

**The Fiftieth Anniversary
of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee**

by Alv Jakob Fostervoll

NATO going global - or almost

by Jamie Shea

The Current Revolution in the Nature of Conflict

by Chris Donnelly



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To mark our 50th anniversary, the Norwegian Atlantic Committee was pleased to be able to arrange this seminar on June 16th. We are particularly happy to mark this occasion through these contributions by three great friends of the committee. They each take on a different perspective. Alv Jakob Fostervoll, our chairman, tell us something about where we have been and our present challenges in the committee's work, Jamie Shea tell us where NATO is today and some of the challenges they see on the horizon while Chris Donnelly ask us to consider the current revolution in the Nature of Conflict in the 21st Century.

We would like to dedicate this book to the memory of someone who gave his whole working life to the Norwegian Atlantic Committee, Ellmann Ellingsen, secretary general from 1972 to 1997.

Chris Prebensen
Secretary General

The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee

by County Governor Alv Jacob Fostervoll

Your Excellencies, Ladies and Gentlemen.

It is with great pleasure and with pride as chairman of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee that I wish you all welcome to this 50th anniversary celebration. It will not be a grand affair like some of the centennial celebrations that we have just had, but we are being honoured by the presence of two great friends of the committee, Chris Donnelly from The United Kingdom and Jamie Shea from NATO as speakers today

It was 50 years ago that the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Norwegian Storting, Finn Moe took the initiative to start the committee. What was and still is unique is that the board is made up of senior spokespeople on defence and security from the main political parties and also has a representative from both the labour organization and owner association in industry.

This make-up of our board these 50 years has shown itself to be both rational and correct. It has ensured that the committee is politically independent while it gives the widest possible political contact and influence. The committee, in short, contributes to a defence and security debate in Norway at an informed and intellectually high level. This aim for the committee's work both gave it an identity and influence and during the cold war an economic base for its work.

It was a clear policy aim in Norway that the public at home and allies abroad should be informed about Norwegian foreign and security policy by Norwegian institutions. The statutes of the committee are short and clearly formulated. They have not needed to be changed these first 50 years and do not need so now.

Broadly a composed board with a circumspect leadership, dedicated secretary generals and a small but multifaceted and efficient secretariat have always been and continues to be the criteria for success.

It is my considered opinion that the efforts of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee in the field of public information was and still is a strong contributing factor to the broad and long lasting support of the Norwegian public for Norwegian defence and security policy including Norwegian membership in NATO. Our political authorities could therefore concentrate on the many difficult political situations which arose during the various fazes of the cold war with a clear mind.

Within the Alliance itself and in The Atlantic Treaty Association the Committee made great efforts to make Norwegian views known and accepted. We have had several excellent secretaries generals through the years, Øyvind Berdal who went on to become the public Information Officer at Kolsås for many years and Kåre Sandegren who went on to become the International Secretary of LO,

But one person in particular is inextricably linked to the success of the committee for over 25 years Ellman Ellingsen. He became highly respected both in Norway and abroad, be it in the East or West .He was in his prime with a lot still to do when he died in 1997. On a day like this, it is particularly fitting to remember his great service and dedication to the Atlantic cause. He could open doors and build bridges. He did have the satisfaction to experience the end of the ideological conflict in Europe with the dissolution of The Soviet Union. He was fully engaged in facing the new challenges, opening up the dialogue with the new Russia and engaging in dialogues with the strategic communities in China. This interest by the committee "Outside" the NATO area is today fully accepted.

At the time when Ellman passed away the committee was again fortunate. We succeeded in convincing the Director of Press and Information at NATO, Chris Prebensen, to take on the job of secretary general and a new era started in the committee.

These new times raise new tasks and new challenges. Defence and security policy is part of a broader foreign policy which must face up to terrorism, fundamentalism and criminal activity in a world which sees closer cooperation between peoples and nations.

There is less and less time to consult when countermeasures need to be taken against an evolving threat. We see that major situations arise which have not been foreseen and the public can be threatened or attacked from many sides by peoples or criminal elements outside the control of the nation-state. We must be prepared to fight them wherever they may arise in the world. It is more difficult to have an adequate insurance against the unknown and the unexpected. Our national defence is being transformed to face these new situations. The public is uncertain as to what is happening and full of uncertainty about the future. It is therefore the opinion of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee that knowledge and understanding of what is going on is even more important today than ever before.

We expect that our authorities see the activity of the committee to be as important as ever, maybe even more important today than it has ever been in the nation's one hundred year history.

The committee is well staffed for these new challenges, something NATO is also aware of. We have reinforced our work of informing the informers. Politicians, editors, researchers and teachers have been our main target groups. The secretariat has become an active supporter to students and PhD projects. The electronic age has arrived and the committee's websites with up to date articles on current affairs are well read both inside the country and abroad.

The NATO family has grown and will continue to grow. The new member countries need assistance both in the preparatory phase and after becoming members. Their challenge is to make the transition to true democratic states based on respect for human rights and the rule of law. Our committee is actively supporting this nation building and has concentrated its efforts on certain countries with positive results.

Nationally we are trying to increase the focus and the efforts of our authorities when it comes to the safety and resilience of our modern society. We have a particular focus on the coordination of preventive measures. We are also paying a particular attention to how this work is being organised.

Our world during the cold war was quite one dimensional. Defence and military policy was reasonably clear. 9/11 changed this world. The defence capabilities of NATO, but also of Norway are being transformed to tackle this new situation.

We are seeing that the Atlantic Treaty Association as an umbrella organisation and the national Atlantic committees are playing an active role in this transformation process.

Like many of these committees the Norwegian Atlantic Committee is living with tight budgetary constraints. It is a major limiting factor in our work.

In our anniversary year I would like to point out that an active information policy is key to getting the understanding and therefore support for the major changes taking place nationally and internationally.

We are celebrating a most active and vibrant 50 years old today. It has a professional secretariat, supported by many active lecturers, advisors and researchers. Our 50 year old is on the net, preoccupied with the challenges of modern society and its resilience based on an updated and well-considered defence and security policy.

NATO going global – or almost

by Jamie Shea

Before Star Wars became a Hollywood blockbuster, science fiction fans were mostly limited to an American series called Star Trek. The operating principle of this series was that the US Space ship Enterprise always had new galaxies to explore in a seemingly unending journey through space and time. Today's NATO bears a distinct resemblance to Star Trek. Barely has our public opinion become accustomed to NATO in Afghanistan or Iraq when it sees the Secretary General in Addis Ababa proposing NATO's support to the African Union in Darfur. A few years ago, NATO's Partnerships focused mainly on its immediate neighbours in Central and Eastern Europe. These days the focus is much more on remoter places such as the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia.

Hardly a day goes by without NATO travelling to parts of the world that were never before on its radar screen. The Secretary General recently travelled to Australia, New Zealand and Japan. Pakistan and South Korea have recently begun to send military officers for training in military academies, while in return NATO opens lines of communication across Pakistan to supply its forces in Kabul. A NATO envoy has recently travelled to Ramallah to open contacts with the Palestinian authorities. High-level visitors to NATO Headquarters these days are more likely to be from distant countries than NATO's own member states – or they are likely to represent organisations that would have hardly dared to put their foot into the building during the Cold War. In recent days we have had President Conaré of the African Union, President Karzai of Afghanistan, Foreign Minister Zebari of Iraq, and the Head of the International Red Cross.

It is easier to open new missions than to terminate old ones. This year the 10th anniversary of the Dayton Agreement, the Alliance is still in Bosnia, albeit with a reduced presence having largely handed over to the EU; and six years after its air campaign against Yugoslavia, NATO still has 18,000 troops in Kosovo which do not appear set to leave any time soon. Nonetheless the Alliance's focus is decidedly beyond Europe. Is it going global? Are there any limits to this new hyper-activism?

All successful enterprises have to be driven by supply as well as pulled by demand. They cannot simply be exercises in self-reinvention or the search for missions at any cost to solve an internal identity crisis. The demand-pull factor has certainly come from the way in which security has changed in the past few years. Instead of defined enemies we have risks that easily transit across borders in a globalised world. Securing territory or defending borders is a necessary but not sufficient condition of being able to cope with these risks, such as terrorism or the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The problems have to be tackled at source. As the former Secretary General of NATO, Lord Robertson, liked to put it, "if we don't go to Afghanistan, Afghanistan will come to us" in the form of drugs, crime networks and terrorism.

Security these days is therefore all about risk management. This requires not only a willingness to deploy forces virtually anywhere in the world, but also a much higher degree of interaction among international organisations and NGOs to ensure that we are working on all facets of a risk at any given moment. For instance we have discovered in the Balkans and now in Afghanistan that crisis management is of little use if it does not make way for nation building and democratisation; a military stabilisation force is of little use if it cannot interact with a vigorous civil administration and programme of economic reforms.

The second aspect is supply-driven. Here it is clear that to be a player in the modern world an organisation has to offer distinct capabilities that are not only in demand but which cannot be easily replicated by either nation states or other organisations. Here NATO inherited two features from the Cold War which have proven remarkably relevant in dealing with the new challenges.

One is the ability to mount complex multi-national peace support operations based on multi-national headquarters, standardised procedures, common doctrine and common operating experience with unity of command. There is almost an inexhaustible demand for these capacities. For instance during the Cold War, the United States mounted a new operation on average once a decade and the United Nations launched a new Blue

Helmet operation on average once every four years. Since 1989 the United States has led an intervention once every two years, and the UN has launched new peacekeeping missions every six months – over 30 alone since 1989. And these, contrary to the popular wisdom, have not been mission impossible. The number of civil conflicts has halved over the last decade and casualty levels have been significantly reduced. UN statistics have shown that without a credible military peace support mission, failed states quickly relapse into anarchy. Consequently, the armies of the western world, including the United States, now see the need to maintain a simultaneous number of stabilisation operations and not prepare only for conventional war.

Why has NATO proven to be the organisation of choice for these peace support operations so that it is now connected even with the implementation of an Arab-Israeli peace agreement? Part of the answer is the integrated military structures, the planning capabilities, and rapid response units that NATO has progressively built up. Equally important, however, is the political consultation machinery which gives all contributing nations – even the small ones – a seat at the decision-making table and the right to approve operational plans and rules of engagement. NATO is also able to reach out to a network of Partners who not only take over significant parts of the mission (for instance both Finland and Sweden have commanded sectors in Kosovo), but also provide convenient things such as logistics, bases and lines of communication. Currently Partners make up over ten per cent of NATO's deployed forces, which is a significant sharing of the burden. Compare this to ad hoc coalitions of the willing where small nations have far less a say in the decision-making process, let alone participation in the political discussions regarding the future of the states where they deploy forces. Ad hoc coalitions may be fast but they are highly unstable. People drop in and out all the time. On the other hand, NATO missions may take a while to launch due to the consensus-building process but they have proved to be remarkably stable and resilient.

The second supply-drive advantage of NATO is its ability to form security partnerships with non-member states. This is a two-way street. NATO helps the Partners with education, training and defence reform. In return,

as they become more capable, the Partners contribute more to NATO's operations. It is inherently a relationship of mutual interests. Originally NATO undertook this educational and integration work with its own members in order to provide for a common Article V defence during the Cold War. One example was the way in which the whole structure and outlook of the Spanish forces was changed after Spain joined the Alliance in 1991. The same techniques of transparency and peer review which helped to integrate NATO in the 50s and 60s have proved remarkably successful at reaching out to a dazzling array of other countries – from Balkan countries that aspire to join NATO to countries well beyond Europe such as Australia or New Zealand that see a relationship with NATO as a good way to leverage their own contributions to international security tasks (New Zealand runs a PRT in Afghanistan) and share information and experience with the Alliance.

Since the end of the Cold War, NATO has demonstrated not only a willingness but also an ability to change. Forty per cent of its membership is today from formerly Communist countries; it has an expanding network of Partners; a new command structure, a NATO Response Force; official relations with other international organisations such as the UN, EU and OSCE; and new units have been created to deal with new challenges, such as a WMD Centre. The problem with change, however, is that it is always in relation to the external environment. You can change at a rapid speed, but if the world is changing faster, you will still fall behind.

The other aspect of change is that as you take on new missions on put your focus less on being and more on doing, all kinds of problems come to light which could be conveniently glossed over when NATO's function was mainly to exist as a geopolitical counterweight to the Soviet Union. Action always creates the need for more action to remedy the problems that suddenly emerge. As Napoleon very aptly put it "on s'engage et puis on voit". These problems can easily be viewed by journalists or think tankers as symptoms of failure. In reality, however, they can be seen more positively as symptoms of success because they show that NATO is capable of taking decisions, taking on new roles, and acting.

Challenge number one is undoubtedly in the area of resourcing NATO's peace support operations and improving its military capabilities.

One issue that has come to light is common funding. The larger Allies currently pay twice for NATO's operations. First because of their high percentage contribution to NATO's common budgets and secondly because they tend to be tapped frequently to provide key capabilities, such as mobile headquarters, satellite communications, helicopters and logistics. This has led to a situation where Allies are reluctant to be the first nation to lead an operation because they have to pay the start-up costs – for instance of refurbishing barracks or improving the local airport – which the second and third lead nations subsequently benefit from free of charge. NATO has thus set out to revise its cost shares. Three Allies have already agreed to increase their cost shares so that the larger Allies can slightly reduce theirs and NATO has also started to make greater use of Trust Funds. When Hungary recently donated T72 tanks to the Iraqi armed forces, it was Greece and Luxembourg who picked up the bill for transporting this equipment to Baghdad. Similarly Turkish helicopters recently deployed to Afghanistan were financed by Iceland and Luxembourg.

A second challenge is to improve NATO's force generation process. Countries need more advanced warning time that their assets are going to be needed for a NATO operation. Too much of NATO's force generation in the past has been at short notice and for comparatively minor assets. The new system of global force generation provides for more long-term planning with the result that lead nations for the ISAF mission in Afghanistan or for the management of Kabul International Airport have been identified for the next two years. It is much easier for nations to contribute for a six-month slot if they have the assurance that somebody has already been identified to replace them at the end of that period. NATO's force generation has also to be much more based on force planning to ensure that the forces that Allies are developing are those that NATO needs.

In this respect military transformation is crucial and the nations bear the responsibility. NATO as an entity owns few military assets and nations devote less than one half of one percent of their defence budgets to NATO

common-funded projects. NATO however must act as a catalyst for military transformation ensuring that nations have a common understanding of what is required and adopt common military standards. The Alliance can do this in a number of ways.

- First the Prague Capabilities Commitment, which seeks to address many of the collective shortfalls in the shorter term. NATO has a success rate at present of about 70-80% in meeting those commitments: not perfect but a lot better than zero percent;
- The force planning system which gives nations an agreed strategy, agreed targets and a collective system of assessing progress;
- The usability targets agreed in Istanbul which aim to increase the percentage of deployable and sustainable forces available for expeditionary operations; the fact that the Europeans today are only able to deploy 70,000 troops, although they have 2.4 million in their active and reserve forces, is clearly unacceptable;
- And the development of the Comprehensive Political Guidance: a high-level political guidance document which should give direction to and set the priorities for NATO's continuing transformation;

If NATO is the catalyst, can we see evidence of change within nations? I am not as pessimistic as some. Today there are European nations committing forces to NATO missions which would have been constitutionally unable to deploy forces outside their own territories a few years ago. Five years ago, 21 of the 24 current European Allies had at least some conscript forces; by 2010 there will be only nine, and remaining conscript forces are being thoroughly modernised. Fourteen Allies are currently planning increases in defence expenditure, even if often modestly; four project broad stability and only one is forecasting a decline.

NATO is doing what it can at the collective level too.

- It has implemented a new streamlined command structure with a strategic command devoted entirely to transformation;
- It has established a NATO Response Force, which is not only a flexible high readiness response force for operational use, but also acts as a vehicle for transformation within the Alliance. Next year it will operate at full strength off the coast of Africa in an exercise at Cape Verde. It has gone from the drawing board to full military reality in just four years;

- NATO has also begun to address the issue of procuring more common capabilities in addition to its existing AWACS fleet. It has recently signed a contract to procure an Allied Ground Surveillance Capability and is looking at the feasibility of a Joint Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile Defence System.

Naturally capability shortfalls remain. As Don Rumsfeld has recently put it, "you have to fight with the army you have, rather than the one that you would like to have". NATO is nonetheless militarily very strong and fully engaged now in the process of military transformation which is in any case a on-going process that is never finished. At the same time, an on-going challenge is to remove the national caveats that can sometimes make a powerful and well-manned force under perform because of restrictions on movement, not having the right equipment, or restrictive rules of engagement. As SACEUR has recently pointed out, the NATO force in Kosovo could be reduced by half but still have the same operational effectiveness if national caveats were removed and the Strategic Commanders has full control of the forces at any one time. The same could be said of ISAF in Afghanistan if greater synergy could be achieved in the sharing of assets such as helicopters with the American-led Operation Enduring Freedom in the south.

A second strategic challenge for the Alliance will be to make better use of its network of Partnerships. The 1990s were to some extent the easy part as NATO was focusing its efforts on Central and Eastern European democracies that emerged rapidly from Communist rule and were on track to join not only NATO but also the European Union – and thus receiving a great deal of technical assistance from both organisations at the same time. Now that most of the Central and Eastern European countries are either in the Alliance or will join it in the near future, the Partnership has sub-divided into several distinct categories.

First the EU neutrals, who have a high degree of interoperability with NATO and the armed forces and resources to make a major contribution. In return they seek greater participation in NATO's planning and decision-making for operations. Second, the states in the Caucasus and Central Asia that have severe resource constraints and a much more difficult

historical legacy, including frozen conflicts, to overcome on their route to Euro-Atlantic integration. The recent crisis in Uzbekistan also points to the need to balance an emphasis on democratic standards and human rights with strategic interests such as the maintenance of bases that supply NATO forces in Afghanistan. Third, there is the need to deepen the special relationships with Ukraine and Russia. Fourth, as NATO goes global, there is the need to engage major actors such as Japan and Australia that can make significant financial and even military contributions to NATO missions in areas of common strategic interest such as Iraq or Afghanistan and have useful experiences and information to share on issues such as non-proliferation and terrorism. Finally, NATO is now developing a security co-operation programme with its neighbours in the Mediterranean region and the Broader Middle East which also reflects common interests in areas such as security sector reform and combating terrorism. How to manage this broader array of Partnerships with NATO's own very limited budgets and human resources will be a key challenge in determining its future.

Clearly also NATO will need to develop more expertise and language skills vis-à-vis the Muslim nations. At the same time it will have to look very directly at how it can add value to the many on-going bi-lateral co-operation programmes that individual Allies run with many of these countries to avoid duplication and ensure that promised help is actually delivered. Balancing technical help in areas such as intelligence sharing and the training and equipping of armed forces with a policy of supporting democracy and human values will also be a key ingredient to maintaining political support for these Partnerships among NATO governments and public opinion more broadly. It is crucial that this second generation of Partnership be successful for NATO. The more NATO is able to secure the broader hinterland around its own expanding membership, the more secure its own members will be. The more these Partners share NATO's security outlook and are prepared to contribute actively to NATO's operations (for instance the many Mediterranean Dialogue countries have already promised logistic and intelligence help to Operation Active Endeavour in the Mediterranean) the less burden Allies themselves will have to bear and the more successful as well as more legitimate NATO's own operations will become.

From a bureaucratic standpoint, it will be difficult for NATO to operate a number of different partnerships simultaneously with Partner countries being put into different categories according to their geographical region (North Africa or Central Asia) or their status (for instance, far away countries like Japan or Australia). It may be easier for the Alliance to simply have one over-arching Partnership which gives every country the right to participate in a consultative council with the Allies and also an individual partnership arrangement based on how much co-operation it wants and can absorb from NATO. At the same time, those Partners who are willing to make a significant material contribution to NATO's on-going operations by providing troops or other capabilities should be more directly involved in NATO's decision-making and planning for these operations. This could be done by setting up committees of contributors in which these participating Partner countries could be represented. This would help to overcome the "no taxation without representation" syndrome which some of the EU Neutral Partners are currently experiencing.

A third challenge for the Alliance will be enhancing its institutional relationships with other organizations. During the Cold War NATO was largely a self-standing organization. It did not require the help of anyone else to fulfil its principal task of deterrence and maintaining the balance of military power in Europe. These days however security is altogether different. International institutions can only be effective to the extent that they can link up with others. For instance, if UNMIK, the UN Administration in Kosovo, is unable to rebuild Kosovo economically and advance the political process, popular frustrations and anger can easily rebound against the NATO KFOR troops stationed in the province, which is indeed what happened in March 2004. Conversely, if NATO ISAF forces in Afghanistan are not sufficient in number to provide security for the parliamentary elections in September 2005, it is much more difficult for the UN and other bodies to ensure a free and fair vote and send their monitors out into the countryside. Clearly a major priority in building security in the 21st century is to improve the strategic co-operation among the principal International organizations.

To some extent this is already happening in the field. NATO and the EU

currently share the responsibility for the security aspects of peace-building in Bosnia as they did also until recently in Macedonia. NATO and the UN are the key partners in Kosovo and also in Afghanistan and in theatre the senior military and civilian representatives of these organizations meet regularly in committees of principles to oversee reconstruction efforts on the ground. At the strategic level, in terms of the relations between the headquarters of these organizations, the quality of cooperation is not as good as it should be. NATO and the EU hold regular meetings but largely focused on their joint endeavours in the Balkans and on deconflicting their military modernization programmes. NATO has been helpful to the EU in giving it military advice to build up its rapid reaction forces and by offering the EU its capabilities for EU-led operations under the so-called "Berlin Plus" arrangements. However, there is enormous unexplored scope for NATO and the EU to co-ordinate more closely. Their joint crisis management missions in Macedonia in 2001-2002 showed that they are much more effective when they work together. In Macedonia the EU offered the carrot of a Stabilization and Association agreement while NATO played more the "bad cop" role of applying its military pressure on the warring factions to respect a cease fire. Both institutions can apply different instruments but in the service of a single policy objective. It is important to keep to this principle although lately it has not been followed in the case of Serbia and Montenegro with the EU going ahead with the offer of a Stabilization and Association agreement while NATO has not yet been ready to offer membership in the Partnership for Peace.

Looking around the perimeter of Europe there are a whole number of issues that cry out for greater NATO-EU co-operation. For instance the future status of Kosovo; how to integrate Ukraine; how to deal with the frozen conflicts in Moldova and the Caucasus; the approach to the Muslim countries in Northern African and the Middle East. This is not a zero sum game in which a plus for one of the institutions is necessary a minus for the other. The Balkans have shown that NATO and the EU are perfectly capable of sharing missions with one being the leader at one minute and the follower the next as the mission evolves from military enforcement to civilian and economic reconstruction. Darfur may be a heaven-sent opportunity to overcome the current institutional blockages in the NATO-

EU relationship. Both institutions are closely co-ordinating their logistic and training support to the African Union as it increases its presence in Darfur. This conflict is also a good reason for NATO and the EU to start holding a regular series of informal ministerial meetings which they recently agreed to in Vilnius. In the medium term, a solution will have to be found for the issue of Cyprus so that Turkey will accept a more expansive agenda for NATOEU ambassadorial meetings. Moreover the United States will need to continue the positive spirit of reaching out to the EU which has characterized the second term of the Bush Administration, seeing EU defence co-operation not as a threat to NATO but as something that can make Europe's burden sharing more effective. Europeans also will need to accept that NATO has a perfect reason to discuss EU defence issues where they impact on the Alliance. Waiting for the EU to have a fixed position on everything before discussing substance with the other Allies in NATO can only lead to frustration and a sense of a lack of transparency.

NATO's relationship with the United Nations also looks set to evolve considerably. Kofi Annan has set out an ambitious agenda for the reform of the UN which involves a considerable boost to the UN's crisis management and peace support activities. The UN recognizes that NATO can be a useful partner in this endeavour by offering help in areas such as the planning of operations, logistics and transport, training of UN Headquarters' staff, help with doctrine and interoperability issues and offering extraction capabilities for Blue Helmet forces in the field. The NATO response force would seem perfectly suited to the latter role. NATO could also help to secure a given area and establish a bridgehead while UN peacekeepers deploy. There is also no reason why NATO should not be part of the UN Peace Building Commission that Kofi Annan is seeking to establish where it can share its lessons learned and experience from areas such as the Balkans or Afghanistan. At a time when a record low number of American and European troops are involved in the UN's current 14 peacekeeping operations (as most of these troops are now involved in NATO or EU operations), we have to avoid a system of "robbing Peter to pay Paul". If NATO support can make a UN operation more effective, that is one less operation which the Alliance will need to do. UN operations are also cheaper than NATO operations. For instance the UN currently spends 3 billion dollars a year

running 14 operations which is less than what NATO is spending running five. Thus now is certainly the time to bring NATO and the UN closer given that the old political inhibitions about working with NATO inside the UN community have thankfully dissipated.

The fourth and final challenge is to enhance the transatlantic political dialogue in the Alliance. When the German Chancellor Schroeder said in Munich last February that NATO was no longer the primary forum for transatlantic consultations, he was speaking a painful truth. What has been remarkable in recent years is that NATO is now operating militarily increasingly beyond Europe but the Alliance's political dialogue still remains largely focused on European issues, such as the Balkans or on places where it has deployed forces, such as Afghanistan. If NATO is going to act globally, it has to start talking globally. Afghanistan has shown that where the Allies consult actively and reach a common assessment of the situation – and feel comfortable about the objectives that they are pursuing – it is much easier to find the forces than in situations such as Iraq, where there was very little consultation in the Alliance before the conflict.

To say this is not to suggest that NATO should take on every responsibility. Some issues, such as Iran or the China arms embargo, are currently discussed between the EU and the United States and there is no reason why that should change. However, there are many issues where Europe and the United States could use NATO more effectively as a forum to test out their thinking and share views. The Middle East peace process, the way ahead in Kosovo and Afghanistan, the future of the Caucasus and Central Asia, the progress of democracy in the Greater Middle East, the significance of new trans-national threats such as pandemic diseases, water shortages and the price of oil, to name but a few. Political consultation does not mean that NATO is assuming responsibility for an issue or is preparing a military response. This will have to be made clear to the public. At the same time, the Alliance should not dramatize if there are disagreements on an issue as NATO unfortunately has done on occasion in the past. It's not the end of the world but part of the normal process of developing policy step by step. After all the UN and the EU go through

numerous disagreements on their way to forging common positions and no-one predicts their imminent demise as a result. We have to understand that we live in a different world now where the nature of security has changed and we are dealing with new trans-national threats. At the same time the responses to those threats are much more complicated than they were in the days of the Soviet Union. Getting the balance right between prevention and pre-emption, the carrot and the stick, the need to show leadership while at the same time building a broad coalition will not be easy. It has not been the case that one side of the Atlantic has always been right and the other side has always been wrong.

So clearly as we move towards formulating a common response, there are going to be differences of view. But NATO's experience over Iraq or a decade ago in the Balkans demonstrates that putting the issues on the table and arguing them out is at the end of the day a much more productive approach than trying to protect NATO by taking it out of the equation altogether and then conducting the debate by megaphone media diplomacy or bilateral diplomacy based on concepts such as "old Europe and new Europe". As it develops a greater role as a forum for transatlantic dialogue, NATO will need to make sure that it prepares discussions carefully to ensure that debate is not being conducted for debate's sake. This will require imaginative policy planning papers and better intelligence information being shared among Allies. NATO will also have to choose its subjects carefully and develop those subjects rather than jump from one to the other inconclusively. Moreover both sides of the Atlantic will have to commit to true consultations rather than being content to explain their positions merely through briefings and question and answer sessions with experts. It will also mean that Ministers from both sides of the Atlantic will have to be prepared to visit NATO Headquarters more frequently to lead the consultations in person rather than delegate the responsibility to their Ambassadors. Success will also depend upon a closer NATO-EU relationship not only to avoid duplication but also to ensure that where there is an operational follow-up – for instance on terrorism or the Middle East – that follow-up can go to either NATO or the EU as appropriate.

In conclusion, during the Cold War the function of NATO was mostly to

exist. Being a fixed, even stolid organization, was part of NATO's usefulness as a geopolitical counterweight to the Soviet Union whose value was consistency and permanence. In the 21st century by contrast, we have moved from institutions to networks whose essence is to mutate permanently and rapidly to adapt to changing circumstances. To use the language of Thomas Friedman, the chief American advocate of the virtues of globalization, you have to be able to "plug and play" by being effectively networked with everybody else.

The key to success for NATO is no longer only the traditional interoperability between its military forces but now also political operability in key relationships: between NATO and its Partners; between NATO and other international organizations; between NATO and the NGO community in the field; between the military and civilian dimensions of nation building; and between North America and Europe in terms of sharing a common outlook on the world's problems and a common willingness to share the burdens in solving them. The task for NATO is to make sure that all of these interoperability areas are working and are also joined up to the new global security network which is emerging. This means that in a future ideal scenario NATO could contribute to the relief of the Tsunami in Indonesia while at the same time calling on Australia or New Zealand to join it in Afghanistan and run a Provincial Reconstruction Team there while Japan contributes to a NATO Trust Fund to help with the disposal of missiles and ammunition in Ukraine or Albania. The future of NATO is to be at the core of a global security network where an expanding number of Allies work with other partners and organizations to handle security tasks such as partnerships and peace support operations which are in everyone's common interest. This NATO-led security system would need to be based on common democratic values and in pursuit of common democratic values and its benefits could be extended to non-member countries to the extent that they were willing to work towards those same values.

The advantages that NATO has to be at the centre of such a network are still impressive: the link between North America and Europe; the experience and expertise in all areas of military education, interoperability and capability development; the attractiveness of the Alliance as a means to identify common responses and to allow countries to leverage

the contributions to common security tasks in a way that makes those contributions more effective than if they were to be made in isolation. NATO remains the best organization to package peace support operations and to help to stabilize those countries on the strategic front line of the fight against terrorism whether through crisis management deployments or the establishment of long-term partnerships focused on security sector reform and capability building. All of this suggests that NATO in the 21st century could be an even more significant actor on the international scene than it was in the second half of the 20th ; but only if it is able to muster the political will and the concrete capabilities to support of its ever-expanding ambitions.

The Current Revolution in the Nature of Conflict

by *Chris Donnelly*

Revolution or Evolution?

1. The nature of conflict changes constantly. But every so often the economic, social, political and technological pressures which force that change build up, and the suddenness, the pace, breadth and extent of change reach such a pitch that we can call it a 'revolution' rather than evolution.

2. Such revolutions in the nature of conflict I would identify as having occurred around 1648 (the peace of Westphalia and the coming-of-age of the nation-state), 1789 (The French Revolution and Napoleonic Wars) and 1914 (the industrialization of warfare). In my view, we are currently experiencing just such a revolution in the nature of conflict.

3. These revolutions have certain characteristics. Firstly, although we label these revolutions with a convenient date (eg. 9/11 2001), in fact, as Clausewitz reminds us, they take place over a long time and their real consequences only make sense through time.

4. Secondly, we think of them as 'military events'. But in fact the principal drivers tend to be economic, social or political rather than military-technical. They are not just "revolutions in the nature of battle".

5. Thirdly, in any revolution, only a fraction of things will change. The other fraction will stay the same. The problem for those of us who are living through this revolution, as with other revolutions, is that it is very difficult without the wisdom of hindsight to identify which things will change and which will stay the same.

6. As a result we are faced with a major problem. In a period of stability and slow evolution our greatest asset is our experience. But at times of revolution our experiences can be fatal baggage. We can no longer assume that, because something we did worked well in the past, it is likely

to continue to do so in current circumstances. If we are to survive living in a revolution, we will need to make a correspondingly revolutionary shift in the way we think about both the risk and the response.

Causes of the Current Revolution

7. The main drivers of today's revolution in the nature of conflict, in my view, are: (a) the growing gap between rich and poor countries, (b) the uncontrollable proliferation of technology, and (c) the information explosion.

8. For an example of the growing gap between rich and poor countries, a map of the Mediterranean basin is a good place to start. Write on the map, for each of the countries to the north and south of the Mediterranean, the UN figures for the population, GDP and per capita income for 1990, today and projected to 2020. The trends are clear. The demographic implications alone are very dramatic.

Another example: The combined wealth of the richest 250 people in the world is equal to the combined annual income of the poorest 2.5 billion people in the world. Above all, the poor are now aware of the disparities.

9. The proliferation of technology refers to all modern technology not just to the technology for weapons of mass destruction. Technological advantage in war and conflict is normally transient, and always depends not just on the available technology but also on our ability to learn how to use it and to incorporate it into our systems. In the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, the French had an effective machine gun. Whereas the Prussians did not. German Radar technology in 1939 was actually superior to the British. But in both cases the losers failed to integrate their technology into a system which would exploit it and as a result threw away their technological advantage. Note Al Qaeda's effective asymmetric use of technology, or the skill with which criminal gangs use modern communications technology. Not only can we sometimes not match the flexibility of these organisations and their ability to learn, but it can cost us £1000 to defeat what it costs them £1 to do.

10. The 'Information Explosion' has two aspects: IT and Media. Today's rapid developments in IT are well known. But with this presumed efficiency comes serious potential vulnerabilities. The ability to launch attacks on information systems depends not on wealth but on the cleverness of the attacker, and our opponents are just as clever as we are. As to media, I would argue that media (in all its forms) has become so out of control and all pervasive that it now constitutes an additional environment in which we must operate. To use a military example: a soldier planning a battle is taught always to give first consideration to the "ground", ie. the environment in which the battle will be fought - open countryside, rivers, towns, mountains, etc. "Ground" affects both sides - not necessarily equally. It cannot be changed very much, if at all. But it can be exploited by either side. To ignore the ground is unthinkable to a soldier. To fail to prepare the ground is unforgivable. To underestimate its influence is usually disastrous. Today, media is like a new environment in which we operate and which affects everything we do in policy making as in armed conflict. Yet many of us still do not usually give in the attention it deserves.

11. Of course the key to understanding the dynamics of today's revolution in the nature of conflict is to understand how all the above factors interact with each other and with the world around us. The spread of information and technology gives weapons, and the ability to use them effectively over a long period of time, to those with a grievance to redress.

12. Defining Security Today

During the cold war, the term 'national security' was synonymous with 'defence'. The more tanks and planes a country had, the safer it felt. Today the terms are no longer synonymous. For example, Israel is militarily stronger today than ever before. Israel could defeat convincingly a simultaneous military attack by all its Arab neighbours combined. Yet today the Israeli people feel more insecure than they have felt for half a century. Today we need to redefine what 'security' is and what we need to do to achieve it. Likewise we need to redefine terms which depend on security, such as 'deterrence'. How we deter today's threats will not be the same as how we deterred the threats during the cold war.

13. A lot of very good work has been done to identify strategic trends, new risks and challenges and potential threats. From these, I would conclude that the major source of problems for us lies in bad governance. By this I mean (a) the incompetence of governments in weak or failing states which cannot cope with their internal pressures or resolve local and regional disputes, and (b) our own inability to change our national and international systems of governance to cope with the new challenges. This includes not just the competence of national Government, but the effectiveness of corporate governance, the efficiency of non-governmental organisations etc, and how we use and control the non governmental bodies that today play an ever increasing role in security.

14. The products of poor governance – organisational inefficiency, corruption, obscure and ambiguous domestic legislation, outdated international law – themselves help generate bad policing, insecure borders, inappropriately structured armed forces, etc. These in turn facilitate the manifestations of the threat or create the actual problem, viz: organised crime, ethnic conflict, religious extremism, terrorism and, of course, actual war.

Responding to the Challenge

15. To respond effectively to the security challenge we face during the current 'revolution', we need to:

- a) change our mental approaches to the problem – concepts;
- b) change the tools with which we respond – capabilities.

The question is, how?

16. Firstly, we need a better understanding of our society today: how it has developed and how these new issues interact with it. For example, the efficiency of electronic banking, combined with the efficiency of 'just-in-time-delivery' processes, creates the real susceptibility to catastrophic disruption that was first noticed in the fuel drivers protest 6 years ago. The volatility of the now-global stock exchange and our economic susceptibility to disruption (eg. by terrorism elsewhere on the globe) is another good example.

17. Secondly, we need a better understanding of the nature of the real issues that now face us. This is not easy. The issues are complex, and the UK, like most countries, has limited resources to study the new issues, and the implications take time to sink in. If we do not understand the real threat, and base our defence and security planning solely on our own perception of our vulnerabilities, not only could we be very surprised by an opponent's different perception (and exploitation) of our weaknesses, but we will also be prey to wasting effort and money on unnecessary defences - worthless, but very profitable to those lobbying for them.

18. When tackling today's security problems, qualities such as 'vigour', 'sincerity', determination, and 'firmly held convictions' are only a good basis on which to proceed if they are based on a real deep understanding. Otherwise they are dangerous attributes. We will only be able to get a deep understanding of the new issues if we get our whole 'thinking community' (officials, academics, technologists, social scientists, economists, etc) thinking and working together, focussed on the new issues, each contributing their bit to the overall understanding. It will not be quick. It will take us time, money, effort and humility. Above all, it requires that we see ourselves through the eyes of others (eg, the Arab Street).

19. Most important to appreciate is the declining role of government in the international arena. Just as we are increasingly seeing non-state actors as generating serious security threats, so also we now see tasks being done by NGOs and private military companies in conflict zones and in the post conflict recovery phase that, in 1990, would have been entirely the prerogative of the state and its armed forces. This trend is likely to increase (if only because these firms and NGOs have a better business model than does the state). But we have not yet developed the tools of governance to handle this new partnership adequately.

20. At home, our societies are losing their trust in government at the same time as they are losing traditions, beliefs, family values, roots. For the first time in human history it is common for people in western societies to live alone in a house or flat. As they lose their traditional psychological support mechanisms (family, religion, ideals, ritual and tradition) people become more easily influenced by external information (and a

media which gives respectability to uninformed opinion). With no-one to share ideas with, people are more easily given to over-responding and intemperate reaction. Society is losing its resilience – its ability to keep its balance, not to overreact, to recover after a shock, to withstand hardships.

21. To compound this situation, there is today an almost total lack of media correspondents and editor who really understand defence and security issues. The widespread popularity of violent video games, films, etc. means that young people no longer understand what pain and death really mean. It is not difficult to imagine that there might be serious implications for the public's response to defence policy issues, or in the event of a military setback or defeat. Long term, these social developments certainly impact on recruiting and retention in the Armed Forces.

Changing the Mechanisms of Response

22. This has two components, (a) changing how we do things (b) changing the actual institutions with which we respond. The most important aspect of changing how we do things refers to the way we respond to the new threats (risks, challenges, etc). We can no longer divide threats to security neatly into internal and external threats. We can no longer guarantee national security by military means. (armies plus diplomacy and spies)

For a military intervention to be successful we now depend on the ability of other departments and agencies to make their successful contribution. If The Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) cannot deliver the support of the international community (via UN, NATO, EU or other), and if The Department for International Development (DfID) cannot deliver adequate post conflict reconstruction and capacity building (including controlling and directing NGOs and private contractors), then the Armed Forces' success in battle (eg. in Iraq) will be for nought. MOD's contribution to joined up governance becomes vital.

Moreover, if FCO, DfID and other departments, and big private companies such as BP, cannot deliver serious improvements in social conditions and economic prosperity, for example in North Africa and the Middle East then, in 10 years time, our Armed Forces might well be having to fight to ensure our energy supplies.

23. Similarly, in domestic security, MOD now has a large vested interest in ensuring that the Home Office, Police, Security Service, the Department of Trade & Industry (DTI), Health, and Transport Department, etc. all make their essential contribution to security. Domestic support for military policy, recruiting, the acceptance of military aid to the civil power in mainland UK, all will be affected. What our troops do today in Basra has an immediate impact on the attitude (eg. towards the government and its policies) of a large proportion of the population of Bradford.

The Challenge

24. The principle task over the next 2-3 years will be to develop MOD's collaboration with other Government departments in researching and tackling new security, resilience and development issues. Most important are the relationships with the Treasury, FCO and DfID; the Treasury because it will need to be convinced of the fitness of the MOD's business model for its changing role in the security equation. FCO and DfID because they will have to play the main role in 'winning the peace' and ensuring that British forces do not need to stay indefinitely after a conflict, or do not need to go there in the first place.

25. A second element that must be considered is the government's relationship to the corporate world. The corporate world has a great to deal offer Whitehall in helping to deal with new security issues of all sorts, and the business community would benefit greatly from more input from government, eg. advising on what countries offer the best prospects for security and stability for long term investments, etc.

26. The third element of "how we do things" relates to technology. During most of the cold war, defence research led national technological research. This is no longer the case in most areas. Furthermore, technological developments are outstripping our capacity to learn how to exploit them and how to incorporate them effectively into our systems. For this to happen, educational systems and force structures need to be more flexible. This affects all aspects of force generation – procurement, manning, training & education, structuring, tactics, organisation and equipment. We do not want our potential enemies to 'beat us to the drop' when it comes to using new technology effectively – an issue shared across government and out to the NGOs and Civil Society.

27. Fourthly conflict is a 'hot house' for forcing change. But that change – in societies, institutions, armed forces etc, occurs in direct proportion to the impact the conflict has on each side. As a society we have not yet understood that the current conflict in which we are engaged is vital for us. It does not yet cause us enough pain for us to learn and change. But our opponents do see this conflict as vital and they are learning quicker than we are.

28. We therefore face the crucial task of ensuring that our Armed Forces are appropriately structured, trained and led to meet the new challenges that will confront us. That includes ensuring their support by the population at home and their protection under international law abroad.


29. Deployed and employed to fulfil new, post 9/11 style operations, our forces will need a very high degree of cultural sensitivity, and the ability to operate at short notice in parts of the world where we may have little experience or infrastructure support. They will need to work smoothly at tactical level with locals, non governmental organisations and private companies. They will need to be able to operate within a variety of ad hoc coalitions, and cope with the fact that coalition partners may not be competent to operate in the difficult circumstances pertaining. Above all, individual soldiers will have to understand that a tactical success can also be a strategic disaster. The soldier on the scene may know the situation better than the senior commanders, and may have to act contrary to their orders.

30. This brings us back to our starting point. We are in the middle of a revolution in the nature of conflict, the impact of which reaches from top to bottom of our defence, development & security structures, home and away. Preserving what is good in our system and changing what needs to change is our second great challenge. Our first challenge is identifying which is which.

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To mark our 50th anniversary, the Norwegian Atlantic Committee was pleased to be able to arrange this seminar on June 16th. We are particularly happy to mark this occasion through these contributions by three great friends of the committee. They each take on a different perspective.

About the authors:

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