabulary, etc.³⁷ Nevertheless, without further empirical evidence, and with weak theoretical underpinnings, the concepts of integration and multifunctionality largely rely on assumptions of increased effectiveness from integration. More research in this area is necessary.

Before looking more specifically at a number of consequences of the extended interface between humanitarian and military actors, the following section highlights the humanitarian principles. The purpose is to understand the reluctance of the humanitarian community to work with military organisations, and to inform the following analyses of potential consequences of integration.

The humanitarian principles

Erin Weir argues that the humanitarian imperative is 'fundamentally incompatible with political objectives and military force'. To come to this conclusion she compares the philosophies and principles of humanitarian action and peace support operations.³⁸ Peace support operations are inherently political and value laden, often based on just war theory and international legal frameworks. The foundation of such operations is the use of force in order to establish or maintain security and thereby to create a condition from where to establish long-term economic and political development.³⁹

Humanitarian action, on the other hand, is based on the principle that receiving humanitarian assistance, as well as offering such assistance, are fundamental rights of all people and an obligation of the international community. Humanitarian activities are therefore ideally motivated by the desire to alleviate human suffering. It should not be 'a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such'.⁴⁰ In the implementation of this humanitarian imperative, aid organisations are guided by four 'core principles' of humanity, impartiality, neutrality and independence,

designed to differentiate humanitarian activity from different forms of politically motivated activities.⁴¹ *Humanity* indicates the duty to alleviate human suffering – a principle that is the source of all other principles. *Impartiality* means that aid priorities should be calculated on the basis of need alone and without regard to race, religion, creed or nationality of the recipients.⁴² The principle of *neutrality* originally asserted that humanitarian organisations should not take sides or engage in controversies of a political, racial, religious or ideological nature. The principle, traditionally interpreted, means that organisations are not allowed to speak out against even the worst regimes or crimes against humanity. Many organisations, most notably Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), have therefore completely reinterpreted this principle to include an obligation to document and speak out against human right abuses. Neutrality is instead maintained by speaking out against all actors involved in abuse in an impartial manner.⁴³ Finally, *independence* means that in order to be impartial and neutral in the provision of aid, to avoid becoming a tool of politics, humanitarian organisations must have complete independence from all actors that can be seen as exerting political influence over the distribution of aid. The main factor is the source of funding for humanitarian activities.⁴⁴ Where does the funding come from and how does that affect the provision of aid?

It is important to emphasise the fact that what this paper refers to as the humanitarian community, or civilians aspects of peace support operations, is actually a highly disparate group of actors with different aims, mandates and ways of operating. Describing and analysing this disparity is beyond the scope of this paper, but for the sake of clarity Weir has provided three categories of humanitarian actors in the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), UN humanitarian agencies, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs). While they all subscribe to the same humanitarian principles, 'there are significant differences in the interpretation and application of these principles in the field'.⁴⁵

A further complicating factor in the civil-military interface is the cultural differences between humanitarian and military organisations. Donna Winslow is but one scholar who describes tensions between the military and humanitarian actors as a result of differing organisational cultures.⁴⁶ These differences influence the ability to interact and co-

operate in the field. The cultural differences include differences in organisational goals, including values and basic assumptions, but also the functional imperatives of the respective organisations (alleviate suffering vs. preparation for war). It also includes differences in organisational composition – the fact that there is often gender, age and ethnicity gaps between military and humanitarian organisations. Other differences are the approaches to violence, nationalism and decision-making styles. While the military emphasises controlled use of violence, has strongly nationalistic values and hierarchical structures, the humanitarian side is strongly opposed to the use of violence, is internationalist and often work in decentralised forms.⁴⁷

The conclusion of Weir's comparative analysis is that the humanitarian imperative is fundamentally incompatible with the political objectives and use of force in peace support operations.⁴⁸ Coupled with the cultural disparities between military and humanitarian actors, cooperation and coordination of these actors in the field of operations is inherently difficult. At the same time, the reality of the contemporary strategic context of complex peace support operations is that the military is increasingly involved in humanitarian activities, and humanitarian and military organisations are working closer together, partly due to tactical realities in the field, and partly because of strategies that emphasise increased civil-military coherence and integration. Weir also notes that the one thing that binds peacekeepers and humanitarian workers together is the common desire to do what is 'morally right' in the face of brutality and hardship. The military and humanitarian activities thereby have the possibility to be complimentary.⁴⁹ However, in order to determine suitable levels of integration, if at all, the consequences of the current trends must be discussed in greater detail. This is the purpose of the following section.

Consequences of military humanitarian activity and integration

Although the use of military units for humanitarian projects is a hotly debated topic, such tasks are too often presented in an unproblematic way. As an example, a U.S. government information site highlights the words of Army Major Philip Spangler who argues that '[w]e want to add to, not detract from, what NGOs are doing'. The major recently worked on

water sanitation problems in Chad, Niger and Mali, where he said NGOs have put in wells but not always maintained them. His command could fix water pumps, ambulances and other donated equipment.⁵⁰

From a military perspective, there is potential for strategic value in conducting humanitarian work. As an example, Reuben Brigety argues that in the context of instant global media and the war on terrorism, 'demonstrating the capacity to care for civilians in the midst of warfare actually helps to achieve the strategic objectives for which the U.S. uses force in the first place - namely, to deter hostile intent toward America and its citizens'. It is, in other words, a way to achieve legitimacy and force protection, as well as to win the heart and minds of the local population in pursuit of the larger strategic objectives.⁵¹ Thomas Henriksen at the Hoover Institution also describes humanitarian activity as a necessary measure: 'If we don't do this, we leave an opening to al-Qaida'.⁵² To place this line of argumentation in a theoretical context, Rupert Smith argues that in the struggle for the hearts and minds of the local population, the number of battlefield victories or reconstruction projects completed matter little if the local population and the wider audiences of international opinion think you are not winning, or visibly improving people's situation. Instead, the success is achieved by communicating with the people through the media and other outlets, getting the right narrative out there and changing perceptions.⁵³

Johnson and Tierney argue that people often evaluate the outcomes of conflict on the basis of factors that are largely independent from the events in the field of operations. Instead, people's pre-existing beliefs, the symbolism of events, and manipulation by elites and the media affect the perception of the outcome.⁵⁴ Among a number of historical examples they mention the 'success' of the emergency withdrawal of British forces at Dunkirk in the early days of the Second World War. The withdrawal operation was certainly a success, but it focused attention away from the fact that the British and French suffered a tremendous defeat when facing the onslaught of the German Blitzkrieg.⁵⁵ The important thing is that the defeat was transformed into some form of success in the minds of soldiers and policymakers. Johnson and Tierney therefore accurately argue that the perceptions of victory and defeat, resulting from competition between the reality on the ground and the biases mentioned above, is of

great importance as they 'not only affect the account book of history but also shape the fate of leaders, democratic processes, support for foreign policies, and the lessons used to guide decisions in the future'.⁵⁶

Lawrence Freedman has developed the concept of 'strategic narrative'. He describes narratives as 'compelling story lines which can explain events', and that they are intentionally designed to structure 'responses of others to developing events'.⁵⁷ The strategic feature of narratives lies in the fact that they are not spontaneous, but 'deliberately constructed or reinforced out of the ideas and thoughts that are already current'.⁵⁸ Freedman argues that the idea of the narrative opens up the possibility that military operations might need to be focused on undermining the narratives on which the insurgent bases its appeal and which guides its activists towards actions. He notes that 'success will depend on how a particular irregular war's purpose, course and conduct is viewed by the public opinion at home as well as within the theatre of operations'.⁵⁹ The biases and interpretations of events should, in other words, be actively influenced by intervening powers to not simply rely on the 'facts' from the ground, but also to create the all important perception of winning or producing successes.

Also underlying this line of argumentation is the strategic context of what Martin Shaw calls 'the global surveillance mode of warfare'. Shaw's important contribution is made by arguing that all armed actors must reckon with comprehensive surveillance by global state institutions, law, markets, media, and civil society. In this context of global surveillance, conflicts are fought under the critical gaze not only of the local population, and the people in intervening nations, but of the world as a whole. Such surveillance means that some tactics of the past are not politically acceptable in today's context where conveying the right message and winning hearts and minds of the local and the global populations are key features. Casualties must be minimised, laws adhered to, and media managed. In particular, Western governments must pay constant attention to, and obviously also play by the rules of global surveillance, as these states generally make and enforce the rules.⁶⁰

Thus, the idea is that within this context of global surveillance, military humanitarian activities can help achieve stability by improving the daily lives of the local population, increasing the legitimacy of the intervention,

and winning the hearts and minds of the local population. Force protection can thus be increased, and intelligence gathering simplified and improved. However, in the global surveillance age of instant media coverage, the internet and mobile phones, controlling a story or a narrative is not easy.⁶¹ In the fight for hearts and minds of local and global populations, assumptions regarding the benefits of military involvement in humanitarian and development activities are therefore potentially dangerous. Calculations of local interests have proved notoriously difficult to achieve with any level of accuracy, not least because of cultural misunderstandings and language barriers in the field of operations. The difficulty to communicate the intended narrative applies to humanitarian activities as well. There is, in other words, a risk that humanitarian activities performed by military units may not be interpreted by the local actors as intended and thereby have unintended consequences. Moreover, even the best intentions and activities in the humanitarian, development and security spheres may be distorted to a different narrative in the hands of insurgents with far better local understanding of and access to the local population.⁶² David Kilcullen convincingly argues that 'in modern counter-insurgency, the side may win which best mobilises and energises its global, regional and local support base – and prevents its adversaries doing likewise'.⁶³

Lt. Gen. Sir Robert Fry, Deputy Commander of Multinational Force Iraq, has argued that one of the greatest problems in Iraq was the failure to translate accurate tactical behaviour into operational effect in the pursuit of strategic goals.⁶⁴ Conducting appropriate and effective tactical operations and translating them into strategic aims, and then getting that message across to the local and global audience in a coherent strategic narrative, is arguably amongst the most important challenges in current and future peace support operations. Understanding the potential impact on the humanitarian community and its ability to operate effectively must certainly be part of such calculations. Placed in a larger perspective of comprehensive and effects based approaches to operations, the potential positive tactical effects of military humanitarian activity may prove to be Pyrrhic victories that undermine the effectiveness of the humanitarian and development communities, and thereby of the larger political aims of the operation.

The militarisation of humanitarian activity

A common argument is that civil-military integration is dangerous to the humanitarian community as it blurs the lines between politics and humanitarianism, and threatens the perception of humanitarian neutrality, impartiality and independence.⁶⁵ For example, Raj Rana argues that:

The distinction between humanitarian, political and military action becomes blurred when armed forces are perceived as being humanitarian actors, when civilians are embedded into military structures, and when the impression is created that humanitarian organisations and their personnel are merely tools within integrated approaches to conflict management.⁶⁶

During interventions, integrated multifunctional approaches may force the humanitarian community not only to associate with the intervening powers, but also to be subordinated to political and military agendas of the larger intervention. Clearly, the humanitarian space – access to suffering communities on both sides of the confrontation line, based on the humanitarian principles – thereby risks being eroded. Moreover, increasing humanitarian task performed by the military may cause both recipients of aid, as well as the conflicting parties to find it difficult to distinguish between providers of assistance and combatants. Brigety argues that this confusion may not only apply to mere physical identification, but that it can also apply to the motives of the different actors. 'While, as stated above, military forces may wish to be identified with humane purposes for both tactical and strategic reasons, humanitarian groups almost invariably do not wish to be identified either physically or politically with any party to an armed conflict.'⁶⁷ The confusion of different actors' identity may compromise the humanitarian principles that the humanitarian agencies depend on for operational security in the field, as well as for political independence in funding and policy circles.⁶⁸

Not only the military organisations, or the multifunctional strategies, are guilty of blurring the lines. Many NGOs have adopted what Stephen Cornish calls a 'maximalist approach' to humanitarian aid, which means that they do not only seek to reduce short term the suffering, but to address the root causes of suffering. Maximalist NGOs therefore increasingly engage in long-term development, governance assistance and security sector reform.⁶⁹ In any case, complex peace support operations with the

far-reaching aims of stability, democracy and economic development require military, development and humanitarian types of activity from the onset of operations. The number of tasks to be performed within the different areas is vast and they will require enormous resources in the forms of funding and manpower. As noted, the humanitarian space is a provider of security and access for humanitarian organisations that may be eroded if such organisations are associated with the larger military or political operations, or if the line between military and humanitarian actors is blurred because of military personnel conducting humanitarian activity. Eroding the humanitarian space based on the traditional principles of impartiality, neutrality and independence may therefore also create the need for an alternative form of security, provided for by military or private security actors. Military provision of security for humanitarian activities of all humanitarian risks draining already overstretched military organisations and limits the troops available for their core tasks of security. For the same reason, solving the problem of security for humanitarian activity by simply letting the military, with the capacity to provide for its own security, to conduct humanitarian operations, is not an option.

As noted above, the blurring of the lines between the military and humanitarian communities is to some extent a result of new contextual realities in the field of operations and not simply a conceptual trend that can be reversed by different level decisions. Moreover, as Erin Weir notes, 'integration is not simply the invention of an overzealous UN bureaucrat, but the reaction to a number of startling failures on the part of the international community'. She argues that these failures have created a 'necessary push' to achieve better co-ordination and co-operation between all involved actors – a necessary development that nevertheless does put the humanitarian imperative at risk.⁷⁰

In Afghanistan, the humanitarian space and the security of humanitarian organisations based on consent from the local population, have eroded and forced many organisations to abandon areas they have operated in for a very long time. The integrated approaches meant that all external actors were associated with the intervention. A Taliban spokesperson even stated that aid organisations were working for the Americans and thereby become legitimate targets of the insurgency.⁷¹ The result is an ever expanding area of the country suffering from an acute humanitarian

emergency, as the private contractors and military PRTs have not been able to maintain the functions of the NGOs.⁷²

It should, however, be noted that the very notion that the erosion of the traditional humanitarian space is caused by association with the military, or by military humanitarian activities that blur the lines between the two groups of actors, is questionable. The problem of the humanitarian space has been most prominent in contexts of forced Western intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, where insurgents have deliberately targeted both NGOs and the UN. Arguing that this is simply the effect of military involvement in humanitarian activities, or the perception of humanitarian non-independence because of association, would be stretching matters too far. Instead, insurgents seem to be fighting not only against the intervention, but against all Western influence and presence in the region. As Karen Guttieri expresses it: 'The simple status of being an "outsider" generates a political signature... When militaries step into an environment previously dominated by relief organisations, as in Somalia in the 1990s and Afghanistan after September 11th – the humanitarian relationships with communities, and also with political and military actors shifts.'⁷³ There is simply no room for humanitarian space in some conflicts – regardless of the approaches adopted by the intervening powers and the humanitarian community.

Another argument against military involvement in humanitarian activities is that military forces, although well organised, efficient and with plenty of manpower, are generally not well trained for humanitarian activity. They have limited understanding of the humanitarian principles at best, and have an organisational culture and ethos not adjusted for such tasks. Paolo Tripodi even argues that professional soldiers with training that emphasised patriotism and a warfighting ethos have caused problems in military peacekeeping operations, which instead require the characteristics of patience, restraint, and flexibility.⁷⁴ While peacekeeping is also different from traditional warfighting, Tripodi's argument can surely also be made using humanitarian activities, which are obviously even more different from the cultural essence of military organisations than peacekeeping. Humanitarian organisations, on the other hand, often have long experience in complex emergencies, and have generally been in the field of operations for year, if not decades, before the military units

show up. Humanitarian organisations therefore have the necessary skills, with needs assessment, water purification, humanitarian demining and human rights monitoring as a few examples. They also often have in depth local knowledge of the area of operations, as well as of local cultures and customs.

Let us also assume that both military and humanitarian organisations adjust their professional cultures and competences according to their respective functional imperatives or main tasks.⁷⁵ The disparity between military and humanitarian culture and competence should therefore be an indication that it is just as unlikely that a humanitarian worker would do well as an amateur soldier, as a soldier showing extreme talent in humanitarian work. Put simply, the military is not as competent as civilian organisations are in the provision of humanitarian assistance. Thus, military involvement in humanitarian type activities, for which they are comparatively incompetent, may undermine the quality of aid delivery, and 'the ultimate success of the humanitarian effort'.⁷⁶ As an example, Stephen Cornish notes that development projects in Afghanistan, funded through external support and directed through private contractors or so called Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), have been 'costly, wasteful, lacking in quality and often not taking into account community needs'.⁷⁷

Related to the view that the military does not have a suitable professional culture and ethos for humanitarian types of activities is the idea that officers and soldiers lack the ultimate commitment to humanitarian tasks and that the recipients of aid may suffer as a consequence. This may not necessarily be caused by a lack of commitment and interest in humanitarian activity. Instead, the fact is that the focus of military organisations, and rightly so, is being directed elsewhere – security, in the traditional military sense. Humanitarian activity will thereby often be a secondary activity for the military. Moreover, the principal motivation of military humanitarian tasks is to achieve military interest such as stability and force protection. It is not governed by the principle of humanity – the right of suffering people to receive aid based on need rather than military objectives. Brigety refers to recipients of aid being subjected to the 'whims' of military interests rather than the humanitarian principles.

When the interests change, the amount or nature of the aid may change as well. Humanitarian agencies, however, see themselves as dedicated

to responding to humanitarian suffering for as long as such suffering exists, regardless of the affiliation of those in need, for as long as they have the capacity to respond, and as long as security conditions permit. All other political and strategic considerations are, generally speaking, irrelevant.⁷⁸

Louise Heywood has described the fickle nature of military humanitarian and development interest in Iraq. She argues that with every unit rotation, with every new commander in a region, interests and methods to achieve different military and civilian aims change.⁷⁹ Humanitarian activities should primarily be based on need rather than the interests of military commanders, and development and reconstruction project need stability and continuity for effective results.

In sum, there are a number of arguments against increased military humanitarian activity, and civil-military integration. While they are important, they are not particularly constructive as they do not acknowledge that the development towards military humanitarian activity and civil-military integration are partly the result of a changing strategic context rather than new ideas and strategies in peace support operations. Weir accurately argues that the criticism of integration from the humanitarian by evoking the humanitarian imperative is a bit like evoking a right. It does not leave room for compromise and requires a clarity that is not possible in the contemporary strategic context of complex peace support operations. Instead, she argues:

The reality is that humanitarian action and peacebuilding are no longer clearly separable concepts, and the most humanitarian actors have to compromise every day – choosing to use armed escorts, military transport, or targeted funding – in order to get the job done for the people who need their help.⁸⁰

Weir's conclusion is that the overlap between military and humanitarian efforts requires a structure that can unify their activities of these disparate actors. Integration is, in other words, the only way forward.⁸¹ However, the complaints raise a number of important questions that must be considered in the development of multifunctional approaches to operations. It also hints towards the problematic notion that integration may not be the conclusive solution to the problem of effectiveness in peace support operations. Before discussing these matters further in the

concluding section, let us take a look at the accompanying trend called the humanitarianisation of the military.

The humanitarianisation of the military

There may also for security reasons be danger in military involvement in humanitarian activities. Anthony Forster notes that the use of British armed forces in Afghanistan's Helmand province provides an example of blurring lines between military and humanitarian work, and a case of what he calls the humanitarianisation of the military.⁸² As these troops were deployed to Afghanistan, a MoD briefing document noted that they would always have the primacy of the reconstruction effort in mind, and that they were not there to wage war but to help to rebuild. Moreover, then Defence Secretary John Reid suggested that the British troops might not even have to fire their weapons by stating that '[w]e would be perfectly happy to leave in three years' time without firing a shot because our job is to protect reconstruction.'⁸³ This quickly proved to be a serious underestimation of the security situation in the province and within days of their deployment the British forces were engaged in sustained and intense fighting against Taliban forces. Planned British reconstruction and development projects have also been on hold because of the security situation which does not allow civilian actors access in the Helmand province. Leo Docherty has described the failure of the British to apply comprehensive approaches in the Helmand province. Although the British Department for International Development and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had no practical measures in place in the northern parts of the province, military teams were sent into the region without any means to win hearts and minds. The teams quickly became the targets of local fighters and became drawn into high-intensity warfighting.⁸⁴

As a consequence of the distance between political statements and realities on the ground, combined with a considerable overstretch of the armed forces – being required to do too many tasks with too few troops – retired senior officers have criticised the political leadership in Britain for failing to give proper support to the armed forces in these deployments, and for confused military objectives that are putting lives in danger.⁸⁵

There may also be a risk in that troops deploy for operations without accurate understanding of the dangers, and without the proper mindset

and training to face those dangers. Christopher Dandeker has written on the need for military culture and ethos to be different from that of civil society, albeit within certain limits, in order to perform effectively in combat situations.⁸⁶ During the 1990s, a debate existed regarding the potential negative consequences of deploying troops for peacekeeping tasks – or tasks beyond traditional soldiering. As an example, Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued against the deployment of US troops in Bosnia by citing the need to retain a warrior culture for the primary military mission of fighting and winning the nation's wars.⁸⁷ The idea that peacekeeping would damage combat readiness and warrior ideals has somewhat died down with the increasing combat intensity of the 'peace operations' in Afghanistan and Iraq, and with the fact that increasing numbers of officers and analysts are considering these types of operations the most likely and important in the near future. But perhaps the issue should be raised again in relation to humanitarian type activities. How does such activity affect military units' culture and combat readiness? How many different tasks is it possible to train soldiers to do at an acceptable level?

While answering those questions is beyond the scope of this paper, it should be noted that a predeployment training not focused enough on combat may leave military forces unprepared for serious situations and thereby risk the effectiveness of the operation, their own lives, and the lives of the local population and humanitarian workers they may need to protect. On the other hand, simply focusing on combat training will leave soldiers unprepared for a number of other important and inescapable tasks in contemporary operations. A healthy balance needs to be struck. Yet, clearly, the learning capacity of soldiers is not unlimited and in order to perform effectively, an emphasis is necessary on the core military tasks.

Conclusion: drawing new lines in the sand

This paper has sought to achieve three aims; to describe the extensive civil-military interface in peace support operations, to analyse a number of consequences of integrated approaches to operations and military activities, and the remaining task to outline a number of policy implications. The descriptive section highlighted two important trends.

First, the increasing strategic emphasis on civil-military integration and coherence in peace support operations. Second, an increasing military involvement in humanitarian activities based on the assumption that within the operational context of global surveillance, conducting so called hearts and minds operations may have a positive strategic impact.

The findings of the analysis of potential consequences of these trends argued that despite the fact that both trends are often seen as necessary developments for increased effectiveness in complex peace support operations, there are a number of serious issues that should also be considered when employing such strategies. With increased integration, the humanitarian principles are watered down and the humanitarian space risks being eroded. The cost of providing an alternative form of security for humanitarian activities may well overshadow the potential benefits of coherent multifunctional operations. The benefits of military involvement in humanitarian activities may be questioned on a number of accounts. In sum, armed forces, while being expensive to train, equip, maintain and deploy, have little humanitarian expertise and commitment. Military organisations are therefore likely to achieve less at a higher cost – while at the same time endangering the work of humanitarian organisations.

Military humanitarian activities are often performed to achieve tactical or strategic effects such as improving force protection and stability, or creating legitimacy for the larger political transformations. However, calculating the psychological effects on the local population is inherently difficult, not least because of poor understanding of local cultures and customs. Thus, while the humanitarian impact of military involvement in such activities is often limited at best, the unintended effects may be serious if the activities are 'misunderstood', or if an alternative narrative is presented by insurgents. Moreover, the humanitarianisation of military affairs means that yet another traditionally non-military group of tasks are expected of the armed forces. There are limits to the amount of tasks that soldiers and officers can be trained to perform effectively and adding humanitarian activities to the list may undermine necessary military competencies such as warfighting and peacekeeping.

In sum, we are left with two 'necessary' trends and a number of serious side effects. It is thereby time to leave the existential debates about

civil-military integration and instead look at ways to implement such approaches with maximum effect and some level of damage control. First, the theoretically weak assumption of increased effectiveness from civil-military integration should be studied further. One step would be to further highlight the outcome based thinking of multifunctional approaches. What are the precise aims of operations, how do they translate into operational and tactical objectives, and how can different instruments of power – civilian and military – be used to achieve those aims? It may not simply be a problem of finding the right method. In some cases, increased integration into coherent comprehensive approaches may be the more effective solution. In other cases, a clear line of demarcation between certain actors and their activities may be the answer. The important thing is that such calculation are made, and that they are holistic in that they involve both short and long term effects, intended and unintended, at all levels of operations. As an example, the unintended consequence of civil-military integration in Afghanistan is that it has eroded the humanitarian space in the southern parts of the country and forced the humanitarian organisations to leave. While the humanitarian situation is worsened, the support for the Taliban insurgency is growing. The intended strategic effect of stabilisation, economic development and strengthening of the central government may therefore have been damaged.

Second, further structural, cultural and doctrinal adjustment of the armed forces is necessary in the direction of traditionally non-military tasks in order to become more effective. However, a delimitation regarding the tasks that should be asked of the military is equally important. As argued above, while armed forces are always practical to use because of their availability, as well as their hierarchical and subordinate structure and culture, they are not capable of performing any number of tasks with good effect. In essence, it comes down to a political choice regarding the use of the military instrument. It can be used as a blunt instrument for any type of tasks and without professional expertise in any field, or it can be sharpened to perform a more limited number of tasks with greater professionalism, but at the same time requiring investments in civilian operational capacity to perform tasks beyond the military delimitation. A military tool as sharp as traditionally configured armed forces for conventional warfare is probably not a useful option as the strategic

context is unlikely to provide opportunities for the effective use of such a tool.

Third, the use of armed forces for humanitarian activities needs to be reconsidered. Again, the mere assumption that such activities will lead to increased support from the local population is an oversimplification and serious thinking is necessary in order to better understand the consequences of military activity in the humanitarian field. The provision of humanitarian aid must be provided for during conflict in order to establish or maintain the legitimacy of the operation, in the eyes of the local population, as well as globally. This paper suggests that maintaining the humanitarian space based on impartiality, neutrality and independence of humanitarian organisations is more effective and efficient than either providing military security in support of humanitarian activities, or by military and private contractor involvement in such activities. To achieve that, some form of divide between humanitarian and political actors such as development organisations, and especially the armed forces, should ideally be maintained. Importantly, the demarcation line is not between military and civilian actors, but between those who operate according to humanitarian principles and those who are part of a political operation – involving both development and security policy.

Despite the fact that this paper advocates a divide between the humanitarian and political activities in the field, it should be acknowledged that this demarcation line can never be too distinct. As noted in the analysis above, the nature of contemporary operations means that military, humanitarian and other civilian actors will always need to interact and co-operate to some extent. The humanitarian organisations will from time to time need security assistance regardless if a better delineated humanitarian space is maintained. Similarly, the stabilisation and state-building processes may be seriously hampered by humanitarian disasters that can limit the legitimacy of the operation and the host government. Communication and some level of cooperation, albeit preferably driven by humanitarian principles, will therefore be necessary, but lines in the sand should be drawn in order not to further blur the contrasts between the different actors and their activities. How such a divide can be practically established and communicated to the people in the field of operations is an important future research question. Nonetheless, in a substantial

number of conflicts – especially in interventions with questionable international mandates and limited local legitimacy – the humanitarian space is nevertheless an ideal that is not likely to become a reality as all external actors are placed in the same category. In these cases, alternatives for the provision of humanitarian aid must be established.

Finally, in more general terms, the current development of integrated and comprehensive approaches to operations contain a 'can do' mentality that disregards the current evidence that interventions in armed conflicts are always highly problematic and that we cannot even be certain that they have a positive effect. Thus, there is a need to consider what can actually be achieved by intervening in complex war zones and post-conflict societies. A conclusion of a recent conference on transatlantic approaches to post-conflict management was that given the many failures in achieving far-reaching political aims in post-conflict management operations, there must either be a substantial increase in the resources used in each intervention, or the aims must be lowered.⁸⁸ While peace support operations are not simply driven by cost-benefit analyses, such recalculations regarding efforts and possible outcomes may well tip the scale towards less optimism and involvement in peace operations. Yet again, the causal mechanisms describing how different strategies and tactics – not least the alternative uses and levels of integration of the available political instruments of power – affect outcome in peace support operations need further study. The substantive number of negative consequences of civil-military integration means that such approaches should not be seen as a silver bullet in the struggle for global peace and security. Nevertheless, with better understanding of the causal mechanisms between certain behaviour and operational outcomes, and with better understanding of the necessary delimitations for such integration, it may well prove to be a step in the right direction.

Notes:

2. Smith, *The Utility of Force*, xii.
3. See for example, Smith, *Utility of Force*; Weir, *Conflict and Compromise*; UK MoD, *The Comprehensive Approach*.
4. Smith, *Utility of Force*; Freedman, *Transformation of Strategic Affairs*; van Creveld, *Transformation of War*.
5. Blair, 'Doctrine of the international community'
6. Forster, 'Breaking the Covenant', 1045
7. Etzioni, *Security First*, 3
8. Fortna, 'Interstate Peacekeeping', 482.
9. Forster, 'Breaking the Covenant', 1045.
10. Collier, *Breaking the Conflict Trap*, 1.
11. Olson and Gregorian, *Side by Side or Together?*, 81.
12. *Ibid.*, 80.
13. Olson and Gregorian, *Side by Side or Together?*, 80.
14. Metz, 'Insurgency and Counter-Insurgency in Iraq', 26–28; Ricks, *Fiasco*, 191.
15. Krulak, 'The Strategic Corporal'.
16. Krulak, 'Three Block War', 139–142.
17. Kelleher, 'U.S. Military Humanitarian Efforts'.
18. Olson, 'Fighting for Humanitarian Space', 15.
19. Olson and Gregorian, *Side by Side or Together?*, 81
20. UK Ministry of Defence 2006, *The Comprehensive Approach*, 1–1.
21. Olson and Gregorian, *Side by Side or Together?*, 81
22. US Joint Forces Command (2001), 5.
23. *Ibid.*
24. Carlsen et. al., *EBO och effektbaserat tänkande*, 21.
25. Derblom, Egnell and Nilsson, *Impact of strategic concepts*, 9.
26. United Kingdom, Austria and Finland, *Enhancing EU Civil-Military Coordination*, 1.
27. *Ibid.*, 5.
28. Council of the European Union, *Draft EU Concept for Comprehensive Planning*.
29. United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*, xiii.
30. United Nations, *Integrated Missions Planning Process*, 3

31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. Egnell, 'Explaining US and British Performance' 1050.
34. Duyvesteyn, 'The Effectiveness of Intervention'.
35. Gordon, 'Military – humanitarian relationships'.
36. Fortna, 'Does Peacekeeping Keep Peace', 288; Smith, *The Utility of Force*.
37. Doyle and Sambanis, *Making War and Building Peace*, 334-337.
38. Weir, *Conflict and Compromise*, 26.
39. Ibid., 20-26.
40. 'The Code of Conduct for the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Movement, and NGOs in Disaster Relief', 1.
41. Terry, *Condemned to repeat*, 26.
42. 'The Code of Conduct'.
43. Médecins Sans Frontières Switzerland, 'Le Témoignage'.
44. Weir, *Conflict and Compromise*, 22.
45. Ibid., 27-30.
46. Winslow, 'Strange Bedfellows'.
47. Ibid., 116.
48. Weir, *Conflict and Compromise*, 26.
49. Ibid.
50. Cited in Kelleher, 'U.S. Military Humanitarian Efforts'.
51. Brigety, 'From Three to One'.
52. Kelleher, 'U.S. Military Humanitarian Efforts'.
53. Smith, *The Utility of Force*, 391.
54. Johnson and Tierney, *Failing to Win*, 5.
55. Ibid., 9.
56. Ibid., 18.
57. Freedman, 'Transformation of Strategic Affairs', 22.
58. Ibid.
59. Ibid., 93.
60. Shaw, *The New Western Way of War*, p. 75; The difficult choices faced by Western states in an era of increasing humanism, and humanity in warfare is also described by Coker in *Humane Warfare*.
61. Shaw, *The New Western Way of War*, 47, 56.

62. Egnell, *The Missing Link*, 36.
63. Kilcullen, 'Counter-Insurgency Redux', 121.
64. Fry, 'Expeditionary Operations in the Modern Era', 62.
65. Weir, *Conflict and Compromise*, 45
66. Rana 'Contemporary Challenges', 586
67. Brigety, 'From Three to One'
68. Ibid.
69. Cornish, 'No Room for Humanitarianism', 12
70. Weir, *Conflict and Compromise*, 45
71. Owens and Travers, '3D Vision', 46.
72. Cornish, 'No Room for Humanitarianism', 38
73. Guttieri, 'Humanitarian Space in Insecure Environments'
74. Tripodi, 'Peacekeepers of the twenty-first century', 71-72.
75. This assumption is based on traditional civil-military relations theory that states that professional armed forces are influenced by a functional and a societal imperative. See for example Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, p. 2
76. Brigety, 'From Three to One'
77. Cornish, 'No Room for Humanitarianism', 30.
78. Brigety, 'From Three to One'
79. Interview with Captain Louise Heywood, 26 January 2007. Many of her comments are published in Heywood, 'CIMIC in Iraq', pp. 36-40.
80. Weir, *Conflict and compromise*, 45
81. Ibid.
82. Forster, 'Breaking the covenant', 1045.
83. Albone et al., 'Soldiers who went to build bridges'
84. See Docherty, *Desert of death*, pp. 185-192
85. Forster, 'Breaking the covenant', 1045-46.
86. Dandeker, 'On the need to be different', 4-9.
87. Powell, 'U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead'
88. 'Transatlantic Approaches to Post-Conflict Management'

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