Charles A. Kupchan is Professor of International Affairs at Georgetown University and Whitney Shepardson Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relation. His most recent book is How Enemies Become Friends: The Sources of Stable Peace.
RUSSIA IN NATO

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States and its NATO allies have constructed a post-Cold War settlement that effectively excludes Russia. While NATO and the EU have enthusiastically embraced the countries of Central Europe, they have treated Russia as a strategic outsider. That Russia today finds itself excluded from the Euro-Atlantic community is in part a product of its own making. The country’s stalled democratic transition and its occasional bouts of foreign policy excess warrant that NATO continues to serve as a hedge against the reemergence of an expansionist Russia.1

Nonetheless, the West is making a historic mistake in treating Russia as a strategic pariah. As made clear by the settlements after the Napoleonic Wars and World War II – in contrast with the one that followed World War I – the inclusion of former adversaries in the post-war order is critical to the consolidation of great-power peace.2 Anchoring Russia in an enlarged Euro-Atlantic order should be a top priority for NATO today.

Russia has been disgruntled with the enlargement of NATO ever since the process of expanding the alliance began in the early 1990s. However, Russia’s economic and military decline and the West’s pronounced primacy encouraged NATO members to discount the potential consequences of Russian opposition to NATO enlargement. “As American capabilities surged and Russian capabilities waned,” argue political scientists Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, “Washington policymakers increasingly acted as though Russia no longer mattered and the United States could do whatever it wanted.”3

The strategic landscape has since changed dramatically, however, substantially raising the costs and risks of Russia’s exclusion from the Euro-Atlantic order. The Kremlin’s recentralization of power and the economic rebound stemming from energy revenues have brought the Russian state back to life. Russians are now pushing back against NATO – just as the West urgently needs Moscow’s cooperation on a host of issues, including the containment of Iran’s nuclear ambitions, arms control and nonproliferation, the stabilization of Afghanistan, counter-terrorism, and energy security.

The ongoing expansion of NATO has made more pressing the resolution of Russia’s place in the Euro-Atlantic order. In its latest military
doctrine, released in February of 2010, Russia identified NATO enlargement as a primary external threat. The issue of potential NATO membership for Georgia and Ukraine is still in play, a move that would presumably cross a dangerous red line for Russia. The Russia-Georgia war of 2008 was to some extent a reflection of Moscow’s disquiet over Georgia’s westward geopolitical alignment. And Russia has been actively seeking to revamp the Euro-Atlantic security architecture. The Russian government has come forward with concrete proposals for a new European security order and, in November 2009, released a draft “European Security Treaty.” Under these circumstances, NATO allies no longer have the luxury of indefinitely postponing consideration of Russia’s place in the post-Cold War settlement.

A vision for bringing Russia into the Euro-Atlantic space is readily within reach: Russia should become a member of NATO. The country’s eventual membership in NATO is the logical completion of a Euro-Atlantic order in which NATO is the primary security institution. Having embarked on the process of enlarging NATO when the Soviet bloc collapsed, the Western allies should now do their best to conclude that process by integrating Russia and other members of the Commonwealth of Independent State (CIS) into the alliance.

There are of course other options for pursuing a pan-European order, including fashioning a treaty between NATO and the Russia-led Collective Security Treaty Organization; elevating the authority and competencies of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), of which Russia is a member; or picking up on Russia’s proposal for a new European security treaty. But now that NATO has twenty-eight members with more to come, these other options are little more than strategic sideshows. Countries will either be NATO members, or they will be outsiders. The only logical pathway to a pan-European order thus entails Russia’s integration into NATO.

Russia may ultimately decline inclusion in NATO due to the requirements and constraints membership entails, instead choosing to go its own way. But if the primary institutions of the Euro-Atlantic community ultimately fail to extend their reach to Russia, let it be due to the Kremlin’s missteps, not because the Atlantic democracies failed to demonstrate the vision or will to embrace Russia in a pan-European order.
Collective Defense and Collective Security

The Euro-Atlantic security order has long had a dual character. On the one hand, Western institutions have sought to provide collective defense against external threats by amassing military capability to defend member states (primarily against the Warsaw Pact) and project power (as in Kosovo and Afghanistan). On the other hand, they have sought to provide collective security against internal threats by tethering members to each other through military, political, and socio-economic integration (via both NATO and the European Economic Community, the predecessor to the EU).

Since the inception of the Euro-Atlantic alliance in the late 1940s, these two missions have backstopped each other – but also been in tension. Collective defense is primarily about the concentration of power through maximizing national armament and coordinating decision making; the aim is to produce a countervailing balance against external threats. Collective security is primarily about the deconcentration of power through the collectivization of both armament and decision making; the aim is to neutralize internal threats through the centripetal force exercised by integration. During the Cold War, the institutional division of labor was relatively clear-cut. NATO delivered collective defense by amassing power against the Soviet threat and collective security by binding its members to one another. Meanwhile, the European Economic Community (and, later, the EU) focused on turning Western Europe into a zone of stable peace through economic and political integration.

Since the Cold War’s end, the Atlantic democracies have found it more difficult to balance collective defense and collective security. The United States sees NATO primarily as a tool for power projection, using it to gather European partners that can contribute to missions well beyond the European theater. The countries of Western Europe tend to conceive of the Euro-Atlantic alliance as an instrument for consolidating peace and prosperity within Europe, and they resist the U.S. effort to turn NATO into a vehicle for the global projection of power. Meanwhile, the new members from Central Europe view NATO in more traditional terms – as a bulwark against Russia. Their preoccupation with collective defense means that they favor a NATO-centered, rather than an EU-centered, Euro-Atlantic order. However, their
reluctance to augment the military strength and profile of the EU could undermine the transatlantic link; a more capable EU is essential to keeping Europe geopolitically relevant to the United States.

Making Russia’s inclusion in NATO a priority for the alliance would ostensibly exacerbate the tensions between these diverging strategic perspectives. In the United States, pragmatists would be intrigued while liberals and neoconservatives would recoil. In Western Europe, which is still trying to digest a steady stream of new entrants to the EU and NATO, the idea would likely intensify “enlargement fatigue.” And in Central Europe, where fear of Russia continues to be strong, the proposal would trigger consternation, if not outright alarm. Moreover, the notion of admitting Russia to NATO admittedly strikes an atonal chord due to the alliance’s Cold War mission, Russia’s backsliding on democratic reform, and its heavy-handed approach to its near-abroad. Nonetheless, the prospect of Russian membership in NATO holds considerable promise for resolving not just how best to construct a pan-European order, but also how to address the logical contradictions facing NATO’s future.

The Case for Russian Membership

The case for Russia’s inclusion in NATO rests on five main arguments. First, opening NATO to Russia would restore one of the Euro-Atlantic community’s primary functions – to provide for collective security through the centripetal force of integration. From the perspective of most NATO members, Russia is stuck in a strategic no-man’s-land; it warrants neither the definitive cold shoulder of collective defense nor the warm embrace of collective security. Laying out a vision for Russia’s inclusion in NATO would resolve this limbo; unless given reason to do otherwise, the alliance would reach out to Russia, thereby exposing it to the democratizing and pacifying effects of integration – just as it did to Germany in the 1950s and Central European states in the last two decades. NATO would be back in business as Europe’s primary provider of collective security and would have a new raison d’être: the completion of a pacific pan-European community.

Second, Russia’s gradual integration into NATO would revitalize the transatlantic link by making Europe the strong geopolitical partner that the United States urgently seeks, which is of particular
importance given how slowly the EU has been moving on matters of defense. A bipartisan consensus now exists in Washington in favor of a more unitary and militarily capable Europe – raising risks to the transatlantic link if Europe fails to rise to the occasion. The Lisbon Treaty entered into force in late 2009, bringing about institutional reforms that have the potential to give the EU more collective and muscular foreign and defense policies. Nonetheless, even under the most optimistic scenarios, Europe is likely to make only halting progress in aggregating its defense capabilities.

Russia can help Europe address its strategic shortfall. The country has over one million active duty forces and would dramatically strengthen Europe’s geopolitical heft were it to be integrated into NATO, thereby consolidating the transatlantic link. NATO would admittedly have to proceed carefully on the sensitive matters of sharing intelligence and technology. But surely such issues can be effectively addressed if doing so would significantly augment the military strength of NATO and the security of the Euro-Atlantic community.

Third, Russia’s integration into NATO would enable Georgia, Ukraine, and other CIS members to join the alliance without provoking a crisis with Moscow. According to the Russian political scientists Sergei Karaganov and Timofei Bordachev, the admission of Georgia and Ukraine to NATO would increase “the risk of a conflict with unforeseeable consequences.” Stopping the enlargement of NATO averts this problem, but leaves unanswered the question of how to integrate Russia and its neighbors into a unitary Euro-Atlantic order. As Andrew Monaghan of the NATO Defense College notes, “even if enlargement stops, Russia remains excluded from Euro-Atlantic mechanisms.”

The solution to this dilemma is for Georgia, Ukraine, and other CIS members to join a NATO in which Russia is already, or is soon to be, a member, ensuring that their entry would cause little, if any, geopolitical tension. More generally, if membership in the CIS remains separate from membership in NATO, Europe’s east and west will be subjected to indefinite geopolitical division and persistent jockeying over zones of influence. In contrast, if NATO opens its doors to members of the CIS, such dividing lines and the competition that accompanies them will likely fade away. A precedent is already in
place for this evolution: all CIS members already cooperate with NATO through the Partnership for Peace program and Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

Fourth, building a pan-European security order around NATO would ensure that the alliance remains in control of the evolution of the Euro-Atlantic space. Alternative options, such as turning to the OSCE or fashioning a new structure, would devolve power to other institutions – one of the main reasons why NATO members have reacted with little enthusiasm to Moscow’s proposal for a European security treaty. Their reaction may be justified, but so, too, is Moscow’s own pique at NATO for ignoring its proposal, especially considering that the alliance has not come up with credible counteroffers. Opening NATO to Russia and other CIS members represents just such a counteroffer – and one that would enable NATO to stay at the center of the game.

Finally, Russia’s inclusion in NATO would help the Euro-Atlantic community focus its attention beyond its own neighborhood. To be sure, there is plenty of unfinished business in Europe itself, including in the Balkans and Caucasus. But the collective interests of the states that occupy the geographic zone that runs from Vancouver to Vladivostock are increasingly affected by developments that are global in character, such as the rise of emerging powers, terrorism, nuclear proliferation, climate change, cyberattacks, and international crime.

Unlike most of the United States’ traditional partners in Europe, which tend to be Eurocentric in their strategic orientation, Russia has broader geopolitical horizons. Moscow is an important player in negotiations with North Korea and Iran over their nuclear programs, and wields considerable influence in Beijing. Russia is one of the world’s major energy suppliers. It is also a key player in the United Nations, G8, and other multilateral institutions. One of the primary challenges facing the West is increasing the influence of emerging powers in multilateral institutions. Russia, as one of the BRIC countries, can assist the Euro-Atlantic community as it seeks to make the necessary adjustments, including expanding the UN Security Council and consolidating the transformation of the G8 into the G20. Indeed, in June 2009 Russia hosted in Yekaterinburg the first BRIC summit,
suggesting that Moscow can help shape the West’s intensifying interactions with emerging powers.

Including Russia in NATO thus promises to have positive spillover effects well beyond Europe. NATO membership for Russia could both complete the project of building a Euro-Atlantic community at peace and help prepare that community for the multipolar and politically diverse world of the future.

The Objections

The prospect of Russia’s inclusion in NATO elicits four obvious objections: Russian membership would bring the fox into the henhouse; it would dilute the alliance and hamper solidarity; it would compromise the alliance’s core values by admitting a member that has not yet consolidated democratic rule; and it would alienate China by extending NATO to its borders.

To be sure, NATO would run a strategic risk by bringing Russia into an alliance that, for the moment, is still intended to hedge against a potential Russian threat. But NATO is actually running a greater strategic risk by excluding Russia from the Euro-Atlantic order. And as long as it proceeds prudently, NATO can minimize the dangers involved in embracing Russia.

For starters, the process would move slowly and deliberately. NATO would begin by making clear that it welcomes Russian membership – a move intended to signal benign intent. Just as the allure of membership helped induce the countries of Central Europe to pursue political and military reforms, the prospect of joining NATO would expose Russia to the incentives and socializing norms that might change its politics and its policies. At a minimum, the West’s leverage in Moscow would be enhanced, and more contact between NATO officials and their Russian counterparts would help reduce mistrust. Cooperation could be tested on many different fronts, including arms control and nonproliferation, missile defense, military exercises, peacekeeping, joint naval operations to combat piracy or drug trafficking, and cyber-security. Such initiatives would not only enhance mutual confidence between NATO members and Russia, but also provide NATO plenty of time to gauge whether Moscow is willing to deepen cooperation and channel its power toward common ends.
There is, of course, no guarantee that Russia would reciprocate NATO’s overture and adopt domestic and foreign policies consistent with eventual membership. But NATO’s courtship of Russia would hardly be irreversible. Were Russia to take advantage of NATO’s open door to thwart the alliance – blocking decision making, stoking internal divisions within NATO, continuing to pursue coercive behavior in its neighborhood – the outreach to Moscow would quickly come to an end. NATO would readily veer away from providing collective security across Europe and return to providing collective defense against Russia.

As for the potential of Russian membership to compromise NATO’s efficacy and solidarity, it is true that the alliance’s dilution unquestionably increases in step with the size and diversity of membership. If by 2025 NATO includes Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, and a handful of other CIS members, it will be headed toward having some forty members of remarkably diverse sizes, levels of wealth, and military capabilities. But is an alliance of forty countries that different from one of thirty? The reality is that the current NATO of twenty-eight members has already been substantially diluted by its size and diversity. Recent summits have witnessed major differences over the question of enlargement to include Georgia and Ukraine. Alliance members are divided over the merits of recognizing Kosovo. In Afghanistan, to its credit, NATO has been carrying a heavy burden. But member states are taking on quite different levels of responsibility and risk, and the Dutch pulled out in the summer of 2010. NATO is already a multi-tiered alliance in which some countries take on much heavier burdens than others.

As a consequence, bringing Russia into the alliance would only advance institutional changes that are already taking place. The automaticity and solidarity of collective defense are giving way to the contingent and looser character of commitments to collective security. Although the checkered performance of the League of Nations and other collective-security institutions provides cause for concern about this transformation, NATO’s transformation is a matter of necessity, not choice. It can remain a traditional alliance focused on territorial defense – and gradually slip into geopolitical irrelevance. Or it can become a broader political-military union focused on advancing
the collective security of the Euro-Atlantic space – and secure its centrality for the foreseeable future.

In this respect, NATO needs to address its outmoded reliance on decision making by consensus, which could become a recipe for paralysis. Precisely because its members have such a wide array of interests, fears, and capabilities, the alliance is more likely to take effective action through coalitions of the willing, not by unanimous consent. For similar reasons, provisions may be necessary to isolate or suspend the privileges of recalcitrant members. Accordingly, NATO should move toward a more flexible system of decision making. Russian membership would help drive home the importance of updating NATO's institutions and procedures.

Should Russia join NATO, Moscow would likely oppose any such move away from unanimous decision making. Moscow jealously guards its veto in the UN Security Council and insists on decision by consensus in the OSCE. Its draft of a European security treaty envisages a forum in which decisions “shall be taken by consensus.” Nonetheless, Russia, just like current NATO members, will have to get used to a more complicated strategic landscape, in which coalitions of the willing and more flexible systems of decision making are likely to be essential for timely action.

It is true that admitting Russia and other CIS members to NATO would likely bring into the alliance countries that are not yet consolidated democracies. Russia may well move in a democratic direction in the years ahead – especially if helped along by deepening ties to the Euro-Atlantic community. But should democratization proceed in Russia, it would surely move slowly, confronting NATO with a timing problem. For reasons of strategic necessity, NATO needs to reach out to Russia sooner rather than later; locating Russia's place in the Euro-Atlantic space is an urgent issue. If NATO proceeds with Russian accession in a timely fashion, however, it will probably face the prospect of admitting Russia before it is fully democratic.

Is it feasible to admit a nondemocratic state to NATO? Doing so would certainly contravene the principles of “democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law” enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty. Moreover, during the three waves of enlargement that have taken place since the end of the Cold War (in 1999, 2004, 2009), the alliance
stipulated that new entrants not only had to be democratic but also had to have a market economy, treat minorities fairly, and be committed to peacefully resolving disputes – none of which is exactly Russia’s strong suit.

Were NATO to admit Russia, however, it would not be the first time a non-democracy joined the alliance. Portugal was an original signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty in 1949 but was not a democracy until 1974. Greece and Turkey were both admitted in the first round of enlargement, in 1952, but in the following years experienced political instability, coups, and military rule. In all three of these cases, admission was justified on strategic grounds. Even official NATO documents acknowledge that early rounds of enlargement “took place during the Cold War, when strategic considerations were at the forefront of decision-making.”

Dan Reiter of Emory University similarly notes that, “During the Cold War, NATO was focused more on maintaining allied unity in the face of the Soviet threat than on democratizing its members.”

Keeping the Soviet Union out of the West during the Cold War was certainly of greater strategic urgency than is bringing Russia in today. But the potential payoff of finally anchoring Russia in the Euro-Atlantic space would be considerable. On a wide range of first-order issues, partnership with Russia is of paramount importance. Indeed, bringing Russia into NATO would contribute at least as much to Euro-Atlantic security today as did membership for Greece and Turkey when they were admitted. If strategic considerations warranted their membership, even as non-democracies, then surely the same applies for Russia today.

Moreover, Portugal, Greece, and Turkey proved to be steady NATO allies. Indeed, democracies and non-democracies have often teamed up to good effect. The United States and the Soviet Union were reliable partners during World War II. Currently, the sheikdoms of the Persian Gulf are some of the United States’ closest allies – even though they are among the world’s most illiberal regimes. Although all of NATO’s current members are democracies, some, such as Bulgaria and Romania, have been falling prey to rampant corruption. The United States, in 2008, ardently backed putting Georgia on the road to NATO membership just after its president, Mikheil Saakashvili, had violently
suppressed anti-government demonstrators and shut down opposition media outlets. If Washington is prepared to cut corners to get Georgia into NATO, then it should certainly do the same for Russia, a country of considerably more strategic importance. Since regime type is not a good predictor of foreign policy behavior, NATO would be wise to choose its partners on the basis of their conduct of foreign policy, not just the character of their domestic institutions.

As for China’s potential reaction to Russian membership in NATO, Beijing would obviously take full notice of the extension of NATO’s frontier to the border of China. But Beijing may well view such a development as a net positive, not a strategic threat. A NATO that includes Russia would be a transformed NATO – one that focuses much more heavily on collective security rather than collective defense. Moreover, Beijing would be right to calculate that if Russia remains excluded from the Euro-Atlantic order, it is likely to be a more troublesome player – one that seeks to compensate for its isolation from Europe by flexing its muscles in its Eurasian neighborhood. In contrast, should Russia end up anchored in NATO, Moscow would pursue a more predictable and benign statecraft. Just as Germany’s neighbors were reassured by its integration into NATO during the early Cold War, so too may Beijing ultimately welcome Russia’s embrace in the binding and bounding institutions of the Euro-Atlantic order.

The Work Plan

A three-phase process would enable NATO to move with prudence and deliberation toward Russia’s inclusion in the alliance. During the first phase, NATO members and Russia would deepen and expand concrete areas of strategic cooperation. The vehicles would be multilateral (such as NATO-Russia, EU-Russia, or coalitions of the willing) and bilateral (such as U.S.-Russia or Germany-Russia). Indeed, Russia is already cooperating with NATO members on many different fronts, including arms control, nonproliferation, and cyber-security. Greater collaboration would serve to enhance mutual confidence between NATO members and Russia. It would also enable NATO and Russia to probe each other’s intentions and test the strength of a mutual commitment to strategic partnership.
The second phase would entail the establishment of a NATO-EU-Russia consultative council. This three-way forum, which would meet on a regular basis, would provide Russia greater equity in shaping its ties to the Euro-Atlantic order. In contrast to the NATO-Russia Council, where NATO’s twenty-eight members meet with Russia as a second-class citizen, Russia would be an equal in this tripartite forum. The council would have the additional benefit of coordinating EU and NATO efforts to deepen engagement with Russia. The EU is one of the primary institutions shaping the evolution of the strategic and political landscape in Europe’s east and must therefore work hand-in-hand with NATO. The new institutions established by the Lisbon Treaty promise to enhance the EU’s ability to do so.

Assuming that concrete cooperation between NATO and Russia advances, the third phase would entail a Membership Action Plan for Russia and the beginning of negotiations over accession. NATO should be careful to avoid appearing to dictate to Russia the precise political and military reforms it would have to embrace to prepare for membership; otherwise, Russian resentment may overwhelm Moscow’s inclination to reciprocate NATO’s overtures. If handled tactfully, however, accession negotiations should provide Russia strong incentives to undertake political and military reforms, and would provide NATO more leverage than it has ever had in shaping the evolution of Russian institutions and foreign policy.

The Hurdles at Home

Managing the politics of bringing Russia into NATO would be at least as difficult as managing the policy. The hurdles are high: every current NATO country must ratify the admission of new members. And NATO enlargement has already proved capable of stirring up passionate domestic debate. Indeed, the post-Cold War strategic confrontation between NATO and Russia is in no small part the product of domestic pressures. The salience of NATO enlargement among voters of Central European descent helped build political momentum behind expansion in the 1990s, as well as during the more recent rounds of enlargement. Suspicion of Russia has lingered among U.S. foreign policy elites and politicians, particularly on Capitol Hill, predisposing them to view Russian foreign policy in an aggressive light.
(This bias was on full display at the outbreak of the Russian-Georgian war in 2008, when, despite considerable evidence that Georgia had initiated the hostilities, the dominant view in the United States was that Russia acted as an unprovoked aggressor.)

In Central Europe, elites and electorates would be staunchly opposed to Russia’s integration into NATO. Opposition would be much less potent in Western Europe, where the publics, in part due to matters of energy dependence, tend to appreciate the need for a strategic outreach to Russia. In Russia itself, where Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and, to a lesser extent, President Dmitry Medvedev, have helped ratchet up anti-Western populism, considering NATO membership would require a stark reversal of course.

In the United States, the Obama administration has already been working hard to “reset” relations with Moscow, a policy that, if successful in continuing to advance cooperation, promises to help dampen residual suspicion of Russia among the U.S. foreign policy establishment. Congress is likely to be the most difficult stumbling block inasmuch as it could stand in the way of the ratification of arms control treaties and oppose other initiatives needed to promote mutual confidence between Washington and Moscow. Even though concrete strategic cooperation between NATO and Russia would help change attitudes on Capitol Hill, convincing Congress of the merits of Russian membership in NATO would be an uphill battle.

Altering attitudes toward Russia in Central Europe would be even more challenging. For starters, NATO should balance a strategic outreach to Russia with reassurance to its members in Central Europe that it remains committed to their territorial defense. In this respect, the alliance should undertake the planning and exercises needed to reaffirm the integrity of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, which provides for collective defense. NATO should also make clear to Central Europeans that its outreach to Russia would take place with eyes wide open and would come to a halt should Russia consistently engage in behavior indicative of predatory or exploitative intent.

Central European leaders have their own hard work to do in toning down the Russophobia that continues to animate politics in the region. They need to impress upon electorates that Russia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic order is a far better investment in Central
Europe’s security than tanks traps, fighter jets, and Patriot missiles. Whether or not it is protected by NATO, Central Europe will remain a dangerous neighborhood if Russia remains estranged from the West. If Russia enters NATO and Europe’s dividing lines dim, then the security problems in the region will be dramatically diminished. From this perspective, the countries of Central Europe have a stronger interest than any other NATO members in the consolidation of a Euro-Atlantic order that includes Russia. Yes, it is difficult to imagine that Poland will ratify Russian membership in NATO anytime soon. But so, too, was it hard to imagine in the late 1940s that Germany’s neighbors would before long agree to its inclusion in the European Economic Community and NATO.

Russian leaders will have to start laying the groundwork for a new domestic discourse about NATO. Rather than portraying the alliance as an offensive instrument intent on encircling Russia, Moscow should openly discuss the possibility that NATO could serve as the umbrella for a pan-European security structure. Sustained cooperation between NATO members and Russia would help improve perceptions of NATO among Russian elites and the Russian public. Russia has long sought inclusion in international institutions, such as the G8 and the World Trade Organization, in order to increase its sway and symbolize its integration into the international community. Indeed, Putin, during his early days as president, asserted that he “would not rule out” Russian membership in NATO “on condition that Russia’s interests are going to be taken into account, [and] if Russia becomes a full-fledged partner.” It is now time to hold Putin to his word.
Endnotes

1  An earlier version of this essay appeared as “NATO’s Final Frontier: Why Russia Should Join the Atlantic Alliance,” Foreign Affairs, vol. 89, no. 3 (May/June 2010).
6  By means of comparison, German and French active duty forces number 285,000 and 260,000 respectively. In 2008, the French and Russian defense budgets were both around $60 billion, illustrating that the size of Russia’s military outpaces its quality and armament.
12  At a summit meeting in Deauville, France in October 2010, the leaders of France, Germany, and Russia discussed a proposal to establish a consultative council between the EU and Russia. In light of the importance of coordinating EU and NATO efforts to engage Russia, a NATO-EU-Russia council makes more sense. See “Russian Wants to Formalize Relation with E.U.,” October 17, 2010, New York Times, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/18/world/europe/18iht-germany.html?_r=1&src=twr&scp=2&sq=deauville&st=cse.
15  See http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/693526.stm
Previous publications in this series:

1-2011 Bringing War Home - The use of Provincial Reconstruction Teams by Norway and Denmark to construct strategic narratives for their domestic audiences

Ida Dommersnes

5-2010 Sjøforsvarets historie 1960-2010 - En kortversjon

Roald Gjelsten

4-2010 The Tragedy of small power politics

Asle Toje

3-2010 Integrasjon med grenser eller grenseløs integrasjon?

Bjørn Innset

2-2010 Reconciling the nuclear renaissance with disarmament

Alex Bolfrass and Kelsey Hartigan

1-2010 Approaching the comprehensive approach

Dag Kristiansen

3-2009 Turkish Neo-Ottomanism: A turn to the Middle East?

Einar Wigen

2-2009 20 år etter muren

John Otto Johansen

1-2009 Between Reluctance and Necessity: The Utility of Military force in Humanitarian and Development Operations

Robert Egnell

5-2008 Civil-military relations: No Room for Humanitarianism in comprehensive approaches

Stephen Cornish and Marit Glad

4-2008 Tsjekkoslovakia - 40 år etter

Jahn Otto Johansen

3-2008 20 år etter muren: NATO - Moldova/Israel/Ukraine

Dr. Gabanyi, Dr. Kogan, Dr. Begma & Igor Taburets

2-2008 Hearts, minds and guns: the Role of the Armed Forces in the 26st Century

UK Chief of Defence Staff, Air Chief Marshal Sir Jock Stirrup

1-2008 Krav til fremtidens forsvar sett fra unge officerers ståsted

Tomas Bakke, Kadett Krigsskolen

7-2007 Threats to Progress of Democracy and Long Term Stability in Georgia

Liana Jervalidze

6-2007 Militærmaktens særtrekk i moderne konflikter

Div. forfattere

5-2007 NATO foran toppmøtet i Riga

Ambassadør Kai Eide

4-2007 Russian energy policy and its challenge to western policy makers

Keith Smith

3-2007 Defence as the Best Offense? Missile Defences and Nuclear Non-proliferation

Lars Van Dassen and Morten Bremer Mærli

2-2007 Energy and Identity - Readings of Shtokman and NEPG

Jakub M. Godzimirski

1-2007 NATO and the Dialogue of Civilisations

Christopher Cooker

1-2007 NATO planlegger å være relevant - også i fremtiden

Ivar Engan

7-2006 Russian energy policy and its challenge to western policy makers

Ole Gunnar Austvik

6-2006 Nordisk sikkerhet

Tanne Huitfeldt

5-2006 Russian energy policy and its challenge to western policy makers

Keith Smith

4-2006 Oil and gas in The High North - A perspective from Norway

Ole Gunnar Austvik

2-2006 EUs sikkerhetspolitische rolle i internasjonal politikk

Jan Erik Grindheim

1-2006 Fra “Kursk” til “Priz”: Ubåtredning som internasjonalt samarbeidsområde

Kristian Åtland

9-2005 Nordisk sikkerhet

Tanne Huitfeldt
8-2005  NATO going global or almost
   The Current Revolution in the Nature of Conflict
   The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee. Alv Jakob Fostervoll, Jamie Shea, Chris Donnelly

7-2005  Galileo - et europeisk globalt navigasjonssystem Hans Morten Synstnes

6-2005  Coming home to Europe? Central and Eastern Europe in EU and NATO
   Eastern Europe's silent revolution Jahn Otto Johansen og Nils Morten Udgaard

5-2005  Det tyske eksperiment Jahn Otto Johansen

4-2005  The naval Dilemma of the early 26st Century Hans Olav Stensli

3-2005  What are the strategic challenges faced by Norway in the years to come?
   In the new types of conflict we face, how to define and defend humanitarian space?
   The Norwegian Atlantic Committee's 40th annual Leangkollen Conference. the Nobel Institute. Jørgen Kosmo and Jonas Gahr Støre

2-2005  The New Geopolitics of the North? Jakub M. Godzimirski

1-2005  “Global Partnership”, russiske ubåter og brukt kjernebrensel – internasjonal koordinering av oppgaver og bidrag
   Christina Chuen og Ole Reistad

6-2004  Oljens geopolitikk og krigene ved Persiagulfen Ole Gunnar Austvik

5-2004  Coping with Vulnerabilities and the Modern society Jan Hovden

4-2004  Forsvarsperspektiver i nord Jørgen Berggrav

3-2004  NATO og de transatlantiske motsetninger
   -Kortviktige og langsiktige perspektiver Jahn Otto Johansen

2-2004  The Role of a Humanitarian Organization in an International Security Operation -
   a Basis for Cooperation or a Basis for Separation? Jonas Gahr Støre

1-2004  If Effective Transatlantic Security Cooperation is the Question, Is NATO the Answer? Stanley R. Sloan

6-2003  Frankrike og Irak-krigen: Bare i prinsippenes navn? Frank Orban

5-2003  Norwegian Priorities for the Extended G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction
   Asle Toje and Morten Bremer Mærlø, NUPI

4-2003  Saddam’s Power Base Major John Andreas Olsen

3-2003  Terroristbemjempelse og folkeretten Terje Lund

2-2003  Men and Machines in Modern Warfare General Charles A. Horner (ret.)

1-2003  The Real Weapon of Mass Destruction: Nuclear, biological and chemical warfare in the era of terrorism and “rogue” states
   Morten Bremer Mærlø