

# B-post

## Summary:

The presented text is a part of a greater work devoted to the question of relationship between Russia and NATO in the wake of the alliance's action in Kosovo. The author finished the work on the first draft of the book in the beginning of September 2001 but the events of 11 September 2001 forced him to add a new chapter to the book covering post-11 September developments. This text is based on this additional chapter. It gives an insight into Russian post-11 September strategy towards the West, and NATO in particular, and offers various interpretations of Russia's policies in the period between 11 September 2001 and February 2002.

## About the author:

Jakub M. Godzimirski (1957). Field of specialisation: foreign & security policy, democratisation, Russia, East/Central Europe. 1981 M.A. in cultural anthropology, University of Warsaw; 1987 Ph.D. in cultural anthropology; 1993-94 Department of Strategic Studies, acting head of section/senior researcher, Ministry of Defence, Poland, co-operation with the Centre for Eastern Studies, Polish Institute of International Affairs, Centre for International Studies, Polish Senate. Since 1994 co-operation with Europa-programmet. Since 1995 Research Fellow, Centre for Russian Studies, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, NUPI. Main fields of interests are Russian foreign and security policy and transition in East Europe. In 2001 he worked on the project financed by the Ministry of Defence on Russia's relations with NATO in the wake of the war in Kosovo and 11 September 2001 events in the US. In 2002 and 2003 his main focus will be on soft security issues in Northern and Central Europe (NFR grant). E-mail: JakubM.Godzimirski@nupi.no

# Contents

---

*Security Policy Library 7-2002*



- 4 11 September and Russia's Options
- 6 Putin's Choice
- 22 Interpreting Putin's Choice: Identity shift or political judo?
- 36 Literature
- 37 Notes

*Published by:* Den norske Atlanterhavskomite  
*Editor:* Kjetil Sørli  
*Printed by:* Hegland Trykkeri AS, Flekkeford  
*ISSN:* 0802-6602

*More information, visit our website: [www.dnak.org](http://www.dnak.org)*

# 11 September 2001 and the shift in Russia's policy towards NATO

*By Jakub M. Godzimirski*

It is widely believed that relations between Russia and the West – and between Russia and NATO – entered a new phase in the wake of the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington on 11 September. President Vladimir Putin was the first world leader to offer condolences to the US president after the disaster of 11 September. These condolences have been followed by a number of statements and actions taken by Russian political leadership and it seems that the climate of co-operation between the two former foes is today better than in any other period of the post-Soviet history. The US and Russian presidents met in November 2001 at George W. Bush's ranch in Crawford, Texas, to discuss issues of importance for the development of relations between the two countries. Three months earlier, before the terrorists attack on the US, this meeting was seen as the most important test of V. Putin's ability to resist pressure from the US administration that was believed to be willing to adopt a tougher approach towards Russia and was interested in realising its controversial NMD programme notwithstanding Russia's loud protests. After the 11 September and Russia's reactions to it, the November meeting turned into a working meeting of two world leaders and

close allies agreeing apparently on the same global strategy to fight Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism.

### 11 SEPTEMBER AND RUSSIA'S OPTIONS

When Putin decided that Russia should follow a new, more co-operative line in relations with the West, many believed that the rapprochement of the former foes had become a reality. Russia is today believed to be an important ally of the United States in the fight against international terrorism. Russia has allowed US military presence in its own 'sensitive' backyard in Central Asia; Putin has met with the most important Western leaders and reassured them that they can rely on Russia; the West has decided to give Russia access to its most important 'security table' by proposing a new formula to Russia–NATO co-operation. All these developments seem to be a manifestation of the emergence of a new framework of co-operation between Russia and the West. The fact that Putin's Russia has adopted this more positive approach to the co-operation with the West has surprised many analysts. In order to propose an answer to the question why Russia has decided to adopt this approach, it is important to look at the Russian cost-benefit analysis of the post-11 September situation.

When the Russian leadership had learned about the attacks in the United States, it could embark on one of the two policies – a confrontational one advocated for instance by V. Zhirinovskiy and G. Zyuganov, and a co-operative one proposed and then implemented by V. Putin.

In order to understand how Russia could have behaved had the country's leadership chosen the confrontational line, let us first outline the contours of the confrontational alternative advocated by V. Zhirinovskiy and the Communists. In one of his first comments on 11 September V. Zhirinovskiy called for using this opportunity to realise the country's goals at the moment when the US was in the state of chaos and the US administration was preoccupied with tackling the post-11 September national trauma. Zhirinovskiy outlined his policy in the for him typically bombastic way: 'The whole planet hates the US because of Washington's ambitions for global dominance. These terrorist attacks are linked with the start of a new era, when the rest of humanity will no longer put up with this. In these circumstances Russia has a unique opportunity. We can put pressure on the Arabs; we have unique air defence

systems and weapons capable of wiping out entire continents. Yesterday's events demonstrated the futility of a US national missile defence. The US administration should start negotiations with Russia and write off our foreign debts, and in exchange we will ensure security for the whole world.'<sup>1</sup> Also Communist leader Zyuganov gave a very critical reading of the line followed by Putin. In his opinion Russian post-11 September policy should be much more multi-vectorial as Russia's interests lie not only in the West, but also in other parts of the world, and by pursuing unconditionally a pro-Western line Russia may alienate other important co-operation partners. In an interview with S. Shuster in NTV's programme *Hero of the Day*, Zyuganov described the priorities of Russian foreign and security policy in traditional Eurasian terms: 'We are a Eurasian country. It is not only the West we have links with. We have a huge frontier. We have a 4,500 km frontier with China. We have a frontier with the Islamic world along the entire southern perimeter of our state. In the East we also border on Japan, a powerful country. We cannot conduct a one-sided policy targeted exclusively at the West. For Russia such a policy would offer absolutely no promise.'<sup>2</sup> In his assessment of 2001 Zyuganov presented an even more critical reading of Putin's new line in co-operation with the West and labeled it capitulation: 'If 2000 was the year of lost opportunities, 2001 was the year of capitulation to the American party of war and to our own oligarchs. What lies behind the smokescreen of the fight against terrorism? Russia, trailing behind the American party of war, will be expected in the new world order to play the role of supplier of manpower, a sort of special forces for new provocations and military conflicts with the Islamic world and, possibly, for hostility with China. And Russia will, of course, retain the role of raw-materials quarry for the Western economies. Putin is fulfilling American instructions irreproachably.'<sup>3</sup>

Although both Zhirinovskiy and Zyuganov represent the extremes of the Russian political spectrum, also mainstream analysts called for what could be termed a more interest-oriented Russian policy towards the new developments. The head of SVOP, Sergey Karaganov expressed views that could be described as characteristic of this more cautious approach. He saw no alternative to joining the West in its anti-terror campaign, but he was very preoccupied with 'rewards' Russia could get for this co-operation, not least due to the fact that Russia could pay a high price for it: 'Our support could cost us more

than anybody else, and we must demand certain concessions from the West in return, in particular, on settling the debt problem, and on our participation in Western alliances, and [consultation on] their enlargement or non-enlargement.<sup>74</sup>

A similar list of issues on which Russia could negotiate with the West as a precondition of support to its anti-terror campaign was also presented by another of Russia's well-known analysts, A. Migranyan. In his interview with the Polish newspaper *Gazeta Wyborcza*<sup>75</sup> he presented what could be termed as a 'mercantile approach' to the problem of co-operation and said that the main problem was that Russia did not get paid for its support. In his opinion it would be quite natural to ask for an economic or political reward for helping the US implement its anti-terrorist measures in a situation where the whole international system seems to be steered by market forces.

#### PUTIN'S CHOICE

Putin's choice of the co-operative approach, notwithstanding the strong voices warning against embarking on this pro-Western line, was probably motivated by his political pragmatism and by a sober calculation of potential gains and losses. The events of 11 September have created a situation where it seemed that many of Russia's strategic interests could be realized more efficiently by choosing co-operation with the West and not by adopting a confrontational approach. The attacks on the USA have apparently given Russia a window of opportunity to achieve its strategic goals in what Putin believed was the most cost-effective way.

When analyzing Putin's choices we have to see them in a proper time perspective, as it was not a single decision but rather a process in which decisions have been taken as new facts and circumstances have been emerging. Putin made in fact at least two important decisions in the first weeks after the attacks on the US.

The first one, of tactical character, was made on 11 September, 45 minutes after the attacks on the US when he called President Bush and presented his condolences. The second one, of strategic character, was taken on 22 September when he ordered the Russian power structures to fully co-operate with the US and asked Russian allies in Central Asia to do the same. After having learned about the terrorist attacks, Putin took immediately con-

tact with the US administration and offered condolences to the US people and the families of the victims of these terrorist acts. He underlined the commonality of fate the US and Russian people experienced in their tragic encounter with international terrorism. He said: 'We understand their sorrow and pain as Russia has also suffered from terrorism.' Then he called for action against the perpetrators and those who supported them by saying: 'There is no doubt that such an inhuman act must not go unpunished. The entire international community should unite in the struggle against terrorism.'

In a televised speech to Russians on 12 September, Putin described the attacks as a 'a brazen challenge to all mankind, at least all civilised mankind.' He offered the US help in the fight against international terrorism, called for pooling 'the efforts of the international community in the struggle against international terrorism' which he labelled 'the plague of the 21<sup>st</sup> century' and reminded the public that Russia was the first to call for fight against this plague when the country answered militarily the Chechen invasion of Dagestan in August 1999.<sup>6</sup>

Putin's words were followed by both symbolic and concrete actions. He asked the Russians to pay a tribute to the victims of the terrorist attacks by observing a minute of silence on 13 September and ordered lowering of flags on state buildings. When it comes to more concrete actions, he ordered the Russian security services to begin co-operation with Western intelligence organisations to help find those responsible for the attacks. The head of the Russian foreign intelligence service SVR informed that Russian intelligence co-operated very closely with its Western counterparts in preventing new terrorist attacks.<sup>7</sup> In order to lower tension and send a signal that Russia was in a co-operative mood, the president also ordered a stop in military exercises that were taking place in Russia in that period.<sup>8</sup> Russia also offered practical help and proposed that a team of Russian rescue workers be sent to help in rescue operations in New York and Washington.

The Russian press followed the official line and an impression was created from the very beginning that there was a direct link between the attacks on the US and the explosions in Moscow two years earlier.<sup>9</sup>

The popular tabloid *Komsomolskaya Pravda* wrote: 'This is not just a terrorist attack – this is a third world war started by terrorists.' *Izvestia* added that the attacks had changed forever the panorama of world politics: 'After

yesterday, there is no superpower left. A war between civilisations has begun. A war of Allah against Jesus, the poor against the rich, barbarians versus the civilised world.’<sup>10</sup>

As one of the leading Russian independent political commentators, Andrei Piontkovsky said in his interview with the AFP on 12 September: ‘He [Putin] implicitly reproached the West for not backing the ‘anti-terrorist’ struggle waged by Russia in Chechnya. He let it be understood that if Moscow supports America, it wants it to stop criticizing Russian actions in Chechnya.’<sup>11</sup> Piontkovsky’s words reveal with all clarity one of the main reasons why the Russian president decided to react in the way he did. Terrorist attacks on the US targets have removed the odium from Russia being accused by the West of conducting an inhumane war against Chechnya, a war the Russians themselves had chosen to label an ‘anti-terror operation’.<sup>12</sup> The attacks on the US have helped Russia to complete the construction of what we have termed the ‘threat bridge’ to the West.<sup>13</sup>

There were many reasons behind Putin’s decision to call Bush on 11 September. First of all it was important for him to show that he belonged to the same political club as Western leaders. His call was not only a political statement, but also an important publicity stunt. This call was to be seen as an apparent manifestation of Putin sticking to the same values and norms as Western leaders. He simply realized that it was a proper thing to do if he wanted to be treated as a leader belonging to the Western world.<sup>14</sup> He had met George W. Bush before and hoped that by calling him at this difficult moment he would not only pass on Russian condolences, but also put Russia on the post-11 September agenda. And it was important for him to do so, because already at this early stage he could hope to achieve some strategic advantages. Once the second plane had crashed into the World Trade Center and before Putin made his call, it became clear that it was a terrorist act revealing US weakness and vulnerability, and irrelevance of the national missile defence programme (NMD) that was one of the main bones of contention in relations between the US and Putin’s Russia.

Although at the moment when Putin decided to phone Bush with condolences, no one knew for sure who was behind the attacks, the list of possible culprits was relatively short and Islamic fundamentalist groups occupied with all probability the highest positions on this short list. Taking into



consideration the history of attacks on the WTC and the role Osama bin Laden had played in attacks on the US targets in East Africa in 1998, it was relatively easy to guess that Islamic fundamentalists were to be blamed for this terrible crime. In Russian eyes the West was therefore expected to join the Russia-lead anti-terror operation against Islamic fundamentalists<sup>15</sup> by opening a second front in this war of civilizations that was to be fought with all probability in Russia's immediate neighbourhood. As *New Times'* commentator Andrei Grachev put it: 'The West, and the USA, in the first place, needed the dreadful shock of September 11 to start regarding Russia as an important ally'. According to the same analyst, after the 11 September the roles switched and 'it was the West that assumed the role of the manifestly concerned party, if not a petitioner. So the president of Russia could set his price and formulate the conditions on which Russia would offer its strategic services to the West.'<sup>16</sup>

Putin decided, however, to approach the issue in a rather untraditional and innovative way. Instead of formulating a list of issues Russia wanted to discuss – and obtain some Western concessions on – he decided to embark on a policy of rapprochement with the West and co-operation with the US without setting any preconditions. He was probably aware that setting any preconditions for co-operation would in this situation be perceived by the West as inappropriate and as an attempt at bargaining in a moment when it was important to show compassion and give practical help to deal with the problem both Russia and the West defined as the main strategic challenge. He could hope that by showing this unconditional and co-operative approach he would be able to achieve strategic goals of Russian foreign and security policy without compromising Russia's international reputation.<sup>17</sup> As he has been advocating a pragmatic approach to foreign policy of the country, his decision to co-operate with the West in fighting international terrorism was therefore quite natural and understandable. An efficient implementation of this policy and achievement of its goals are, however, tasks of extreme difficulty.

Boris Piadyshev, the editor-in-chief of the *International Affairs*, a Russian journal treated by many as a semi-official tube of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described Putin's post-11 September dilemma in the following words: 'We need to be decisive, but extremely circumspect. It is like walking on the knife's edge. We cannot allow ourselves to be involved be-

yond a reasonable point. Neither can Russia afford to miss a chance.’<sup>18</sup> Piadyshev, like Putin, did understand that what he termed as ‘horsetrading’ was inappropriate in the existing situation; however, it did not prevent him from mentioning in the next paragraph the two issues that were the main problems in Russian-US relations. The first was the question of Chechnya, the second one the question of the modification of the ABM Treaty and US plans to build a NMD protecting the US against incoming missiles. When he wrote ‘that the September events showed that the real threat comes not from ballistic missiles that are going to be countered with a national missile defence system, but from organized international terrorism that is emerging as a formidable force’,<sup>19</sup> he revealed the second reason why Putin decided to embark on a co-operative approach. Had Russia chosen another, confrontational way of approaching the post-11 September developments, it would definitely have had a very negative impact on Putin’s chances to convince his US counterpart that NMD could be shelved. By co-operating with the US administration he could still hope that Russia would have at least a chance to persuade the US to focus on a joint anti-terror operation and forget its plans to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.<sup>20</sup>

As Putin’s priorities seem to be not of military, but of an economic character, the potential of US halting plans to build an NMD could be seen as an extra reward resulting from the new situation. However, Putin was aware that the Bush administration treated this issue as a top priority and that it would not be willing to withdraw from it as it could be interpreted as giving in to both Russian objections and to the international terrorists, especially in a situation where the country’s vulnerability was so manifest. By not tabling this issue immediately after the attacks on the US, and by not treating it as a bargaining chip, Putin wanted to make his policy of rapprochement more credible; in addition he could hope that he would be able to discuss the issue at his meeting with President Bush scheduled for November and press him for some concessions if the US were to be in more need of Russian help in its fight against terrorism.

The third issue playing a role in Putin’s decision was the realization of the fact that the US operation would require Russia’s consent in the UN Security Council<sup>21</sup> and access to territory controlled either by Russia or by the country’s CIS allies. Putin had simply realized that in this new situation Russia had

some strong liberal-institutional and realist geopolitical cards that could be played in order to achieve some indirect US concessions on issues of importance to Russia. He did not need to formulate any wish lists because he hoped that by playing those cards not in a hard but in a soft way he would be able to both defend Russia's national interests and achieve an extra PR dividend making him a more credible partner or even a friend. This new friend could not be refused some small concessions such as dispensation to do whatever he wanted in Chechnya,<sup>22</sup> membership in WTO or even the postponement of the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and/or NATO enlargement to the Baltic states.

The top priority for president Putin – both before and after 11 September – is the consolidation of the Russian state, revitalization of Russia's economy and strengthening of Russia's position on the international arena. By embarking on a policy of co-operation he could hope to get green light for his campaign in Chechnya and improve Russia's credibility with the West that is Russia's most important trade partner and source of potential investment in the country's economy. The fact that the US was so preoccupied with building an international anti-terror coalition in which Russia was to play a central role due to the fact that Russia seemed to have some strong geopolitical and institutional cards, improved seemingly Russia's chances to regain at least some of its lost influence in international politics and get an opportunity to be treated as an almost equal partner by the US administration on a bilateral basis.<sup>23</sup>

In addition, Russian authorities could also hope that Russia would get some direct economic dividend as a result of the new situation, not in form of direct US or Western money transfers, but because it was clear that the Middle East would most probably become the scene of the conflict building up in the wake of 11 September. Moscow could hope that any tension in this region of crucial importance for the world energy markets would lead to higher oil prices. Such a development would definitely be very beneficial to Russia's economy that has been 'oiled' by incomes from the sale of energy commodities on the global markets over the last two years, contributing to a large extent to what has been described as Russia's economic miracle of 2000 and 2001.

The building conflict also had strong 'civilisational' component. At this

early stage it was therefore unclear whether the US would succeed in persuading oil-producing Islamic countries to join the emerging coalition with some anti-Islamic flavour. Russia could therefore hope to become not only a provider of geopolitical space needed to launch an anti-terror operation, but also the West's main provider of energy commodities whose prices were to skyrocket as a consequence of the terrorist attacks and the US-led war on international terrorism. In that way Russia could get a kind of indirect economic compensation for its co-operation with the West and win the West's ear. This approach fits well with Russia's shift in foreign and security policy. Over the last years, and especially after Putin's ascent to power, Russia has been redrawing its policy towards co-operation with the West from being based on a georealist paradigm to being based on a geoeconomic approach. One of Russia's main geoeconomic projects was building closer links between the country's energy sector and the EU that was interested in receiving Russian gas and oil. The 11 September opened a new window for Russia. The country could not only strengthen its position as an important gas partner of the EU, but also get a stronger role on the global oil market and strengthen its position vis-à-vis the main oil exporter, Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia was in an indirect way deeply involved in terrorist attacks (most of those taking part in the attacks were Saudi citizens) and had shown more reluctance to joining the anti-fundamentalist Western coalition, forcing probably the US to reconsider the co-operation with the Saudis and making Russia a more probable alternative as a provider of 'safe oil'.<sup>24</sup>

To sum up, we can say that at least five issues can be identified as playing a crucial role in the original choice made by Putin just after 11 September:

**Justification of Russian policy in Chechnya.** What happened in the US was seen by Russians as a proof that international Islamic fundamentalists have waged a war against the West. Russia had been warning the West against this threat and the operation in Chechnya was aimed at destroying the Russian 'branch' of Islamic fundamentalists, though the West had misread the Russian policy in the Caucasus and accused Russia of violation of human rights. Now the West is facing the same threat and has to join Russia in its fight against the international terrorism with roots in the Islamic world.<sup>25</sup> By fighting Islamic fundamentalists Russia has shown that it belongs to the West; although the country had adopted harsh measures in Chechnya, they

were justified because of the international threat both Russia and the West are facing today.

**The irrelevance of NMD as a strategic shield against all conceivable threats to the US.** The attacks on New York and Washington have shown that US territory could be attacked by 'rogue forces' also from within; the NMD would not – and will not – prevent this kind of attack and would not give the US protection against large-scale terrorist threats launched by a determined group of terrorists acting on their own or on the orders of rogue states.<sup>26</sup> Putin could therefore hope that the US would reconsider its plans to build this 'nuclear shield' and should co-operate with Russia in finding a solution that could help it meet both the old and the new security challenges without breaching the 1972 ABM Treaty.

**The weakening of the US as a global hegemon.** The US proved vulnerable to asymmetric warfare and the US self-confidence was shattered, making the US seemingly more prompt to adopt a more multilateral approach to the question of global governance.<sup>27</sup> The weakening of the US was also important from a realist point of view and what was labeled 'international Islamic terrorism' has become a new, though rather amorphous, power pole in the international system constraining in a very dramatic way what by Russia was defined as the US drive for world hegemony.<sup>28</sup> The US realized that it would need new allies in a war against international terrorism, and that the country cannot afford acting unilaterally, without the backing of legitimate international bodies in which Russia had a strong voice such as the permanent seat in UN Security Council.

In the first days after 11 September the Russian leadership could also hope that the economic chaos and unpredictability of the situation would **lead to higher oil prices at the global market, giving Russia some short term '11 September economic dividend'**. For some reasons – first of all economic slow-down in the West – this last hope did not materialize and Russia faces today pressure from other oil producers to cut its production and seems to realize that its economy can suffer from the 11 September attacks even more than the Western one.

**The greater geopolitical importance of Russia and of Russia's near abroad.** Once the US identified Osama bin Laden and his network with bases in Afghanistan as the most probable perpetrators of the terrorist acts it became

clear that Russia had a strong 'geopolitical card'. As Aleksey Arbatov explicitly put it: 'To ensure the success of the US operation against the Taliban – let's put it this way – in Afghanistan, its effectiveness will largely depend on the position of Russia, both directly through its participation and indirectly through Russia's influence on such neighboring countries as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Iran'.<sup>29</sup> Russia had military bases and units in the area close to the possible theatre of war, exerted strong influence on at least some of the local Central Asian regimes (Tajikistan), had strong interest in containing the Taliban threat and not least its own experience from a war in Afghanistan. It was clear that due to the political situation (bad relations with Iran and tense situation in Pakistan) the US would need access to Russian and local facilities in the area.<sup>30</sup>

Though Russia could fear that the US troops would not leave the area after the end of the anti-terror operation in Afghanistan,<sup>31</sup> Russia could use its control over the area as an important short-term leverage in relations with the West and get some concessions from it. Russian calculations could be based on a sort of win-win thinking. No matter how the situation in Afghanistan was to develop, Russia could hope to achieve some short- and long-term realist gains.

If the US troops were forced to stay in Central Asia due to the fact that a protracted war in Afghanistan would require their presence, it could lead to a situation where the US could be defeated in this area in the same way the Soviet army was at the end of the 1980s; in the longer run it could mean the weakening of US global hegemony, US humiliation and withdrawal from the region and strengthening of Russia's position in Central Asia as the sole guarantor of security of the countries of the region facing a growing Islamic threat.

If the US was, however, able to defeat the Taliban regime, it would help Russia get rid of the Islamic threat along its southern border and the US troops would probably be withdrawn without damaging Russia's strategic interests in the region. Thanks to Russia's co-operative approach to the US-lead operation, Russia could therefore indirectly strengthen its position in Central Asia and make this region safer without directly engaging its forces and scarce resources. Russia considered attacking the Taliban regime in 2000 in connection with its claimed support of Islamic fundamentalists in Central

Asia and Chechnya, but the Russian leadership decided that it was too risky to implement these measures. When it turned out that the Taliban played a part in the terrorist attacks on the US and that the US was to intervene in the region it could have been seen by Moscow as a possibility to solve a Central Asian – and indirectly Russian – security dilemma in co-operation with the US.

Had Russia decided not to give the US access to military facilities in Central Asia, it could have faced a situation where some local leaders (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan) could use this opportunity in order to counterbalance Russian influence in the region or at least improve their bargaining position in relations with Russia by inviting the US on their own. Such a situation would reveal limits of Russia's real influence in Central Asia and limit its ability to control the developments in the region. It could effectively prevent Russia from playing its geopolitical card but not stop the deployment of US troops and materiel in the region. The country would miss the opportunity to influence the US and the Western policy in the region; it would also damage Russia's credibility as a strategic partner not only in the ongoing fight against Islamic terrorists, but also in other 'projects' of strategic importance to the reform programme implemented by Putin. On 14 September the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergey Ivanov, said in the Armenian capital Yerevan that he was against launching an attack on Afghanistan from bases in Central Asian or other CIS countries. He was quoted as putting his reservations in the following way: 'I can see no grounds, even hypothetical, for a possible NATO deployment in Central Asian states.'<sup>32</sup> But very soon it turned out that Russia, as some British analysts wrote, was entering 'an international game in which Moscow does not have all the cards.'<sup>33</sup> Once the Central Asian republics began to air the idea that they could decide to co-operate with the US-led coalition in the fight against terrorism,<sup>34</sup> the only possible and effective strategy for Russia was to take the leading seat in this co-operation and secure its interests by co-operating with the global anti-terror coalition in the making. As Vanora Bennet put it, 'the final blessing for Mr Putin may be that, through stepped-up military activity around Afghanistan, he now has a chance to strengthen his influence over Central Asia.'<sup>35</sup>

After having conferred with Central Asian leaders on 17 September and

dispatching the Secretary of the Security Council, V. Rushailo, and the Chief of General Staff, General A. Kvashnin, to Central Asia, Putin decided to call the leadership of the Russian security policy-making community to Sochi where he spends his holidays. They met on 22 September and after a seven-hour-long meeting a strategic decision on the content and form of the anti-terrorist co-operation with the US coalition was made. Putin outlined the main lines of this co-operation in a televised speech broadcast on 24 September. The five main points were:<sup>36</sup>

1. Closer international co-operation between special services in the fight against international terrorists. Russia was to provide information on their infrastructure and whereabouts.
2. Russia was to make available its airspace to the aircraft delivering humanitarian aid to the region.
3. Russia consulted its Central Asian allies who shared Russian views and did not rule out the possibility of the coalition using their airfields.
4. Russia was ready to take part in international search and rescue operations.
5. Russia was to expand its co-operation with the internationally recognised government of Afghanistan led by Rabbani, amongst others by providing its military forces with military hardware.

President Putin did not rule out other forms of even closer co-operation with the anti-terrorist coalition and decided to set up a body co-ordinating this concerted effort headed by the Minister of Defence, Sergey Ivanov. He said, however, that this co-operation would depend directly on the general level and quality of relations with other members of the coalition and on mutual understanding in the battle against international terrorism. In the same speech he linked indirectly the war in Chechnya to the fight against international terrorism and offered an amnesty to those Chechen fighters who were to lay down their arms in the next 72 hours.

Putin's speech was followed by a diplomatic offensive. On 25 September he left for Berlin, where he delivered a historical speech in Bundestag. This diplomatic tour of Europe culminated in the beginning of October in Brussels where president Putin met with both EU's and NATO's leaders.



## 11 SEPTEMBER AND RUSSIA'S RELATIONS WITH NATO

Putin's 3 October visit to Brussels and his talks with Secretary-General Lord Robertson marked a new beginning in Russian–NATO relations. As NATO is perceived by Russia first of all as an instrument of US policy in Europe,<sup>37</sup> relations with the alliance have improved as a consequence of this strategic policy choice made by Putin and announced on 24 September. Only two days after the attack on the US, the Permanent Joint Council met and issued a statement on the event, calling for closer and more intensive co-operation between NATO and Russia in defeating the terrorist 'scourge'.<sup>38</sup> A number of Russian politicians called for giving Russian–NATO relations a boost and even suggested the possibility that Russia could join the alliance. On 18 September Alexey Arbatov told journalists that Russia could join NATO if the alliance stated that the fight against international terrorism was to become its new main goal;<sup>39</sup> on 21 September the former prime minister and head of the FSB, Sergey Stepashin called for rethinking relations with the alliance. In an interview published in the American magazine *Business Week* he stated that expanding Russian co-operation with the US in the fight against terrorism would require a redefinition of Russia's relationship with NATO. He also added that Russia should not be in the position of providing assistance while being kept out of the decision-making structures of the alliance.<sup>40</sup>

PJC met again on 19 September and reconfirmed the need for intensification of Russian–Western co-operation in the fight against international terrorism.<sup>41</sup> During his visit to Rome NATO's Secretary-General pointed at the growing potential of co-operation between Russia and NATO in the wake of the attacks on the US. He said that this dramatic event had changed the situation and that Russia and NATO had been drawn closer because they faced the same threat and had to join the same coalition.<sup>42</sup> Also President Putin during his three-day visit to Germany at the end of September, called for closer co-operation between Russia and NATO<sup>43</sup> and his German hosts did not rule out the possibility of opening the doors of the alliance to Russia.<sup>44</sup>

On the eve of the planned meeting between Lord Robertson and President Putin that was to take place in Brussels on 3 October, a lot of opinions were voiced on the possibility of Russia joining the alliance. The debate on

that issue boiled down to two main points. From the Russian point of view Russia could join the alliance provided that the alliance went through a deep transformation and became more of a political body than a military defence alliance. There were also voices pointing at the need to halt or at least reconsider the policy of the enlargement of NATO as a precondition for Russian membership. On the NATO side the realistic approach to the Russian bid was that Russia itself had to go through a deep transformation in order to meet the membership criteria.<sup>45</sup>

The dilemma both NATO and Russia were facing when discussing their closer co-operation, or even Russian membership in the alliance, was summed up in the following way by Ira Strauss: 'What NATO really fears is that Russia will get a power of veto and will use it to make it impossible for NATO to reach any of the decisions it wants to reach and needs to reach. What Russia fears, or has objected to in the past arrangements, is that, under the formula of a "voice not a veto," it has not had enough influence to make a difference, and that NATO will never give it any real influence.'<sup>46</sup>

The issue of closer co-operation between Russia and Western organisations – the EU and NATO – dominated the agenda of Putin's visit to Brussels at the beginning of October 2001. During this visit he met with both the EU leadership and with NATO's Secretary-General Lord Robertson. Although he did not decide, as many expected he would, to give a symbolic dimension to his visit by meeting Secretary-General in NATO HQ as the first Russian leader ever, President Putin signalled new opening in relations with the alliance. He reiterated that Russia could even join NATO and voiced interest in building closer relations with the alliance, but he also added that Russia was still against NATO enlargement, as this step would not contribute to the improvement of European and global security. Lord Robertson expressed NATO's interest in developing closer ties with Russia, not least because, as he put it, 'the attack at the heart of the United States was not just an attack on the United States and members of NATO; it was an attack on the values that unite Russia with the countries of the North Atlantic Alliance.'<sup>47</sup> Lord Robertson outlined also scope and hinted on the form of this closer co-operation with Russia. He said that although Russia had not filled an official application to join the alliance, the developing partnership 'is growing in importance, in depth and in relevance and that is what we must focus on just now.'<sup>48</sup>

Especially important for the new partnership to work smoothly was the idea of an institutional upgrading of the relationship between NATO and Russia put forward by the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair. He suggested that Russia's could be given a voice by becoming a member of the proposed new body, dubbed the Russia-North Atlantic Council (R-NAC), that would replace the Joint Permanent Council, established in 1997. NATO's spokesman Mark Laity described the plan in the following words: 'We are looking towards a structural change, moving to another stage, where we meet a lot more and discuss more substantively.'<sup>49</sup> Also President Putin was positive to the improvement of co-operation between the alliance and Russia. He ruled out Russia's membership in NATO as premature, saying: 'We are ready to bring our positions closer to NATO's in many directions, to the extent that the alliance itself is ready for that.'<sup>50</sup> In addition to opening a new chapter in relations with NATO, Putin also achieved another important goal in the work on linking Russia to Western security structures. During his talks with EU officials both sides agreed that Russia be given a right to take part in COPS (Political and Security Committee) meetings on a monthly basis.

The discussion on development of new ties between Russia and NATO continued in the last months of 2001. In a brief interview with the Russian news agency ITAR TASS on the eve of Lord Robertson's visit to Moscow, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, outlined Russian attitude to the form and mechanisms of new co-operation: 'This co-operation should not be based on the 19-plus-1 formula. We would like to have a mechanism for solving all problems on the basis of equality and finding common answers.'<sup>51</sup> It also seemed that at this stage Russia decided not to apply for membership in the alliance as the whole process was perceived as humiliating. Maybe the clearest message on this issue came from the secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation, V. Rushailo, who said that 'Russia cannot take a place in a queue for NATO and wait for its application to be considered.'<sup>52</sup>

Lord Robertson for his part decided to use his visit to Moscow to present his – and NATO's – views on further co-operation. On 22 November he gave a speech at the Russian Diplomatic Academy in which he outlined how this new partnership could develop and what should be done in order to make it function. He said that the terrorist attacks on the US and Russian

reactions were an important watershed in relations between the alliance and Russia, but he meant that both Russia and NATO should develop closer ties not only in their fight against the terrorist scourge, but also in other fields. He argued that the current state of NATO–Russia relations was not sufficient to deal seriously with the new security challenges, and he added therefore other issues to the list of areas of co-operation between Russia and the alliance. He called for closer co-operation in ‘protecting our populations from chemical, biological and nuclear weapons and the ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver them’, for moving forward with a meaningful dialogue on military reform, co-operation in civil emergency planning, and in international peace-keeping operations. He also encouraged Russians to reconsider their approach to the problem of NATO enlargement, that, in his words, should be seen in this new context as a part of a broader process of European integration, as a means of contributing to the growing togetherness of Europe, and as a step stabilising the situation in Europe and easing reconciliation among European nations.<sup>53</sup>

The secretary-general also elaborated on the new form and mechanism of co-operation between Russia and NATO when he was asked a question on that issue during the press conference on 22 November. In his view on specific occasions or when discussion is on specific subjects, the representative of Russia would sit around the round table in the NATO Council Chamber between Portugal and Spain. This new formula would be called the Russia-North Atlantic Council, the R-NAC, and the Secretary-General would chair the discussion. It would involve Russia and give the country an equal status with the NATO countries. It would allow Russia to be part of the same compromising trade-offs, a give and take approach so characteristic of the daily policy-making within NATO based on the idea of reaching a consensus on issues of importance to the alliance. This solution would give Russia a right of equality but also a responsibility and an obligation that would come from being part of the consensus-building organization.<sup>54</sup>

Details on the further deepening of co-operation between Russia and NATO were discussed at a series of meetings that took place in December in Brussels. On 6 December the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council decided that the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session was to explore and develop ‘new, effective mechanisms for consultation, co-op-

eration, joint decision, and co-ordinated/joint action' between Russia and NATO. It was decided that the results of its work will be presented at NAC's next meeting in Reykjavik in May 2002. The final communiqué issued after the 6 December NAC meeting listed also areas in which NATO was to deepen its co-operation with Russia and welcomed what was understood – not quite rightly – as the beginning of the political dialogue on the problem of Chechnya.<sup>55</sup> The same issues were also discussed with Russian representation at a PJC meeting at the level of foreign ministers that took place in Brussels on 7 December, as well as at the PJC meeting at the level of defence ministers on 18 December. In the communiqué issued after this last meeting the ministers 'committed themselves to enhance their partnership in the security and military field'; they also 'agreed to the holding of a NATO-Russia conference on the military role in combating terrorism in February 2002', and 'recognised the importance of defence reform as a key instrument to ensure adequate military capabilities.'<sup>56</sup>

The planned conference on the fight against terrorism and the military's role in it took place on 4 February at the premises of NATO Defence College in Rome. The conference was opened jointly by the Secretary-General of NATO and by the Russian Minister of Defence, Sergey Ivanov, and a number of prominent Russian and Western specialists discussed thoroughly the issue of terrorism and ways of combating this phenomenon. The Rome conference was the last of a series of joint Russia-NATO meetings confirming the new climate in bilateral relations between the former foes. As the decisions on the final form and content of the new phase of co-operation will be taken at NAC's Reykjavik meeting in May 2002, it still remains to be seen whether the dream about a better future in relations between Russia and NATO will come true.

In the meantime it is important to follow the development of these relations not only on the top of hierarchy, but also in a more prosaic context. One of the issues that will give us some good hints on the direction of the development in relations between Russia and NATO will be the discussion on the next wave of NATO enlargement taking place in the same time as the discussion on the new content and form of co-operation between Russia and NATO. One could expect that the dramatic change in Russia's attitude towards NATO announced by the Russian leadership and welcomed by the

West also could mean new tones in the debate on NATO enlargement. Already during his visit to Finland at the beginning of September 2001 the Russian president signaled that Russia was softening its line in the discussion on the Baltic countries' membership in NATO. He did not welcome this possible step, but he had probably realized that Russia cannot win this game and that it would be better to soften its stance on the issue and not reveal its weakness by embarking on a policy that from the very beginning was doomed to fail. After 11 September Russian statements on the issue of enlargement have been even softer, and during the last round of Secretary-General's talks in Moscow in the end of November 2001, it was even hinted by the Russian president that Russia could drop its protests against enlargement if it could be given a say in new Russian-NATO body.<sup>57</sup> The Russian attitude towards NATO enlargement, and especially towards the NATO membership for Baltic countries will in a way be a real litmus test of Russia's real intentions in this new era of relations between Moscow and the West.

#### INTERPRETING PUTIN'S CHOICE: IDENTITY SHIFT OR POLITICAL JUDO?

How can we interpret the change in Russian attitude towards the US, towards the West and towards the Western alliance? The optimistic interpretation is based on the presumption that Russia has realized that it has common long-term interests with the West, and that by co-operating with the West the country can achieve its long-term goals sooner and in a more efficient way. This approach can be described as an interest-based renewed version of Atlanticism, as a new attempt at building a strategic partnership with the West that faces the same strategic challenges as Russia, the most important of them being international terrorism. If this reading is correct, then the issue of NATO enlargement should no longer be a bone of contention in Russia's relations with NATO.<sup>58</sup>

However, one of the main problems arising when making any assessment of Putin's post-11 September policy choice is the problem of the ultimate goals of this policy. Here we have at least three possible readings of his choice. The first one is that Putin has chosen to pursue the policy of further Westernisation of Russia. It would mean that his choice is of civilisational, long-term nature and not of tactical character. By embarking on the policy of co-operation with the West in the fight against international terrorism, rooted

– as both he himself and the US administration claim – in Islamic fundamentalism, he has made what could be described as an identity choice. He deliberately placed Russia on the Western side of the ‘barricade’ and jumped on the US bandwagon because he may believe that only this choice will make Russia a prosperous democratic country with a functioning market economy resembling Western powers.

This choice could be in line with his pragmatic approach to policy-making. As his main declared goal is revitalization of the Russian economy as a means of achieving two other long-term declared goals – making Russia a better place to live for its citizens and regaining Russia's central position on the global power map – he has maybe realized that the only path for Russia to follow is the path chosen by the countries that today play a leading role in the world, first of all the US and Western Europe. Democracy and market economy are not the goals per se, but the best available instruments in making the Russian state stronger and more efficient. Due to some old and new circumstances – Russia's involvement in the Chechen war and the fact that the attacks on the US were launched by the same forces Russia identified as the main enemy in Chechnya – this choice could be easily ‘sold’ to both the international and the domestic public as the only logical option Putin had at his disposal. The co-operation with the West can therefore be seen as a sort of filling in and then submitting an application form to the Western club of nations. He also could hope that by submitting this application form in a moment when both the West and Russia were facing the same ‘civilisational’ threat (Islamic fundamentalism) the West would be willing to lower the threshold and Russia could get access to the Western club even if the country had some problems with meeting all entry criteria (deficiencies in the Russian market economy, some problems with freedom of the press and the functioning of democratic institutions, human rights abuses in Chechnya and the way Russia decided to solve this problem etc.). By making this choice Putin could hope for Western direct and indirect help in building a new, revitalized Russia, in form of investments, more trade and not least of what could be described as Russia's ‘peace dividend’. By becoming a member of the Western club Russia would be able not only to save money the country would otherwise have to spend on building a strategic parity (or at least a credible and sufficient anti-Western defence), but also get its place under the Western

(read: US) umbrella protecting it against other global civilisational (Islam) and strategic threats (China?).

The second explanation is that he has decided to use this opportunity to permanently switch Russian policy from being imperial (or post-imperial) and mainly realistically and geopolitically oriented towards being mainly geoeconomically and at least partly liberally and institutionally oriented. By embarking on the policy of co-operation in this crucial moment he could make Russia a more credible political and economic partner of the West that is definitely Russia's most important trade partner. Russia's opposition to OPEC's pressure to reduce its production of oil in order to prevent oil prices from going down at the end of 2001 was unofficially 'sold' as Russia's contribution to making the economic consequences of 11 September less grave for the West. It was claimed that by not reducing its oil production Russia was contributing to keeping oil prices at a lower level, and thus helped to revitalize the Western and global economy. Over the last years – and the process had began long before 11 September – Russia has been trying to establish itself as a reliable and to a certain extent alternative source of energy to the West. As both oil and gas are strategic commodities, it was important for Russia to improve its image as a reliable, long-term and strategic partner of the West. The fact that Russia joined the West in its anti-terror campaign without setting any political or economic preconditions was a strong signal to the West, and the main message was that the West can count on Russia when it really matters. This approach has definitely improved Russia's image in the West and will probably help Russia attract new political, and not least economic partners the country needs in order to revitalize its own economy and become a full-fledged and strategic partner of the West. The fact that the anti-terror campaign was directed against Islamic fundamentalists – and that the threat of Islamic fundamentalism is the most imminent in the area that used to be the West's main provider of energy resources – will probably only help Russia to become an alternative and more reliable source of energy to the West. If this was the main reason behind Putin's choice of the post-11 September strategy, then the fact that Russia hasn't got any short term economic or political dividend for its co-operation with the West will be more than outweighed by future Western investments and revenues from the sale of gas and oil to the West, and by outmaneuvering on the global energy market its



main Arab competitors, who were definitely more reluctant than Russia to join the anti-terror coalition.

By combining the civilisational, institutional-liberal and geoeconomic approaches in formulation and implementation of the post-11 September policy Putin could hope to achieve a synergy effect in relations with the West and improve Russia's position on the global stage at a very low cost. The real help he offered the West was first of all of a symbolic character, but he managed to 'sell' this highly symbolic move as a real shift in Russia's attitude towards the West. It is not so important that after some Central Asian states – first of all Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan – had offered the US help in fight against international terrorism, he had no choice but to give consent to the use of military facilities in Central Asia. Even though he could not play the 'geopolitical card' anymore, he continued his policy of rapprochement with the West hoping to achieve other non-geopolitical and non-realist goals, such as improving Russia's credibility and image in the West and what could be termed as Russia's 're-branding.'<sup>59</sup>

Both interpretations of Russia's choice of a post-11 September strategy described above would mean a significant departure from traditional Soviet and to a very large extent post-Soviet thinking on Russia's place in the international system and its real ability to influence the course of events through the use of decaying realist instruments. It also would mean closing what could be described as 'perceptual gap' in relations between Russia and the West, because it would be a sign of Russia's self-perception adapting to the new realities. The new Russian self-perception would match better the Western perception of Russia and the country's role in the emerging world order. It also would mean departing from Primakov's policy of counterbalancing the Western influence by building ad hoc and, where possible, strategic anti-Western alliances with what was described in the Russian official foreign policy discourse as alternative centres of power of the multipolar world. Paradoxically enough, it could also, however, mean Russia logically choosing cooperation with the strongest of the poles in the multipolar world. Close cooperation with this strongest pole could mean losing some geopolitical influence and leverages, but would be outweighed by long-term economic gains that are much more important in the opinion of the leadership embarking on a policy of 'economisation' of the country's foreign and security policy.

The third interpretation is based on the assumption that the Russian leadership still approaches the realm of international politics in a traditional realist-geopolitical way. This leadership is, however, aware of the fact that Russia is too weak to counter all negative developments in its international environment on its own and achieve its long-term goals by openly confronting the West. Joining the West in this campaign is therefore not a goal per se, a manifestation of an identity choice or change of the dominant paradigm, but a sort of survival strategy in a time when the country has to concentrate on domestic economic revival. It seems that at this stage Russia has neither the means to nor an interest in engaging into a very costly foreign and security policy and direct rivalry with the West. Russia can afford only a low-budget foreign and security policy, as the top priority is the economic revival of the country. Only a Russia with a sound economy can rebuild its military power as an efficient instrument of realist policy that would eventually result in the country regaining its high international status. The top priority at this stage should therefore be a focus on improving the country's economic performance, regaining at least some of the state control over the country's resources by intimidating oligarchs and continued participation in trade with the West as a source of revenues financing domestic reforms.

Two ideas or concepts, one stemming from the Russian diplomatic tradition of the second half of 19<sup>th</sup> century, and the second one from Putin's letter to Russian voters published on the eve of elections in 2000 may help us understand the strategic choices of the Russian political leadership in the wake of 11 September. When Russia was defeated and humiliated after the Crimean war of 1856, the then Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Count Gorchakov, stated that Russia had to 'concentrate'. It meant that the country had to solve its domestic economic and political problems in order to become strong enough to engage in an efficient security and foreign policy. Gorchakov – and Czar Alexander II – clearly understood that without an economic and political modernization of the Russian state, the country would not regain or even retain its international position and influence. Through concentrating on domestic reforms and building alliances with other European powers Gorchakov and Aleksander II managed to get rid of the humiliating limitations the 1856 Treaty of Paris imposed on Russia.

Gorchakov's skilful policy of playing various European powers against

each other combined with domestic reforms have made him a 'hero' to those who believe that today's Russia faces problems similar to the ones the country faced in the time of Gorchakov, and that similar methods should be used in order to regain the country's international status. Gorchakov's revival in Russia dates back to Yeltsin's time, when the country's foreign policy was steered by Yevgeniy Primakov.<sup>60</sup> As his main idea was the retaining of the balance of power between the weakened Russia and the West by co-operating with other global centres of power, he focused mainly on Gorchakov's skills as an 'alliance builder'. Under Putin much more attention seems to be paid to Gorchakov's hierarchy of interests and the focus on the internal revival of Russia as the precondition of a revival of Russia as an influential player on the global scene. This historical tradition was recalled amongst other by Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Igor Ivanov, in a speech on 11 September 2000 in Canada.<sup>61</sup> He described the main goals of Gorchakovean foreign policy by quoting Gorchakov himself: 'Our political activity must pursue a double aim. First, to protect Russia from involvement in all kinds of external complications which could partially divert its resources from its own internal development; secondly, to make every effort to ensure that there occurs no territorial change in Europe at this time, no change in the balance of forces and influence that might be greatly detrimental to our interests or our political situation.' Ivanov also quoted Gorchakov's words on the long-term goals of Russian foreign policy: 'upon fulfilment of these two conditions, it can be hoped that Russia, having recovered from losses, having consolidated its strength and restored its resources, will again acquire its place, status, prestige, influence and mission among great powers... Russia will only be able to occupy this position by developing its internal strength, which as of now is the only actual source of the political power of states.'

An appeal similar to that of Gorchakov's call for concentration on domestic issues and consolidation of the Russian state can be found in Putin's statement on the priorities of Russian foreign and security policy stemming from his letter to Russian voters published on the eve of the elections in 2000 in which he said that Russia had to 'wait' with the realisation of ambitious tasks in foreign policy until conditions in the country improve. Not only Putin's words, but also his actions on both the domestic and the international scene seem to confirm that he treats Gorchakov's prescription in a serious

way. The line followed by Putin after the 11 September may be seen as undeniable proof of him taking note of what Gorchakov had to tell his followers about the priorities of Russia's foreign policy.

This Gorchakovean reading of Putin's post-11 September policy can, however, be supplemented by an interpretation taking into consideration not only Russian diplomatic tradition, but also what could be described as Putin's pragmatic contribution to it.

What is interpreted as a pro-Western shift in Russian policy can, therefore, be seen not only as an application of Gorchakov's modified ideas but also as a kind of a more advanced political *maskirovka* exercise Russia engages into in a time when, as Putin put it himself in his letter to Russian voters, the country has to wait for realisation of more ambitious tasks on the international arena. The goal of the exercise can be twofold: firstly, to convince the West – first of all the US and NATO – that Russia is really interested in developing constructive co-operation with its institutions; and secondly, when Russia is given access to the Western decision-making process, to use this access in order to block the decision-making process in the West and make the Western alliance a lame duck. By undermining its credibility as an efficient security provider and turning it into a new version of the inefficient OSCE Russia could make it a less attractive alternative to the countries that have been perceiving membership in the alliance first of all as a protection against the revival of Russia's great power ambitions in the region. Russian obstructive policy within the alliance paralyzing its activity would mean achieving one of the most important realist goals of Russian long-term strategy – getting rid of NATO as an efficient instrument of transatlantic co-operation.

This interpretation would also mean that NATO is still 'read' by Russia as a purely realist military alliance with clear realist interests in areas that also by Russia are perceived as vital for the country's own national geopolitical interests. Its enlargement would therefore still be perceived as a realist problem. By disguising its new modified approach to the West as a 'value-based policy', Russia could in fact seek to achieve purely realist goals. As pointed out by Lord Robertson and confirmed by many Russian pre-11 September official statements, Russia perceives relations with NATO as a zero-sum power game. The Russian leadership is, however, aware that at the current stage Russia is definitely a weaker partner, and it is therefore very important for

Russia to work out a policy with a pragmatic or even pro-Western outlook.

The pragmatism advocated by President Putin is probably Russia's best 'survival strategy' in relations with NATO; confrontation with NATO is today ruled out first of all due to the pragmatic approach to the question of the country's security.<sup>62</sup> If you are too weak to win the confrontation, you have to avoid it, and wait for a better occasion to achieve your goals. Or you can try to achieve your goals by joining those you cannot beat and trying to weaken them from within.

After having spent many years in *dojo* Vladimir Putin has probably learned the basics of power politics much better than his predecessor who had visible problems with adapting to the new changing circumstances. Being an apt adept of judo Putin seems to adapt the principles of this noble art of self-defence not only when facing his opponents during the private and public exercises, but also as a guidance for the country's security policy. Since he had realised that Russia and NATO belong today to two different weight categories,<sup>63</sup> and Russia had only slim chances of winning an open category match against NATO, he decided to adopt a policy of the 'gentle way' – *judo* in Japanese – in relations with the alliance. According to the theoreticians and practitioners of judo, this sport has two basic principles. Allan Watts describes them in the following way: 'One of the most basic things to the whole practice of Judo is an understanding of balance. Balance, indeed, is a fundamental idea in Taoist philosophy. The philosophy of the Tao has a basic respect for the balance of nature. You don't upset that balance. You try to find out what it is and go along with it. The second principle, beyond keeping balance, and understanding balance, is not to oppose strength to strength. When one is attacked by the enemy you do not oppose him. Instead you yield to him, just like the matador yields to the bull, and you use his strength and the principle of balance to bring about his downfall.'<sup>64</sup> The founder of modern judo, Jigoro Kano, also hinted how to use skills in the best way: 'A main feature of the art is the application of the principles of non-resistance and taking advantage of the opponent's loss of equilibrium.'<sup>65</sup>

If this reading of Russia's post-11 September policy as a *maskirovka* exercise and not as a paradigmatic or even normative and civilisational shift in the policy of the country is closer to the real intentions of Russian policy-makers, then the moment for launching this policy was chosen almost perfectly. The

main opponent had definitely lost equilibrium; instead of opposing him openly, Russia may have been trying to use his own strength to bring about his downfall. This approach would also be in line with the theory and practice of asymmetric warfare. While during Yeltsin's period Russia at many instances pursued a policy of asymmetric political warfare *à rebours* – using often successfully its own weaknesses against its Western opponents strengths – it seems that under Putin situation could have become much more normal. He seems to pursue a policy based on a combination of the basic rule of asymmetric 'warfare' – use your strengths against your opponent's weak points, or at least when your opponent is weakened – and his own personal style based on pursuing the political goals by means of the 'gentle way' and not by the means of open confrontation.

The line followed by Putin after the 11 September seems to be revolutionary and conservative at the same time. Revolutionary, because he apparently decided to use this opportunity to strengthen bonds to the West hoping that it would help him reform Russia and get more understanding for Russia's choices on the domestic front (Chechnya); conservative, because the line followed after 11 September was a result of strategic policy choices he had made long before the attacks on the US. Only two weeks before 11 September C. Bohlen laconically described the main traits of Putin's foreign and security policy. According to this analysis Putin decided that Russia had 'to lie low, tend to its domestic affairs and substitute diplomacy for confrontation.'<sup>66</sup> Having made this strategic choice Putin could hardly afford choosing another line after the 11 September than the one he decided to follow. The main interpretative problem is therefore not the question of why the Russian leadership decided to follow this line, but what are the long-term intentions of Russian leaders and how to 'read' this policy in a strategic perspective. In the current context the choice made by Putin was made first of all because it served in the best way Russia's short- and mid-term interests on both the domestic and the international arena. It is, however, still difficult to judge which of the readings of Russia's long-term intentions is correct. We can learn more about them by observing its attitudes towards co-operation with the West, especially in the areas that had been singled out by Russian analysts and leaders as areas of actual and potential conflict with the West before the 11 September attacks on the United States.

As already mentioned, one of the issues that could be useful as a litmus test of Russia's real (or realist?) intentions will be the question of the Russian attitude towards NATO enlargement seen in the context of development of a new institutionalised relationship between Russia and NATO. If the last, realist reading of Russian policy is correct, then we can expect to see at least two variants of Russian policy towards enlargement: the rather short-sighted, opposing enlargement openly and revealing in that way Russia's real and realist intentions; or the second one, with Russia apparently appeased by the Western offer of closer co-operation and making this co-operation an instrument of weakening of the alliance from within. The first option could be counterproductive, as it could prevent the 'institutionalisation' of the new framework of co-operation between Russia and NATO and unwillingly contribute to the opening of the alliance's doors to new members. The second option seems, therefore, to be a more probable choice as it could help Russia hide its real intentions for much longer, until the moment when Russia is given access to NATO's decision-making table and uses this chance to get rid of NATO as a credible and efficient security provider.

This would also be more in line with Gorchakovean tradition of playing on the contradictions between the most important partners within the international system Russia is a part of to achieve the country's strategic goals and defend what is defined as its national interests. It should be, however, remembered that Gorchakov's way of pursuing Russia's national interests was not always successful; in 1878 Russia – and Gorchakov himself – had to accept the terms of the Berlin Treaty limiting Russia's gains in the Balkans and restoring the European balance of power upset by Russia's successes in the war against Turkey. This diplomatic failure forced Gorchakov to resign and Russia to rethink its role on the international arena, showing at the same time the limitations of playing on others' contradictions as a way of achieving political goals. This failure also is an important part of Gorchakov's diplomatic heritage and should be internalised by the Russian leadership, especially if it wants to achieve the country's realist goals by using his methods. If the main reason for the post-11 September shift in Russian policy is the wish to get access to the Western decision-making table as a means of weakening the coherence of the Western alliance, Russia may risk a real set-back in its relations with the West if these real and realist goals are revealed.

If, however, the first, civilisational, or the second, liberal-institutional reading of Russia's policy is correct, then the question of NATO enlargement should simply disappear from the Russian-Western agenda, as it could be read by Russia as an enlargement of a Russia-friendly Western security community to the east. It could also be read as an enlargement of a security community that has had a stabilising effect on the situation in what both the West and Russia perceive as a European and trans-Atlantic security complex they both naturally belong to. In addition, the same security community has since the 11 September been actively and successfully engaged in a fight against the threat of international terrorism both Russia and the West treat as the main challenge to their security. By taking action in Afghanistan with Russia's support and consent, the US and the West have managed to remove the imminent threat of Islamic fundamentalism looming over Russia's southern flank. The tragedy of 11 September and joint action in the fight against the threat of international terrorism can become a cornerstone of the new Russian-Western co-operation in the sphere of security. In order to make this new co-operation a success story both sides have, however, to treat each other with respect and sincerity. Any double-dealing and hidden agendas should be banned, and the new relationship should be based not only on the commonality of short-term interests, but also on the commonality of values and norms making co-operation between the former foes a solid bedrock of a new world order.

The debate on the content and form of further and deeper co-operation between Russia and the West in the wake of 11 September has signalled both sides' readiness to rethink and reconsider their mutual relations. In the beginning of 2002 some circles in Russia started, however, sending new and more disturbing signals; Russian elites seemed to come to the conclusion that the results of the co-operation were disappointing. Although Russia did not formulate any official list of conditions for co-operating with the West, it seems that the Russian policy-making community is annoyed or even provoked by at least three developments.

Firstly, the fact that the US decided to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty is regarded not only as a slap in the face because of this treaty's importance for the maintenance of the existing disarmament regime, but also, and maybe foremost, as a slap to Russia's pride, because Russia had publicly



signalled its interest in retaining this treaty as the basis of the new strategic partnership with the US. The US's withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is therefore interpreted not only as being motivated by the US real needs to build an anti-missile defence, but also as an important signal showing that the US is willing to pursue a unilateral line in dealing with international issues, taking into account neither symbolic nor real interests of the country's old and new allies. A heavy salvo came even from S. Rogov who used to have a more sober reading of Russian-Western relations. In an article published in January 2002 in *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye* he commented on the US decision to withdraw from the 1972 ABM Treaty in the following words:

*By launching a policy of attaining absolute military superiority, Washington showed that it would not recognise Moscow, Beijing or anyone else as an equal in terms of strategic status. The USA did this despite major improvement in Russia-US relationship after the September 11 tragedy, when the USA and Russia actually became allies in the war against the Taliban and bin Laden.<sup>67</sup>*

The second development considered by Russians as a challenge is the US – and more generally Western – plan to remain in Central Asia also after the successful conclusion of the most intensive phase of the Afghan operation. A number of Russian politicians who visited Central Asia in the beginning of 2002 expressed their concern with these developments. Although the harshest signals came, as one could expect, from the opponents of the pro-Western line chosen by Putin,<sup>68</sup> also representatives of Russia's military did not hide their irritation with the fact that the US planned to remain in the region after the end of the Afghan air campaign.<sup>69</sup> Minister of Foreign Affairs Igor Ivanov, who also was in Central Asia at the beginning of January 2002 decided not to comment on the issue at all.<sup>70</sup> Though Putin tried to calm the situation by saying that the 'presence of American partners in the region must be solved by Washington and the related countries on a bilateral basis',<sup>71</sup> it is obvious that the Russian policy-makers are really not happy with the new situation developing in Central Asia and perceive the growing and continued Western presence in this region as a purely geopolitical and realist challenge.

The third issue making the Russians feel betrayed by the West is the renewed wave of criticism of the way Russia deals with the situation in

Chechnya. On 11 January 2002 the US and on 15 January the French government criticised Russia for its actions in Chechnya, received representatives of the elected Chechen President A. Maskhadov and called for political solution to the conflict; on 18 January Ruud Lubbers, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees decided to not share the official Russian view that the Chechen President A. Maskhadov is a terrorist and also called for political solution;<sup>72</sup> on 24 January PACE – the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe – discussed the report on the developments in Chechnya and received the Chechen representative who on his way to Strasbourg had meetings in both London and Paris.<sup>73</sup> As if this was not enough, at the end of January Russian troops suffered heavy losses in Chechnya and Chechen separatists managed to shoot down a helicopter killing a group of Russian high officials on a visit to what was believed to be a safe part of the rebellious republic.

All these developments make Russian analysts and the policy-making community reconsider in a more critical way what they have been interpreting as a pro-Western shift in Putin's policy. Their re-interpretation of this policy seems to be based on the realisation of the fact that Russia's hopes for getting some indirect but substantial concessions and rewards from the West for what they 'read' as a Russia's co-operative approach have not come true. They seem to signal that they are disappointed with the results of this co-operation, that the West, and especially the US, have not rewarded Russia in the way Russian elites had expected when they embarked on this apparently pro-Western policy. This Russian impatience and visible dissatisfaction with the immediate results of the post-11 September co-operation may suggest that Russia's choice was rather of a conjunctural and not of a genuine character. When he was asked on 13 November to comment on the recent developments in relations between Russia and the West, the Russian writer and journalist Vitaliy Korotich said: "This is completely unnatural if a friendship begins for some reasons. Normally you become friends with each other without having any agenda. Putin and Bush became friends because of the terror, it means of fear and necessity. It will never turn into a real friendship."<sup>74</sup> His words may be the key for understanding of the complexity of challenges faced by both sides in their work on cementing this interest-born friendship. For friendship to develop and to last it is important to have not only some

common short-term interests, but also share some basic values and norms. In a time when both parties embark on building friendship because they feel threatened by what they both want to regard as a common enemy it is easy to forget about these basic rules of friendship-making. In an emergency situation, when your existential interests seem to be threatened, every offer of life-saving technical co-operation is indeed welcomed. One can make this technical co-operation very effective by using appropriate technical tools; but this technical interest-motivated co-operation will never turn into a real genuine friendship if it is not based on common values and norms.

Finding and agreeing on these common values and norms still can be regarded as the main challenge in Russian–NATO relations. Russia and NATO declare that they are willing to undertake an effort to build a new institutional framework for a new phase of their co-operation.<sup>75</sup> However, without finding a common value and norm ground they both risk that this new institutional framework will become nothing more than an artificial substitute, an *ersatz* for a real partnership. This will only cause new frustrations and will be doomed to failure once a new crisis in the relations between Russia and NATO is a reality, in a way similar to the case with its institutional predecessor, the ineffective PJC that has never produced what it had been designed for.

Russian–NATO and Russian–US co-operation is so important that every possible effort should be made to not repeat the errors of the past and to avoid the new pitfalls, also these caused by too high expectations on both sides of the negotiation table. This task is not an easy one, because there are still signs that both sides tend to perceive the realm of international relations in slightly different ways. Many Russians are still convinced that the only way for Russia to restore its status is through the restoration of the country's economic, political, and not least military might. A clear exemplification of this approach is Sergey Rogov's prescription on how Russia can regain its international position: "The development of a truly mutually beneficial partnership of Russia and the USA will be a difficult task because the possibilities of the two states are vastly different now. The situation may change only when Russia overcomes its systemic crisis and restores its economic, political and military might, thus turning into a centre of power on the world scene. This will create a potential base for more equitable partner relations between

the USA and Russia.<sup>76</sup>

These words and this prescription may well be true, but by providing what can be seen as a simple solution, they will not make Russia reconsider its attitudes and develop new approaches; neither will they prompt Russia to look for new ideas, values and norms, thus preventing this vast and important country from making a real step towards rapprochement with the West, a rapprochement that is both in Russia's and in the West's interest.

Let us hope that this shift in Russia's policy means that Russia has at least – and at last – realised that NATO has an important and positive role to play, and that getting rid of NATO as a credible security provider – what has been an important and declared goal of both Soviet and Russian foreign policy – is no longer on the top of not only official but also 'hidden agenda'. Until 11 September there had been rather few signals coming from Moscow showing that Russia was really willing to embark on a policy of frank and open co-operation with the alliance instead of waiting for an occasion to make NATO disappear. As Russia does not seem to have any long-term strategy of what the country would do in case this 'NATO disappearance dream' came true, it would be even more interesting to see whether building constructive relations with NATO is now really regarded by Moscow as a top priority...

#### LITERATURE

Bennet, Vanora (2001) 'Kremlin has vested interests in promise of help to Washington', *The Times* (UK) 14.09.

Bohlen, Celestine (2001) 'Putin the Power Broker', *New York Times* 26.08.

Cullison, Alan and Guy Chazan (2001) 'Russia Hopes WTC Attacks Force U.S. to Rethink Defense', *Wall Street Journal* 13.09.

Fyodorov, Andrey (2001) 'Russia Is Facing A Difficult Choice. By Supporting US Anti-terrorist Actions, Moscow May Speed up Its Rapprochement with the EU and NATO', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 14.09.

Golotyuk, Yuriy (2001) 'Nuclear Conflict Scenario Set Aside. Russian Military Ordered Not To Prepare For Attacking the US', *Vremya Novostey* 12.09.

Gornostayev, Dmitriy (2001) 'Will Bush See that His Myths Are Dispelled? Horrendous errorist attacks in the U.S. prove that the new threat is international terrorism, not ballistic missiles', [www.strana.ru](http://www.strana.ru) 13.09.

Grachev, Andrei (2001) 'The Second Front in World War III', *New Times*, November,

p.39.

Ham, Peter van (2001) 'The Rise of the Brand State', *Foreign Affairs*, vol. 80, no.5, pp.2-7.

Kokoshin, Andrey (2001) 'We Need A G-5, Not A G-8. Interview with Duma deputy Andrei Kokoshin, former Security Council secretary', *Rossiyskaya Gazeta* 19.09.

Lathem, Niles (2001) 'U.S. May Sock Bin Laden From Russian Bases', *The New York Post* 14.09.

Matser, Willem (2001) 'Towards a new strategic partnership', *NATO Review* no.4, internet edition at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0104-05.htm>

Mereu, Francesca (2001) 'U.S.: Russia Says Chechen Conflict Aids 'Understanding' Of U.S. tragedy', *RFE/RL Moscow* 14.09.

Migranyan, Andranik (2002) 'Na Zachód – za ile?', *Gazeta Wyborcza* 12-13.01.

Piadyshv, Boris (2001) 'After the Terrorist Attacks', *International Affairs. A Russian Journal of World Politics, Diplomacy and International Relations* vol.47, no.5, pp.1-15.

Plater-Zyberk, Henry and Anne Aldis (2001) 'Russia's Reaction to the American Tragedy', *Occasional Brief* no. 84, Conflict Studies Research Centre, Sandhurst.

Rogov, Sergey (2001) 'Novyy etap v rossiysko-amerikanskikh otnosheniyakh', *SshA Kanada.Ekonomika.Politika.Kultura* no.12, pp. 3-24.

Rogov, Sergey (2002) 'Russia And USA Are Facing A Choice', *Nezavisimoye Voennoye Obozreniy*, no.1 (translation from RIA Novosti).

Slutskiy, Leonid (2000a) 'XXI vek. Balans interesov v treugolnike SSha-Rossiya-Germaniya. O traditsiyakh gorchakovskoy diplomatii', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 26.09.

Slutskiy, Leonid (2000b) 'Vneshnaya i vnutrennaya politika Rossii: vmeste ili vroz?', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* 28.11.

Strauss, Ira (2001) 'Commentary: How Russia can get into NATO', *UPI*, 03.10.

Taylor, Paul (2001) 'Russia In Nato? Don't Hold Your Breath', *Reuters* 27.09.

Twohey, Megan (2001) 'Russia Waits for NATO's Embrace', *Moscow Times* 02.10.

Uzelac, Ana (2001) 'Terror May Be Tie That Binds', *Moscow Times* 13.09.

Vasilyev, Yevgeniy (2001) 'Moment Of Truth. The Kremlin Had Better Revise Its Foreign Policy and Defense Doctrines', *Vremya MN*, 14.09.

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> *Kommersant* 12.09.2001.

<sup>2</sup> *BBC Monitoring*. Communist leader Zyuganov attacks Putin for lack of dialogue with opposition Source: NTV, Moscow, in Russian 1535 gmt 1 Oct 01.

<sup>3</sup> *BBC Monitoring*, Russian Communist leader: 2001 was the year of capitulation to US party of war. Text of report by Russian newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* on 29 December: subheadings are the newspaper's own.

<sup>4</sup> *BBC Monitoring*, Russia must join antiterrorist coalition – pundit. Source: Ekho Moskvyy news agency, Moscow, in Russian 0940 gmt 17 Sep 01.<sup>5</sup> Migranyan 2002.

<sup>6</sup> On 14.09. 2001 Putin's chief propagandist, S.Yastrzhembskiy, linked the two events – Russia's war in Chechnya and events in the US – in an even more direct way when he said: 'I think that after what happened [in the United States] it has become clear why Russia has tried so seriously to eliminate the roots of terrorism on its own territory – on the territory of the Chechen republic. I think there is a direct connection between [the terrorist assaults] that occurred in various Russian cities and what, to my great regret, took place in the United States today' (Mereu 2001).

<sup>7</sup> Reuters 12.09.2001.

<sup>8</sup> Golotyuk 2001

<sup>9</sup> On 12 September 2001 an article appeared in *Komsomolskaya Pravda* linking these two events in a direct way: 'Those who Bombed Moscow Reached the United States'.

<sup>10</sup> Reuters 12.09.2001.

<sup>11</sup> AFP 12.09.2001.

<sup>12</sup> One of Russia's leading experts in international relations, S.Rogov, described the hopes Russia had in this connection as follows: 'The main thing is that for the first time since 1945 we [Russia] and the USA have a common enemy – international terrorism. There are possibilities for the most extensive cooperation in this but there must be no double standards when our terrorists turn out to be their [US] freedom fighters and their terrorists – our freedom fighters' (*BBC Monitoring*, International terrorism is US and Russian common enemy – Russian expert. Source: NTV, Moscow, in Russian 0600 gmt 15.09.01).

<sup>13</sup> In his televised speech on 25 September Putin expressed this in a very direct way when he said: 'We also believe that the events in Chechnya cannot be seen out of the context of the struggle against international terrorism' (quoted from Piadyshev 2001, p.6).

<sup>14</sup> The head of the Center for Political Technologies, Igor Bunin, elaborated on this Russian hope to be recognized as member of the club of civilised nations in the following words: 'This is a chance for Russia to be accepted into the club of civilized nations and become an ally in the U.S. fight against Osama bin Laden in particular, and the international terrorist threat in general', quoted in Cullison and Chazan 2001.

<sup>15</sup> The chief of the FSB, Nikolay Patrushev, described the new situation as follows: 'Many people regarded terrorist acts in Russia as Russia's internal problems. I think that now they will come to understand that they are not our internal problems but problems facing the entire world community' (*BBC Monitoring*, Russia against double standards in fighting terrorism. Source: Russian Public TV (ORT), Moscow, in Russian 1100 gmt 15.09. 01).

<sup>16</sup> Grachev 2001.

<sup>17</sup> Andrey Fyodorov, one of the key members of the influential Council on Defence and Foreign Policy (SVOP) said the following on the choice Russia faced in connection with the 11 September: 'A serious challenge has been thrown at Russia, too, and its place among the world powers largely depends on the answer to this challenge' (Fyodorov 2001).

<sup>18</sup> Piadyshev 2001.

<sup>19</sup> Piadyshev 2001, p.6.

<sup>20</sup> Michael McFaul gave the following comments on the impact 11 September will have on ABM debate: 'Before Tuesday's attacks, missile defense was the only foreign policy issue for the Bush administration. Our Russia policy was a byproduct. That has totally

changed. Now we are going to have to have a foreign policy that goes beyond missile defense. The race to get the ABM Treaty changed has ended. That will have positive effects for U.S.–Russian relations' (quoted in Uzelac 2001). Also the Chairman of the State Duma Committee for Foreign Affairs, Dmitriy Rogozin, hoped that the US was to understand that the country embarked on a wrong policy when he gave his comments on the 11 September attack on Russian TV: 'This shows that the USA which is now trying to find answers to new threats which exist in the world – and this is precisely why it is talking about its missile defence programme – the USA is seeking answers to the wrong threats, rather than to the ones which really exist' (*BBC Monitoring*, Russian Duma official says USA can now see where real threat lies. Source: Russia TV, Moscow, in Russian 1518 gmt 11.09.01).

<sup>21</sup> The influential Russian politician and analyst Andrey Kokoshin gave the following assessment of the role UN SC should play in dealing with the new situation: 'The UN Security Council is the most authoritative body for resolving major international security issues. Its five permanent members - Russia, the United States, China, France, and Britain, each with veto power - play a decisive role in it. Thus, decisions made by the UN Security Council would also create the necessary legal basis for any specific counter-terrorist action (with the US as the main executor, as the victim of an appalling act of aggression), as well as for long-term efforts to counter terrorism as a phenomenon and the reasons behind it. The participation of China, which is our ally in the Shanghai Six and with which we have recently signed a significant agreement on neighborly relations, friendship and cooperation, is very important in decision-making on this problem' (Kokoshin 2001).

<sup>22</sup> Michael McFaul described this in the following words: Another result of the attacks on the United States is that Washington may become more tolerant of the way Moscow is waging war in Chechnya, said Michael McFaul of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington. "With these new circumstances, it will be difficult to criticize Russia for Chechnya," McFaul said in a telephone interview. "The word Chechnya will not be uttered by U.S. officials again in the U.S' (quoted in Uzelac 2001).

<sup>23</sup> The official newspaper of the Russian armed forces, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, called for the US to drop its unilateral policy and become again a normal member of the world community: 'But there is a simple and easy way forward for Washington. The United States should return to the international community as a fully-fledged member, and join other countries in looking for ways of countering international terrorism. However, this would mean abandoning some US goals. First and foremost, it would have to abandon its strategy of a mono-polar world under US dominance' (*Krasnaya Zvezda* 18.09.01).

<sup>24</sup> During his visit to New York in connection with the 2002 gathering of the World Economic Forum, Russian Prime Minister M.Kasyanov signed a deal on the deliveries of Russian oil to the US and on the deepening of the bilateral co-operation in the energy sector. This move can be interpreted as a part of the Russian strategy to become a more important Western partner; by selling oil to the US and countering OPEC Russia can compensate for lower oil prices by increasing its share in the global oil trade by using not only purely economic means but also by playing what could be described as 'post-11 September security and identity card'. For more details on Kasyanov's talks in New York see: <http://lenta.ru/economy/2002/02/03/kasyanov/>

<sup>25</sup> These motives were very visible in Ambassador Ushakov's letter to Americans published on 13.09 in *Washington Post* where he wrote that 'The urgency of Russia's specific proposals to create a united front against global terrorist threat has been once again tragically underscored' (*Washington Post* 13.09.01). The day before his letter was published, the US Ambassador to Moscow warned Russians that the US still saw the need for finding a political solution to the problem of Chechnya and that

'A military approach is only making a bad situation worse' (quoted from: US Department of State 12 September 2001 Transcript: U.S. Ambassador to Moscow on Terrorist Attacks).

<sup>26</sup> Even the title of Gornostayev's analysis of the impact 11 September was to have on US policy reveals how important the issue was for Russians. 'Will Bush see that his myths are dispelled? Horrendous terrorist attacks in the U.S. prove that the new threat is international terrorism, not ballistic missiles' (Gornostayev 2001 at [www.strana.ru](http://www.strana.ru), 13.09). Also another Russian specialist, Mikhail Nosov, of the prestigious USA-Canada Institute, was quoted as saying: 'The anti-missile shield will not protect the United States. The threat will come not from rogue states and their feeble missiles, but from Islamic terrorism' (quoted in Bennet 2001).

<sup>27</sup> Andrey Kokoshin said as follows on the issue: 'I very much hope that their policy of complete self-reliance and their feeling that they are the only superpower will be changed under the impact of the events. I am certain that if the USA set out the task of developing cooperation on equal terms in this area then other members of the international community, including Russia, China and India, let alone Europe, will take an active part in that work but only on a basis of equality' (*BBC Monitoring*

Russia: Fears voiced over US "emotional, unpredictable" response. Source: Radio Mayak, Moscow, in Russian 1100 gmt 12.09.01).

<sup>28</sup> This was explicitly expressed by one of Putin's 'makers' Gleb Pavlovsky: 'They (terrorists – JMG) have created a new reality where what earlier was thought impossible is now possible. Many regard it as a symbolic event on the same scale as previously the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Now we have come to see that the stability of the U.S. dominance was as seeming and transient as the stability of the Soviet stagnation period, which also appeared as a very firm and indestructible fortress' ([www.strana.ru](http://www.strana.ru), 12.09.01).

<sup>29</sup> Press Conference With State Duma Committee For Defense Vice Chair Alexei Arbatov On US–Russian Relations, RIA Novosti News Agency, 11:05, 18.09.01. Source: Federal News Service at <http://www.fednews.ru>.

<sup>30</sup> For more on that see Lathem 2001.

<sup>31</sup> Sergei Zagidullin, deputy chairman of the Parliamentary Committee for International Affairs commented on this in the following way: 'U.S. action could so destabilise the situation in Central Asia that Russia might be deprived of its zones of influence in the region' (*Reuters* 17.09.01).

<sup>32</sup> *RFE/RL Newslines* 17.09.2001, *Jamestown Monitor* 18.09.2001.

<sup>33</sup> Plater Zyberk and Aldis 2001, p.4.

<sup>34</sup> Both Kazakhstan's and Turkmenistan's presidents said already on 15 September that their countries were ready to support the US measures against terrorists (*RFE/RL Newslines* 17.09.2001); on 17 September similar declarations came from Georgia and Uzbekistan. Foreign Ministry spokesman Bakhodyr Umarov told AP that, if asked, Uzbekistan would consider allowing the US the use of its military bases to launch strikes against Afghanistan (*RFE/RL Newslines* 18.09.2001). This declaration was even more annoying for Russia, because only one year earlier the Uzbek president ruled out allowing Moscow to use Uzbek territory to launch preventive strikes against the Taliban regime (*RFE/RL Newslines* 29.05.2000). As Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Committee for International Affairs, Sergey Zagidullin said it, Uzbekistan's decision to co-operate with the US 'placed Russia in a difficult situation' (*Reuters* 17.09.01).

<sup>35</sup> Bennet 2001.

<sup>36</sup> For more details, see Pyadyshev 2001, p.6. For the text of the speech see: <http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events/311.html>

<sup>37</sup> Commenting on the Russian bid to join NATO an anonymous NATO high official said the following on the Russian perception of NATO: 'In reality, I don



't see Russia putting in an application. Russia still wants to be equal with the United States, and certainly not with individual NATO countries. They still believe the U.S. runs NATO completely' (Taylor 2001).

<sup>38</sup> Text of the PJC statement at <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p010913e.htm>.

<sup>39</sup> Press conference with Deputy Chairman of the State Duma Defence Committee A. Arbatov on US-Russia relations. RIA Novosti, 11:05, 18.09.2001. Source: Federal News Service [www.fednews.ru](http://www.fednews.ru).

<sup>40</sup> *RFE/RL Newslines* 24.09.2001.

<sup>41</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p010919e.htm>

<sup>42</sup> Reuters 25.09.2001.

<sup>43</sup> Those allusions can be found in Putin's historical speech in the Bundestag where he called for building of a European home without divisions and for putting the definite end to the cold war. The text of the speech can be found at: <http://www.president.kremlin.ru/events/313.html>.

<sup>44</sup> Commenting on Russian-German talks, German ambassador to Moscow Ernst-Jörg von Studnitz said that it was 'quite possible to imagine Russia's entry into NATO in this changing world' (*Interfax* 24.09.2001).

<sup>45</sup> For more on this see, Twohey 2001.

<sup>46</sup> Strauss 2001.

<sup>47</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s0111003a.htm>

<sup>48</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s0111003a.htm>

<sup>49</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid\\_1670000/1670139.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1670000/1670139.stm)

<sup>50</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid\\_1671000/1671654.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/newsid_1671000/1671654.stm)

<sup>51</sup> ITAR TASS 20.11.2001.

<sup>52</sup> *Reuters* 20.11.2001.

<sup>53</sup> Lord Robertson's speech is available at: <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011122a.htm>.

<sup>54</sup> <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011122b.htm>

<sup>55</sup> For more details see: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01-158e.htm>

<sup>56</sup> For more details on the content of discussion and decisions taken at this meeting see: <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p011218e.htm>

<sup>57</sup> On 15 November, Rear Admiral Valentin Kuznetsov, who in January 2002 was appointed Russia's new military representative to NATO, said the following when asked to give his comments on the new line towards the West adopted by President Putin: 'Russia's point of view on the process of NATO enlargement has not changed at all. Europe is not a region where the security can be organized by enlarging NATO' (<http://www.rambler.ru/db/news/msg.html?mid=2057705>).

<sup>58</sup> Russian commentator Y. Vasilyev gave the following assessment of how 11 September could change Russia's policy agenda: 'The post-September 11 situation does give Moscow a chance to draw closer to the West, and to the United States in particular. Actual involvement in the civilized world's united counter-terrorism front will require Russia to revise its foreign policy and defense doctrines. As a result, the Kremlin may finally understand that Russia is not threatened by the West, NATO expansion, or even national missile defense systems. It is threatened by something entirely different' (Vasilyev 2001).

<sup>59</sup> On the use of 'branding' techniques in a political context see van Ham 2001. Also volume 9 of *The Journal of Brand Management* edited by Simon Anholt contains a series of articles on the technology of branding of various countries.

<sup>60</sup> On Primakov's reading of Gorchakov's heritage see: Goble 1998 at: <http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2296.html>

<sup>61</sup> The text of the speech stems from the official MFA website at [www.mid.ru](http://www.mid.ru). The speech was given at the Seventeenth All-Cadet Convention in Val Morin, Canada, on September 11, 2000. On the Gorchakovian ideas as the potential guideline for the

country's policy see Slutskiy 2000a and Slutskiy 2000b. Slutskiy's views are important and representative not least because he is the deputy of the head of the State Duma's Committee on Foreign Affairs.

<sup>62</sup> For more on that, see: Odnokolenko 2000 and Rastopshin 1999. Even the titles of the articles reveal the consequences 'economisation' of Russian foreign policy has had on its content. Odnokolenko writes that 'friendship with NATO is simply the cheapest option', while Rastopshin points at the lack of a material basis for confrontation with NATO when he writes that 'there is nothing to meet the NATO tanks with'.

<sup>63</sup> More on Russian understanding of Russia's weak position in the new developing international system and the dominant role played by the US and the West in general see Utkin 2000, especially subchapters on unipolarity and economic disparity.

<sup>64</sup> *Judo: The Gentle Tao* by Alan Watts at <http://www.judoinfo.com/watts.htm>

<sup>65</sup> *Judo, the Japanese Art of Self-defence* by Jigoro Kano at <http://www.judoinfo.com/kano2.htm>

<sup>66</sup> Bohlen 2001.

<sup>67</sup> Rogov 2002.

<sup>68</sup> On 9 January *RIA-Novosti* reported that at a press conference in the Kazakh capital Astana Seleznyov said he was against the long-term deployment of US forces in Central Asian states. He said any decision related to the establishment of permanent American bases in the region must be made only after collective discussions between those Central Asian states and Russia. He also warned that the use by the United States of airfields in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan means that from there the U.S. will attempt to control not only the situation in Afghanistan, but also on the Indian-Pakistani border, the western areas of China, and in Kazakhstan.

<sup>69</sup> According to *Interfax*, the Commander of Federal Border Troops General Konstantin Totskiy told reporters in Dushanbe on 15 January that the presence of US troops in Central Asia will become unnecessary after the counter-terrorist operation is completed in Afghanistan. Also the official newspaper of the Russian armed forces, *Krasnaya Zvezda*, published on 9 January 2002 a critical article on the growing US presence in Central Asia.

<sup>70</sup> When Igor Ivanov left Tashkent for Moscow after concluding his visit to Central Asia on 10 January, he decided not to appear at a previously planned news conference. The official explanation given was that the minister was in a hurry to complete the preparations for President Putin's visit to Poland, but the Russian newspaper *Kommersant* (11.01.2002) commented that the reason was that in fact the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs had nothing to tell journalists about the results of his Central Asian tour.

<sup>71</sup> *RFE/RI Newsline* 10.01.2002.

<sup>72</sup> <http://www.lenta.ru/vojna/2002/01/18/maskhadov/>

<sup>73</sup> <http://www.lenta.ru/vojna/2002/01/24/zakaev/>

<sup>74</sup> *Vlast'* 13.11.2001.

<sup>75</sup> For more on these efforts see W. Matser's article (Matser 2001) published in the last 2001 issue of *NATO Review* and available also at NATO's web: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/0104-05.htm>

<sup>76</sup> Rogov 2002.



## ANDRE UTGIVELSER I DET SIKKERHETSPOLITISKE BIBLIOTEK

- 9/98 **Gedde-Dahl, Hendriksen, Middtum og Moen**  
Norge og Øst-Europa 1945-65.
- 10/98 **Knut Vollebæk**  
The 1999 Norwegian OSCE chairmanship.  
**Bronislaw Geremek**  
Current challenges for the OSCE and the role of the chairmanship.
- 11/98 **Pavel K. Baev:**  
Russia's policies in secessionist conflicts in Europe in the 1990s.
- 12/98 **Jakub M. Godzimirski**  
Russian security policy objectives in the Baltic sea and the Barents area.
- 1/99 **Jahn Otto Johansen**  
Tyskland i hjertet av Europa.
- 2/99 **Fostervoll, Gjerde, Petersen og Bondevik**  
NATOs 50-års jubileum.
- 3/99 **Aage Borchgrevink**  
Bakgrunnen for konflikten i Kosovo og OSSEs rolle.  
**Terje Lund**  
Interne konflikter og humanitær intervensjon.
- 4/99 **Alyson J.K. Bailes**  
The new european defence debate.
- 5/99 **Idås, Wiborg, Surlien og Storberg**  
USA og Vest-Europa 1945 - 1965.
- 6/99 **Geir Hågen Karlsen**  
Militær støtte til de baltiske land: erfaringer og anbefalinger.
- 7/99 **Knut Vollebæk**  
Det nye NATO og konsekvenser for Norge.  
Vedlegg med NATOs strategiske konsept i norsk oversettelse.
- 8/99 **Eldbjørg Løwer**  
Forsvarspolitiske utfordringer.
- 9/99 **Fredrik Bull-Hansen**  
En all-europeisk sikkerhet etter bomber overBalkan.
- 1/00 **John Berg**  
Europeisk forsvarsidentitet - europeisk forsvarsindustri
- 2/00 **Tor Aagaard Borgersen**  
Forsvaret i skuddlinjen  
**Olav Martin Kvalsvik**  
Ikke-intervensjon og humanitære prinsipper
- 3/00 **Jahn Otto Johansen**  
Sentral og Øst-Europas fremtid
- 4/00 **Bjørn Olav Knutsen, Alf Granviken, Mats Ruge Holte, Anders Kjøberg og Finn Aagaard**  
Europeisk sikkerhet i en foranderlig tid: En analyse av Norges utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitiske handlingsrom
- 5/00 **Gábor Iklódy**  
The Kosovo conflict - experiences of a new NATO member
- 6/00 **Christian Borch**  
NATO etter Kosovo
- 7/00 **Dan Smith**  
National sovereignty and citizens' rights: Having it both ways
- 8/00 **Jakub M. Godzimirski**  
Russian National Security Concepts 1997-2000. A Comparative Analysis

- 9/00 **Bjørnar Kibsgaard**  
Norske havområder: Strategiske og sikkerhetspolitiske utfordringer
- 10/00 **Tormod Petter Svennevig**  
Sikkerhet og samarbeid rundt Østersjøen
- 1/01 **Andreas Selliaas**  
Kaliningrad - en spesiell region i Russland
- 2/01 **Kjeld G. H. Hillingsø**  
Det danske forsvaret i omstilling
- 3/01 **Bjørnar Kibsgaard**  
Norge i energiens geopolitikk
- 4/01 **Jahn Otto Johansen**  
Øst-Europas plass i fremtidens Europa
- 5/01 **Andrej Fjodorov m. fl.**  
Hva er Russlands interesser i Nord-Europa?
- 6/01 **Pavel Baev**  
Putin's Military Reform: Two Trajectories for the First Presidency
- 7/01 **Olav Orheim**  
What are the strategic challenges Norway is facing in the High North?
- 8/01 **Ole Gunnar Austvik**  
Norge som storeksporthør av gass: Utenriks- og sikkerhetspolitiske implikasjoner
- 9/01 **Arkady Moshes**  
Russian Policy in the Baltic Sea Region in 2000-s: First Results and Future Prospects
- 10/01 **Bjørn Olav Knutsen**  
EU - En militær stormakt? Kooperativ sikkerhet og integrasjon som grunnlag for europeisk samarbeid
- 11/01 **Jahn Otto Johansen**  
Tysk utenrikspolitikk før og nå
- 12/01 **Tormod Petter Svennevig**  
FN, NATO OG EU På Balkan
- 13/01 **Olav Riste**  
Facing the 21 century: New and old dilemmas for Norwegian foreign policy
- 14/01 **Nils Marius Rekkedal**  
Utfordringer fra de såkalte asymmetriske trusler
- 15/01 **Geir Flikke**  
Norge og europeisk sikkerhet - tilpasning til besvær?
- 1/02 **Christopher Coker**  
September 11th and its implications for EU and NATO
- 2/02 **Svem Gunnar Simonsen**  
Russlands militære som et politisk mikrokosmos: Verdiorientering og valgfaterd, 1995-2000
- 3/02 **Iver B. Neumann**  
Norges handlingsrom og behovet for en overgripende sikkerhetspolitisk strategi
- 4/02 **Jahn Otto Johansen**  
Et mer selvbevisst Tyskland
- 5/02 **Nils Marius Rekkedal**  
Asymmetric Warfare and Terrorism – An Assessment
- 6-02 **Andreas Selliaas**  
EUs nordlige dimensjon – i Norges interesse?