



**DEN NORSKE  
ATLANTERHAVSKOMITEE**  
THE NORWEGIAN ATLANTIC COMMITTEE

Security Policy Library

2-2012

**NATO'S INFLUENCE IN THE NEAR ABROAD**

*Oktay Bingöl, brigadier general (ret.) Turkish army*



**Oktay Bingöl** is a retired Brigadier General from the Turkish Army and holds two master degrees in business administration and security studies, and a PhD in international relations. He is currently an analyst in the International Strategic and Security Studies Center (USGAM) which is based in Ankara. During his military career, he served in various NATO HQs in Turkey and Belgium, ISAF in Afghanistan and Provide Comfort Forward Military HQ in Iraq. He specializes on failed states, state building, Middle East conflicts, peace operations and civil military relations.

Published by: The Norwegian Atlantic Committee  
Editor: Neving Rudskjær  
Printed by: Hegland Trykk AS, Flekkefjord  
ISSN: 0802-6602

For more information, visit our website: [www.dnak.org](http://www.dnak.org)

## Introduction

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the regions beyond NATO's conventional Area of Responsibility (AOR) have become of vital interest for the security of NATO member states and the whole international community. As the possibility of big conventional offensive attacks against NATO has decreased and a number of new risks and threats from the periphery have emerged, NATO has adopted its policies, structure and even membership to meet new challenges and remain relevant as a regional political-security institution. NATO's 1991 and 1999 strategic concepts were prepared to deal with the requirements of the new strategic environment, initiated the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD), and conducted peacekeeping operations beyond the AOR. After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO declared an Article-V operation against terrorism and introduced a new cooperation program, namely Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) to help the countries in the Broader Middle East Project, but especially for Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)'s member countries

Resulting from the 2012 Chicago Summit NATO's existing cooperation tools should be reviewed and new initiatives must be made. It is believed that NATO's real influence in the peripheral area, which is referred to as "NATO's near abroad" in the following chapter, and the perceptions of NATO by the people of the various countries must be clearly understood before NATO initiates new programs or conducts any further action.

The hypothesis of this article is that NATO does not have a big influence in its near abroad despite several initiatives towards the region. More importantly it has a bad image. Therefore, all NATO actions towards the region should be carefully planned and gradually conducted.

This article consists of four parts; a definition of the area and its importance for NATO; discussion of the current NATO policies and tools towards the region; the perceptions of NATO by the people of the region; and finally some recommendations for NATO.

## **How to define the near abroad and the related specific term; the broader Middle East and North Africa**

At the very start of this chapter, there is a need to define the terms, “the near abroad” and “the broader Middle East.” In Russian political language and some other post-Soviet states, the near abroad generally refers to the newly independent republics which emerged after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The term is normally used to refer to several countries in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia.<sup>1</sup> By looking at this meaning of the term, one could easily define an area as “NATO near abroad” which includes the adjacent territories of the borders of NATO members. Such an area largely overlaps with the borders of the broader Middle East except the countries in Eastern Europe.

The term “broader Middle East” has been used to refer to a large area of Arab and non-Arab Muslim countries, stretching all the way from Morocco in the west to Pakistan in Southeast Asia. However, there is no precise listing of designated countries. There are various lists with changing numbers of countries. Some argue that the term “broader Middle East” refers to the countries of the Arab League, plus Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Turkey, and Israel,<sup>2</sup> Thus a total of 27 countries. Another group adds the central Asian countries such as Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and South Caucasus countries such as Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia, extending its total to 36 countries. The article will use the latter definition to refer to the area beyond the conventional NATO AOR.

Some countries on the lists such as Turkey and Egypt have never accepted being designated a target country of the project, while other countries are not even aware of what they are targeted for.

## **Why the broader Middle East is important for NATO?**

There are several reasons why it is important for NATO to promote dialogue and foster stability and security in the broader Middle East. European and North American leaders and populations have a strong strategic self-interest in promoting security in the Middle East. NATO members have more interest in this region than in any other.<sup>3</sup> One key reason is that a number of today’s security challenges – terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states and

transnational organized crime – are common to both NATO member states and to countries in these regions and, consequently, require common responses.

The potential in these regions for instability due to many unresolved political, social and economic issues is also a concern. In the Middle East, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remains a major source of tension. Progress towards a just, lasting and comprehensive settlement of this conflict should be a priority for the countries of the region and for the international community as a whole.

The stability and the peace in Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan are important for both the countries in the region and the entire world.

Energy security is another concern with as much as 65% of Europe's oil and natural gas imports passing through the countries in the region. A secure and stable environment in the region is important not only to Western importing nations but also to the region's energy producers and to the countries through which oil and gas transit.<sup>4</sup>

NATO also has other important reasons to focus on this region following the events in 2011 such as the possible implications of the Arab Spring to the countries concerned as well as to the NATO members.

### **NATO initiatives and missions in the broader Middle East**

With each passing year, and in ways no one could have foreseen, NATO's role in the broader Middle East has continued to expand. At the time the peacekeeping operations were conducted in the Eastern Europe, Bosnia and Kosovo, few could have envisaged that almost a decade later NATO would deploy over thousands of troops to Afghanistan, intervene humanitarily in Pakistan and Sudan, train Iraqi military forces in Baghdad and the intervene in Libya to help the rebels change the regime.<sup>5</sup>

### **Over the past several years, NATO has:**

- invoked its Article 5 defense clause for the first time ever, following the September 11 attacks on the United States;
- deployed thousands of troops to Afghanistan and committed to a state building mission; As of January 2012, ISAF's total strength is about 130,000. There are 50 troop contributing nations. Seven of them, namely Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Georgia, Jordan, United Arab Emirates and Turkey are from the broader Middle East region,
- launched a NATO Training Mission operation for Iraqi forces involving contributions from all NATO members;
- created the NATO Response Force (NRF), a grouping of some 20,000 forces and equipment that can be deployed anywhere in the world at short notice.
- deployed the NRF in an earthquake relief operation in Pakistan;
- established an air-bridge to supply soldiers from the African Union to a peacekeeping mission in Sudan;
- launched the ICI to develop its political and military relations with members of the GCC;
- expanded its MD to facilitate political dialogue with Middle Eastern countries including Egypt;
- enlarged the scope of political discussions in the North Atlantic Council to include briefings on a range of Middle Eastern and global issues;
- established a Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Response (CBRNR) team to help deal with possible weapons of mass destruction contingencies.
- and lastly conducted the operation in Libya.

By looking at this long list, one can say that NATO has a big influence in the region and is in the process of transforming itself into a global security organization in terms of its missions, its participation and possibly its future membership. This might seem right from a NATO point of view however the perceptions of NATO by the peoples of the various countries in the region are different. If we look into some initiatives in detail, we will see what this means.

## **Partnership for Peace Program**

The first NATO initiative in the region is the PfP Program. There are eight countries from the broader Middle East region participating in this program; Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Among these countries, Georgia has adopted a very different approach towards NATO. Georgia's membership aspiration is a challenge for NATO because of the political realities and instability in the region. NATO has been supporting Georgia's defense and security sector reforms and full membership aspiration through the NATO-Georgia Commission. However the ongoing disputes over Abkhazia and South Ossetia complicate NATO's relations with Russia. It is argued that the South Ossetia War in 2008 has diminished the likelihood of Georgian accession to NATO in the near future, although some analysts see it as a justification for Georgian NATO-membership. This article argues that in the near future NATO cannot ignore the influence of Russia in these areas.

Azerbaijan, Armenia and Kazakhstan agreed on Individual Partnership Action Plans which aim to deepen the relationships of the PfP partners with NATO in the general categories of political and security issues. The main activities for these and remaining countries are however limited to seminars, courses, visits at different levels, meetings and for some countries, small size unit contributions to NATO missions.

None of the Central Asian countries contribute with troops to the ISAF mission. Furthermore, NATO and coalition partners often face challenges when using military bases in these countries for logistic purposes. Despite this however, one can conclude that NATO has an influence on these countries only 18 years after having signed the PfP Framework Document. There are several reasons for NATO's limited influence. The main reason is the influence of powerful regional actors such as Russia, China and India. Most of the PfP countries are members of regional political and security organizations such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)<sup>6</sup>, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS)<sup>7</sup>, and the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).<sup>8</sup> These organizations have also expanded their roles in the region over the years. One example is the CSTO military exercise in 2011 which was the largest military exercise ever held by the CSTO.

Involving up to 12,000 troops, it was conducted to raise preparedness and co-ordination to counter Arab Spring style destabilization techniques.

The close economic relations of the Central Asian countries with regional powers are other important factors which constrain NATO and Western relations. The biggest trade partner for these countries is either Russia or China.<sup>9</sup>

Another important reason is NATO's negative image among the Muslim populations in these countries. This issue will be further elaborated in the following chapters.

Because of these reasons, it could be argued that NATO's influence through the PfP program in Central Asian countries, together with Armenia and Azerbaijan, will remain limited for the foreseeable future.

### **Mediterranean Dialogue<sup>10</sup>**

Since the launch of the MD in 1994, the number of countries participating in this program has increased: Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia, which accepted the invitation to participate in the Dialogue in 1994, were joined by Jordan in 1995 and Algeria in 2000.

Initially, NATO wanted to create a forum for confidence-building and transparency in which Allies could learn more about the security concerns of Dialogue countries as well as dispel misperceptions about NATO's aims and policies.

After the Istanbul Summit in 2004, NATO and the Dialogue countries have taken several steps. Some of them are:

- bilateral and multilateral meetings at various levels,
- establishment of Annual Work Program in 1997,
- strengthened political consultations,
- military-to-military cooperation,
- intelligence-sharing related to Combating terrorism and new security threats,
- cooperation for preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery,
- border security particularly in connection with terrorism as well as tackling the spread of small arms and light weapons and illegal trafficking,
- civil emergency planning and,
- defense reform.



Furthermore, in the field of cooperation in crisis management, NATO and the MD partners have some positive records. Morocco, Egypt and Jordan participated in NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Morocco and Israel are playing a role in the Operation Active Endeavour patrolling the Mediterranean Sea.

The MD provides a multilateral format designed to stimulate talks between the seven countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. Since the MD achieved partnership status in 2004 meetings at a level of the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs as well as Joint Chiefs of Staff have been held. However, no real multilateral cooperation on security and defense issues is underway among the Mediterranean partners. Mutual distrust and long-standing misconceptions have precluded them from establishing a constructive interaction.

### **Istanbul Cooperation Initiative<sup>11</sup>**

NATO's ICI, launched at the Alliance's Summit in Turkey June 2004, aims to contribute to long-term global and regional security by offering countries of the broader Middle East region practical bilateral security cooperation with NATO.

Six countries of the GCC were initially invited to participate. To date, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have joined. Saudi Arabia and Oman have yet to participate.

Since the Summit annual Menu of Practical Activities focusing on agreed priority areas has been gradually enhanced and now contains about 500 activities.

ICI partners have also increasingly demonstrated their readiness to participate in NATO-led operations, acting as security providers. Today, Bahrain and UAE are recognized as contributing nations to the NATO ISAF operation in Afghanistan although their contributions are symbolic (Bahrain 95 troops and UAE 35). Following the launch of Operation Unified Protector (OUP) in Libya, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates provided air assets to the operation.

Concerning the multilateral dimension, the ICI lacks a structured forum for dialogue among partners. Although the new NATO Strategic Concept (2010) advocates an "active engagement" with all partners, the success of NATO initiatives and attempts towards the region highly depends on the dynamics of the region rather than something else.

## **NATO image and real influence in the broader middle east**

With respect to NATO image in the broader Middle East, it is always difficult to tell the truth if it is uncomfortable. . There is a Turkish saying “friends say even what hurts”. Thus, the truth needs to be told.

Even though NATO has made a moderate success through the MD and ICI program its image is poor in the broader Middle East.

Starting with Arab countries, it is quite clear that Arabs perceptions of NATO are quite negative. There are of course reasons for this. First of all, it is a reflection of prevailing attitudes in the Arab world that are rooted in Arab historical experiences.<sup>12</sup>

For the Arab public, NATO has no separate identity from those of the Western powers and states that created the Alliance and constitutes its members. In this way, the Alliance’s image has been formed by attitudes towards events in the Arab world involving major NATO members such as France’s colonial rule and the Algerian War; Italy’s involvement in Arab North Africa; the United Kingdom’s occupation of the Gulf region and the support provided to Israel by the United States. Based on this, NATO is widely perceived as a colonialist club.

Another factor contributing to NATO’s negative image in the Middle East is religious perceptions. Except Turkey, NATO is seen as a dominant Christian club. Unfortunately Turkish membership of the Alliance has not rectified this image.

Furthermore, NATO’s Afghanistan intervention and the high numbers of civilian casualties have considerably contributed to the negative image.

Although NATO involvement in Iraq is limited to training mission, the US and coalition operations have produced negative perceptions not only among the people of Iraq, but also the Muslim people throughout the broader Middle East and North Africa.

I, Lastly, it is time to touch upon NATO’s Libya intervention and its negative image. The operation is generally seen as a success in two respects by NATO officials. In their opinion, NATO demonstrated its capacity both to decide and to act quickly and efficiently. Moreover, the Alliance proved its ability to end a military engagement when the reason for military action disappeared.

There is also a general belief in Western countries, especially in the US, that NATO’s Libya intervention has produced positive results on

Arab perceptions of the US and NATO. It is believed that intervening in Libya would shift the regional narrative that the U.S. and Western countries only support brutal dictators and not the democratic aspirations of Arabs.

However, there are some polls in Arab countries which indicate that the intervention has not translated into greater support for the US among Arabs. A high percentage of people thinks that the US, some Western Countries and NATO intervened in Libya to share its oil and gas resources. They also firmly believe that the air campaign destroyed the infrastructure of the country and killed thousands of innocent civilians.

The operations has also been severely criticized by Turkish people. While the Turkish Government gave a limited and obligatory support for the operation, the leaders of the opposition parties spoke up against the air campaign inflicting damage on the infrastructure and causing civilian casualties.<sup>13</sup> Some polls indicate that the Turkish people do not approve of NATO operations in Libya. According to the IPSOS poll of May 2011, only one third (35%) of Turkish citizens supported the actions.<sup>14</sup> This could however be an optimistic estimate as other polls in Turkey indicate much lower support for NATO after the Libya intervention. The IAW 2011 transatlantic trends survey showed that while 53% of Turks felt that NATO was essential to their security in 2004 compared to only 30% in 2010.

After the Libya operation a survey was conducted in Arab Countries between October-December 2011 by the Turkish think tank TESEV (the Turkish Economic and Social Studies Foundation) showed some interesting perceptions. Arabs perceive Israel to be the greatest threat to their security followed by the US and Iran. <sup>15</sup> Arabs see NATO as the least important security provider among seven actors, including US, Russia, China, Turkey, UN, EU and NATO. Turkey is the first and UN, EU and Russia follow respectively.<sup>16</sup>

There is a considerable number of articles claiming that the Libya intervention was not a humanitarian operation. Although they accept that the Qaddafi regime was brutal, they argue that its forces massacred no civilians before the campaign to “save” the Libyan people. Like other civil wars in Third World countries, this one generated most of its killing through the fighting itself. The number of

Libyan deaths is uncertain but likely runs into the tens of thousands. Most civilians died after the conflict was lengthened by minimal, half-hearted Western action. NATO airstrikes persisted even after Qaddafi's forces were largely defeated.

The legitimacy of the operation is debated. Some scholars in the region and the people on the streets question the legitimacy of UNSC structure and voting procedures. Moreover, there are other sources of legitimacy, the most important one being the belief of the citizens in the relevant country. Nobody asked the Libyan people before bombing their country.

It is argued that NATO's future image is also in danger. By entering the Libyan civil war, NATO has tied its credibility to an eventual post-Qaddafi regime it has no control over, creating the potential for an embarrassing implicit NATO endorsement of an abusive Libyan government.

## Recommendations

To play a successful and useful role in the broader Middle East, NATO must be careful to distance itself both from the West's colonial past and the dictatorial regimes of the present; any NATO role in the Middle East must be based on universal moral norms and local values of the countries in the region.

More public diplomacy focusing on younger people is needed to advertise NATO and its role for the security and stability of the region. Such diplomacy should advocate the use of all possible communication means, especially traditional ones. Moreover, NATO must take into consideration the requirements discussed above.

The ongoing events and unpredictability of the new regimes in the Arab World might put the MD and ICI at risk. It is crucial to stress the decision of the Egyptian provisional authorities to allow the passage of two Iranian warships through the Suez Canal as it was neither in line with the traditional Egyptian policy nor with the security arrangements relevant to the NATO Active Endeavor and the aims of MD.

NATO operations should be carefully conducted to avoid civilian casualties. The behavior of NATO troops respecting local rules and order, traditional values, culture, and religion sometimes becomes more important than a victory over the insurgency. Therefore NATO soldiers and leaders should be given cultural education before deployment.

NATO should cooperate more with regional security and political organizations in the broader Middle East including the SCO, CIS, AU, GCC and Organization of Islamic Countries.

The recent events and ongoing conflicts in the region clearly demonstrate the need to raise a regional security compact/organization to tackle the common threats to peace and stability. In this regard, it is believed that any initiative by either US or NATO to create "mini NATO" or "Middle East NATO" would complicate the region's fragile dynamics. We should bear in mind the 1950's CENTO or Baghdad Pact in the Middle East which is generally regarded as one of the least successful of the Cold War alliances.<sup>17</sup> Instead, the security organizations should be created by the countries in the region which NATO should support and seek to cooperate with.

## Endnotes

- <sup>1</sup> Wikipedia, "Near abroad", [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Near\\_abroad](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Near_abroad) (Access date:30 January 2012)
- <sup>2</sup> Jeremy M. Sharp, "The Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative: An Overview", CRS Report for Congress, p.2, February 15, 2005, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22053.pdf>
- <sup>3</sup> Philip Gordon, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East", The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research Lecture Series 63, 2006, p.4, [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2006/spring\\_middleeast\\_gordon/emirates20060530.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2006/spring_middleeast_gordon/emirates20060530.pdf)
- <sup>4</sup> NATO Web Site, "Security Cooperation with the mediterranean region and the broader Middle east", p.2, <http://www.nato.int/docu/mediterranean/secopmed-e.pdf>
- <sup>5</sup> Philip Gordon, "NATO's Growing Role in the Greater Middle East", The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research Lecture Series 63, 2006, p.7-8, [http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2006/spring\\_middleeast\\_gordon/emirates20060530.pdf](http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2006/spring_middleeast_gordon/emirates20060530.pdf)
- <sup>6</sup> SCO Web Site, <http://www.sectsc.org/EN/>
- <sup>7</sup> CIS Web Site, <http://www.cis.minsk.by/>
- <sup>8</sup> Wikipedia, "Collective Security Treaty Organization", [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth\\_of\\_Independent\\_States](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commonwealth_of_Independent_States)
- <sup>9</sup> CIA Web Site, "Factbooks of Central Asia Countries, 2011", <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/>
- <sup>10</sup> NATO Web Site, "NATO Mediterranean Dialogue", [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-E5801E39-A3DF90E8/natolive/topics\\_60021.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-E5801E39-A3DF90E8/natolive/topics_60021.htm?)
- <sup>11</sup> NATO Web Site, "Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)", [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics\\_58787.htm?](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_58787.htm?)
- <sup>12</sup> Mustafa Alani, "Arab perspectives on NATO", NATO Review, Spring 2005, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2005/issue4/english/art3.html>
- <sup>13</sup> Medya Kocaeli, Kılıçdaroğlu: NATO'nun Libya operasyonu amacını aştı, 01 Temmuz 2011 Cuma 16:48, <http://www.medyakocaeli.com/dunya/kilicdaroglu-natonun-libya-operasyonu-amacini-asti.htm>
- <sup>14</sup> IPSOS Web Site, "Ipsos Global @dvisory: Majority (60%) of Global Citizens Support NATO's Military Intervention in Libya", Thursday, May 12, 2011, <http://www.ipsos-na.com/news-polls/pressrelease.aspx?id=5234>
- <sup>15</sup> TESEV Report, "Ortadoğu'da Türkiye Algısı 2011", Ocak 2012, p.11, [http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD\\_OBJS/PDF/DPT/OD/YYN/OD\\_Turkiye\\_Algisi\\_2011.pdf](http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DPT/OD/YYN/OD_Turkiye_Algisi_2011.pdf)
- <sup>16</sup> TESEV Report, "Ortadoğu'da Türkiye Algısı 2011", Ocak 2012, p.10, [http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD\\_OBJS/PDF/DPT/OD/YYN/OD\\_Turkiye\\_Algisi\\_2011.pdf](http://www.tesev.org.tr/UD_OBJS/PDF/DPT/OD/YYN/OD_Turkiye_Algisi_2011.pdf)
- <sup>17</sup> Martin, Kevin W. (2008). "Baghdad Pact". In Ruud van Dijk et al. *Encyclopedia of the Cold War*. New York: Routledge. pp. 57. ISBN 9780415975155. <http://books.google.com/books?id=rUdmyzkw9q4C&pg=PA57&dq=cento+%22least+successful%22+%22baghdad+pact%22&client=safari>.



## Previous publications in this series:

- 1-2012 Ungarn – alene og miskjent *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 4-2011 Conflict or Coincidence of Interest of Main Oil and Gas Importing, Exporting and Transit Countries *Liana Jervalidze*
- 3-2011 Breaking down the remaining walls *Alister Miskimmon*
- 2-2011 Russia in NATO *Charles A. Kupchan*
- 1-2011 Bringing War Home - The use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams by Norway and Denmark to construct strategic narratives for their domestic audiences *Ida Dommersnes*
- 5-2010 Sjøforsvarets historie 1960-2010 - En kortversjon *Road Gjelsten*
- 4-2010 The Tragedy of small power politics *Asle Toje*
- 3-2010 Integrasjon med grenser eller grenseløs integrasjon? *Bjørn Innset*
- 2-2010 Reconciling the nuclear renaissance with disarmament *Alex Bolfraass and Kelsey Hartigan*
- 1-2010 Approaching the comprehensive approach *Dag Kristiansen*
- 3-2009 Turkish Neo-Ottomanism: A turn to the Middle East? *Einar Wigén*
- 2-2009 20 år etter muren *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 1-2009 Between Reluctance and Necessity: The Utility of Military force in Humanitarian and Development Operations *Robert Egnell*
- 5-2008 Civil-military relations: No Room for Humanitarianism in comprehensive approaches *Stephen Cornish and Marit Glad*
- 4-2008 Tsjekkoslovakia - 40 år etter *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 3-2008 NATO - Moldova/Israel/Ukraine *Dr. Gabanyi, Dr.Kogan, Dr. Begma & Igor Taburets*
- 2-2008 Hearts, minds and guns: the Role of the Armed Forces in the 26st Century *UK Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup*
- 1-2008 Krav til fremtidens forsvar sett fra unge offiserers ståsted *Tomas Bakke, Kadett Krigsskolen*
- 7-2007 Threats to Progress of Democracy and Long Term Stability in Georgia *Liana Jervalidze*
- 6-2007 Militærmaktens særtrekk i moderne konflikter *Div. forfattere*
- 5-2007 Norge i et Sikkerhetspolitisk Dilemma *Asle Toje*
- 5-2007 EU-staters varierende bidragsvilje til militær intervensjon *Rolf Magnus Holden*
- 4-2007 Defence as the Best Offence? Missile Defences and Nuclear Non-proliferation *Lars Van Dassen and Morten Bremer Mærlø*
- 3-2007 Putins Russland - Partner eller utfordrer? *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 2-2007 Energy and Identity - Readings of Shtokman and NEPG *Jakub M. Godzimirski*
- 1-2007 NATO and the Dialouge of Civilisations *Christopher Cooker*
- 1-2007 NATO planlegger å være relevant - også i fremtiden *Ivar Engan*
- 7-2006 Putins Russland og utenverdenen *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 6-2006 Ungarn 1956 - Et 50-årsminne *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 5-2006 NATO foran toppmøtet i Riga *Ambassadør Kai Eide*
- 4-2006 Russian energy policy and its challenge to western policy makers *Keith Smith*
- 4-2006 Oil and gas in The High North - A perspective from Norway *Ole Gunnar Austvik*
- 2-2006 EUs sikkerhetspolitiske rolle i internasjonal politikk *Jan Erik Grindheim*
- 1-2006 Fra "Kursk" til "Priz": Ubåtredning som internasjonal samarbeidsområde *Kristian Åtland*
- 9-2005 Nordisk sikkerhet *Tønne Huitfeldt*
- 8-2005 NATO going global or almost  
The Current Revolution in the Nature of Conflict  
The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee. *Alv Jakob Fostervoll, Jamie Shea, Chris Donnelly*
- 7-2005 Galileo - et europeisk globalt navigasjonssystem *Hans Morten Synstnes*
- 6-2005 Coming home to Europe? Central and Eastern Europe in EU and NATO  
Eastern Europe's silent revolution *Jahn Otto Johansen og Nils Morten Udgaard*
- 5-2005 Det tyske eksperiment *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 4-2005 The naval Dilemma of the early 26st Century *Hans Olav Stensli*



- 3-2005 What are the strategic challenges faced by Norway in the years to come?  
In the new types of conflict we face, how to define and defend humanitarian space?  
The Norwegian Atlantic Committee's 40th annual Leangkollen Conference. the Nobel Institute. *Jørgen Kosmo and Jonas Gahr Støre*
- 2-2005 The New Geopolitics of the North? *Jakub M. Godzimirski*
- 1-2005 "Global Partnership", russiske ubåter og brukt kjernebrensel – internasjonal koordinering av oppgaver og bidrag  
*Christina Chuen og Ole Reistad*
- 6-2004 Oljens geopolitikk og krigene ved Persiagulfen *Ole Gunnar Austvik*
- 5-2004 Coping with Vulnerabilities and the Modern society *Jan Hovden*
- 4-2004 Forsvarsperspektiver i nord *Jørgen Berggrav*
- 3-2004 NATO og de transatlantiske motsetninger  
-Kortsiktige og langsiktige perspektiver *Jahn Otto Johansen*
- 2-2004 The Role of a Humanitarian Organization in an International Security Operation -  
a Basis for Cooperation or a Basis for Separation? *Jonas Gahr Støre*
- 1-2004 If Effective Transatlantic Security Cooperation is the Question, Is NATO the Answer? *Stanley R. Sloan*
- 6-2003 Frankrike og Irak-krigen: Bare i prinsippenes navn? *Frank Orban*
- 5-2003 Norwegian Priorities for the Extended G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction  
*Asle Toje and Morten Bremer Mærli, NUPI*
- 4-2003 Saddam's Power Base *Major John Andreas Olsen*
- 3-2003 Terroristbekjempelse og folkeretten *Terje Lund*
- 2-2003 Men and Machines in Modern Warfare *General Charles A. Horner (ret.)*
- 1-2003 The Real Weapon of Mass Destruction: Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare in the era of terrorism and "rogue" states  
*Morten Bremer Mærli*





**B** ØKONOMI  
ÉCONOMIQUE



NORGE P.P. PORTO BETALT



**DEN NORSKE  
ATLANTERHAVSKOMITE**  
THE NORWEGIAN ATLANTIC COMMITTEE

Fridtjof Nansens plass 8

N-0160 Oslo

Tel: +47 22 40 36 00

Fax: +47 22 40 36 10

post@dnak.org

www.dnak.org